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WITH WHOM ARE WE AT WAR?

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD

SECOND in importance only to the question raised by the short editorial in the last number of *Philosophy*: Why are we at War? is that on which there is at present a lively discussion going on in *The Times* and elsewhere under the title of "German Rulers and People": With Whom are we at War? On one point there is no difference of opinion: we are at war with the blood- and crime-stained group that, with Hitler at their head, hold the reins of government. Difference begins when it is asked what share the people of Germany as a whole has in their crimes. On the one side are those who hold that, as you cannot, in historical words, "bring an indictment against a whole nation," neither can you be at war with a whole people, and that the main problem we have before us is the discovery of the means to appeal to the intelligence and hearts of the mass of the nation in order to enlist it against its Government as a common enemy. On the other side are those who quote the equally historic words that "every nation gets the kind of government it deserves," from which "it follows that it deserves no immunity for the acts of the Government by which it chooses, or allows itself, to be governed."[1] This argument is reinforced first by a general philosophy of war as the "natural" order of things from which man is only gradually emerging into an exceptional and precarious condition of peace; and secondly, with regard to Germany in particular, that "the lust for dominance through force is, and will be for generations, at the root of the German character." The importance of the issue as thus stated requires no emphasis.

[1] Sir John Risley in *The Times*, 23rd November.

Need the readers of *Philosophy* be reminded that few now believe the thesis of Huxley's famous Romanes Lecture that drew a deep division between the law of Nature "red in tooth and claw" and Moral law, and found in the Cosmic process "no sort of relation to moral ends." As regards human nature, common language refutes any such division. "Humane conduct," as one correspondent quotes from Erasmus, that great humanist, "is conduct worthy of the nature of man, acting his proper part in civil society." The Germans, it is true, have had a long drilling in a military tradition, extending to remote times, glorified by Frederick the Great, carried on into the nineteenth and the twentieth century by such writers as Clausewitz, Treitschke, and Bernhardi, and now being drummed into the rising generation at school and on parade. It is true further that the mistakes that were made at Versailles and that continued to poison the "Peace" seemed to justify a recurrence to this tradition as a means of rectifying them. It is true finally that the Germans as a race, like other races, have peculiarities of temperament which, whether "natural" or inured by habit, mark them out as different from others, not least from ourselves, in their leaning to the two extremes of home life with its immediate interests, and things of universal interest such as music and literature, science and philosophy, leaving comparatively little room for the intense interest in politics and the intense love of liberty that mark the Anglo-Saxon race. But we have yet to learn that as a race they are made of a different clay from ourselves or have inherited a more ample dose of original sin. Given favourable circumstances, such as those that momentarily showed themselves at the revolution after the four-years war in a large section of the nation, or given again strong religious faith, such as we have to-day in a large section of the Church, and the great traits of human nature are ready to assert themselves in Germany as elsewhere. The very barbarity which the Hitler régime has to exert to maintain itself in existence is a witness to the power of the forces which it has to keep in obedience. Even apart from the more heroic manifestation just referred to, one hears everywhere of latent resentment against its cruelty when this is brought home by the sufferings of neighbours and kinsmen. The present writer has received word since the outbreak of the war from a member of the original Nazi Party, just before he crossed the frontier on his way back from an autumn holiday, conveying warm greetings and containing no trace of national hatred, and from refugees in this country witnessing to the kindly feeling of simple folk towards them before their escape. Even although we can bring ourselves to believe that in the German youth this natural disposition has been wholly overlaid by an education, instinct with racial pride and hatred of ourselves, this has had as yet not more

than six years to operate and there are still multitudes of the older generation who are immune from its intoxication.

From all this two things bearing on our question seem to emerge. In the first place there is no *a priori* reason drawn from the supposed universality of the struggle for existence to hold that man is by nature a wolf to man or that periods of rest from war are an uncommon and unnatural, perhaps unhealthy, feature of civilization. In the second place, with reference to the German nation, we have to recognize that the problem is not so simple as the title "Rulers and People" seems to suggest. The German people, like others, is a complex entity. Besides the distinction between rulers and people, there are in the people itself several clearly distinguishable groups. There is that already mentioned of the younger generation (calculated at over ten millions) who since 1933 have had the Nazi mentality drilled into them almost from infancy—surely the greatest crime of all, reminding one of the judgment on those that kill the soul. This leaves some sixty or seventy millions of the older generation; but these again constitute no homogeneous mass. There is among them a large group who, sharing with the section of the Church already mentioned the liberalism of the modern outlook on the world, either openly or in their hearts, while condoning much in Hitler's early policy of restitution were as deeply shocked as we were when, on those fateful Ides of March, he flagrantly departed from it and started on one of open enslavement of weaker nations around him. Finally we have the large remainder of the population who in 1933 were beyond school age, but, docile and credulous, having constantly dinned into them what the Führer has done for the nation in leading it up out of the house of bondage, kept in ignorance of more recent events and of the reactions both of the Eastern and Western world to them, resent the hardships that the swollen war machine imposes upon them but acquiesce with more or less conviction in what is told them as to where the blame rests.

Returning to our questions: with regard to the first of these groups the present Government and its minions, there is, as said at the beginning, no difference of opinion. We are at irreconcilable war with its personnel and policy, pledged by every code of honour not to rest till it is totally discredited not only in the eyes of the world (it is that already) but in the eyes of the nation it has misled. The accusation brought against us by other dictators of want of commonsense realism in not being willing to recognize *faits accomplis* only shows the gulf that separates their mentality from our own, and a total insensitiveness to any law higher than that of force that makes them ready to accept Cain's question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" as the last word of wisdom in human affairs.

Leaving for a moment the second of the above groups and coming to the third, we certainly have no cause to be at war with it. On the contrary, we count it among our most valuable allies—however little it can do for us or (worse pity still) however little we can do for it.

It is in connection with the second and the fourth groups that any real question rises. If, in the field and behind the lines, we have to include the ten millions of young men and women among those with whom we are at war, it is the saddest of necessities, and only brings home to us from another side the organic unity that pervades human society: "The parents have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge." But some comfort comes from the realization that the same organic unity pervades the soul of the individual. It is not with the whole soul of each that we are at war, but with that superficial part of it which has fallen a victim to the temptation of "thinking with its blood" and not with its brains. With regard to this more than with regard to the other groups, it is a war of emancipation from an evil spirit. It may rend them in the process of being exorcised; but this way lies salvation for the coming generation, the other way lies only madness.

How far can the remaining part of the population be said to share, I will not say the guilt, but the inhuman psychology of the Government, its minions, and the youths whom they have indoctrinated with it? I would be deceiving myself and any readers I may have if I said that I believed it possible to give any simple answer to the question. As the correspondence already referred to has shown, there may be wide legitimate differences of opinion upon it, if for no other reason than that among these many millions also there may be degrees of inhumanity. What I believe is possible (and to say so was my object in writing these lines) is to disabuse our minds of all theoretic fallacies as to the existence of any essential differences between the fundamental traits of human nature as it exists in Germans and in ourselves, and to place our faith in the possibility of opening a way, at the end of the war, for these traits to reassert themselves in a co-operative effort in the interest, if not of what Kant called "perpetual peace," at least of a state of European society in which war will come to be regarded, not as what Clausewitz called it, "the continuation of politics," but as the failure of politics. For my own part, if we win the war (as we cannot but believe that we shall), I should despair of our also being able to win the peace, if we are not prepared to answer our question in the spirit, though with a slightly altered meaning, of the advice which Virgil puts into the mouth of Anchises in addressing the Roman conqueror:

Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY[1]

PROFESSOR H. H. PRICE

THE subject of my lecture is an appropriate one for several reasons. The first is purely chronological. Hume's first and greatest work, the *Treatise of Human Nature*, was published in 1739, two hundred years ago. Its illustrious author was then quite unknown in the world, and as he tells us himself the book "fell dead-born from the press." But by the end of the eighteenth century its reputation was securely established, and it has long been regarded as one of the masterpieces of European thought, and as the classical statement of the Empiricist Philosophy. It is true that, like other classics, it has had its ups and downs. During the Absolute Idealist period, which ended early in the present century, Hume was the great bogey-man, and the duty of all self-respecting philosophers was to refute him. In our own day things are different. Empiricism, despite many obituary notices, is very much alive again. And this time it is in close alliance with Natural Science, and has equipped itself with all the technique of modern Symbolic Logic; it is more vigorous in construction and more formidable in criticism than it has ever been before. Consequently Hume is no longer the bogey-man. People now read the *Treatise* not as an awful warning, but as a source of stimulus and illumination. Incidentally, we can now enjoy his admirable style without any qualms. It is no longer thought that if a philosopher writes in clear and entertaining English, what he writes must therefore be either superficial or false. We regard obscurity and turgidity as demerits, not as signs of profound thinking. Moreover, we have learned to appreciate the eighteenth century, of which Hume was one of the most characteristic products. We are glad to refresh ourselves in the cool and sane atmosphere of an age which was in so many ways more civilized than our own. Nor are we in the least shocked by Hume's ironical and "de-bunking" tone. We go to philosophers for instruction; not, as some of our predecessors did, for edification.

But, you may say, we are supposed to be discussing the *permanent* significance of Hume's philosophy. The Empiricism of to-day, you may suggest, is only a fashion, and will pass like other philo-

[1] A lecture delivered before the British Institute of Philosophy on 14th February, 1939.

sophical fashions. Even so, I think it will leave its permanent mark upon our thought. It has given a very nasty blow to at least some forms of nonsense, from which they will not easily recover. Moreover, even though it does pass, it will certainly revive again one day in some form or other. For it seems to be one of the permanent tendencies of the human mind. I may add that it is one which is peculiarly congenial to the inhabitants of these islands: a fact which no teacher of Philosophy in this country can fail to notice, whether he approves of it or not.

I should like to add another thing, if I may stray a little outside my province. I think that there is some connection, both historically and psychologically, between Empiricism and Liberalism: I mean Liberalism in that large and non-party sense in which we say that the English-speaking countries have a liberal tradition.[1] Empiricism is hostile to humbug and obscurity, to the dogmatic and authoritative mood, to every sort of *ipse dixit*. It does not conceive of Philosophy as a heresy-hunt, directed against those who stray from the truths once for all delivered to our fathers; but as a free and co-operative inquiry, where anyone may put forward any hypothesis he likes, new or old, provided it makes sense. The same live-and-let-live principles, the same dislike of humbug and of the *ipse dixit* sort of authority, are characteristic of Liberalism too. I think that these two attitudes have many of their psychological roots in common, and that where the one prevails in the world, there is some likelihood that the other will prevail as well: not at once, for the movement of philosophical opinion is quick and the movement of political opinion slow, but within a generation or so. If I am right, the present revival of Empiricism is a very good augury for the future of our sadly shaken civilization. The totalitarian political systems which now afflict the continent of Europe are the long-delayed effects of the philosophies of Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, or at least of the psychological attitudes which underlay those philosophies. If Empiricist philosophy is strong to-day, perhaps we may hope to see a vigorous revival of Liberalism the day after to-morrow.

The matter may be put in another light (if I may continue straying), a light which may be more congenial to some of you. Ever since the beginning of this century Western Europe has been suffering from a failure of nerve, intensified by the war of 1914. It has ceased to know what it wants or where it is going. Now if we look back to our past, we find that the one outstanding achievement of Western Europe since the Renaissance has been Natural Science. In the other great departments of human activity we have been

[1] Hume himself was a Tory in politics, chiefly because he disliked the humbug of the Whig historians. But I think he was a Liberal in my large sense, like most of the great eighteenth-century thinkers.

surpassed by other peoples and other ages: in literature by Ancient Greece, in the pictorial and plastic arts by the China of the T'ang and Sung dynasties, in religion by our own medieval predecessors, and still more by the Semites and the Hindus. But Natural Science is our own peculiar creation, for which posterity will always thank us. In this and in this alone Western Europe has no rival in the whole of recorded history. If our civilization is to be put on its feet again, if it is to see where it stands and know where it wants to go, the scientific attitude, which is at the heart of it, must be brought into full self-consciousness. And this is just what Empiricism, especially the most recent form of it, is trying to do. Perhaps it will not succeed, though it has more hopes of success than the old Empiricism, because it does full justice to the part played by Mathematics. But whether it succeeds or fails, the task it has undertaken is of no small importance for the whole future of our civilization. A really clear and adequate formulation of the scientific attitude, the characteristic and distinctive outlook of Western Europeans at their best, may do very much to save us from that inward collapse and intellectual defeatism which is far more perilous to us in the long run than all the political and economic troubles of our age.

Perhaps you will say "These considerations may show that Empiricism is beneficial to mankind: or at any rate that it is a social phenomenon of great importance, whether beneficial or not. But these are matters for the historian and the sociologist. Our business as philosophers is to ask whether Empiricism is *true.*"

I cannot but agree with the spirit of this objection, which recalls me from an over-long digression. But I do not think that the question is quite so simple as that. Neither Empiricism, nor yet its historical rival Rationalism, ought to be considered as a cut-and-dried body of doctrines to be accepted or rejected. The difference between them is rather a difference of attitude and starting-point, of programme and method. An Empiricist is just a man who makes it his aim to be as empirical as he can; he tries to push empirical analyses and explanations as far as ever they will go—or a little farther. A Rationalist is a man who tries to push *a priori* reasoning and non-empirical analysis as far as they will go. He puts off the appeal to experience to the last possible moment—or even a little later. But no sane Empiricist would deny that there are *a priori* propositions —certainly Hume would not—though some Empiricists may call them "tautologies." And no sane Rationalist would deny that there are empirical propositions, though he may not think much of them. Thus the right question to ask is not "Is Empiricism true?" but rather "How far will the Empiricist programme take us?"

But it is time to turn from these very general reflections. I have

been trying to show, somewhat obliquely I am afraid, that Hume's contribution to the Empiricist philosophy is worthy of careful and sympathetic study, and never more so than to-day. But what exactly *was* his contribution? Let us now consider this question in some detail.

I turn first to Hume's formulation of the Empiricist programme. As everyone knows, he formulated it in the dictum "All ideas are derived from impressions." Other people, especially writers on the history of Philosophy, have preferred another formulation: "All knowledge is derived from experience." I think that this second way of stating the programme is much inferior to Hume's own. It is not merely knowledge that is in question, but all the states of mind (including erroneous ones) into which "ideas" enter: belief, disbelief, taking for granted, assuming, supposing—not to speak of volitional and emotional attitudes. Let us look at the matter from the side of language. Take any sentence you like, whether it be a statement or a command or the expression of a wish, and consider any general symbol which occurs in it. (Obviously any sentence must contain at least one general symbol.) Then Hume says: "Show me the impression, the sensible or introspectible datum or set of data, from which your general symbol derives its meaning. If you cannot, I put it to you that your sentence is nonsense, and that you don't know what you are talking about."

Or rather, that is what he is trying to say, but he does not get it quite clear. The word "idea" is one of the most pernicious sources of confusion in the whole history of Philosophy. Among other things it may mean either a concept or a mental image. Hume was perhaps the cleverest man who ever used the idea-terminology, but even he cannot escape its baneful influence. There are places where he quite explicitly identifies ideas with mental images. But the doctrine that all *mental images* are derived from impressions, whether it is true or false, is not of the faintest philosophical interest. It is a psychological doctrine, not a philosophical one, and it has nothing whatever to do with Empiricism. Empiricism is a theory about concepts, not about images. Or since the word "concept" has a misleadingly subjectivist flavour, let us say instead that it is a theory about our consciousness of universals. It holds that every universal which we are aware of has *either* been abstracted from experienced instances, *or* is wholly definable in terms of universals so abstracted. (*Redness* would illustrate the one alternative, *sea-serpentness* the other.)

But perhaps even this formulation of the Empiricist Principle is not wholly adequate. It is so to speak too historical. The difficulty lies in the use of the perfect tense, "has been abstracted." There is the same difficulty in Hume's own phrase "derived from," which

has a like reference to the past. For how should I set about to test the adequacy of the Principle? I should have to rummage among my memories, and try to recall the sensed or introspected particulars from which I abstracted such and such a universal which I am now aware of. But obviously I couldn't recall them in most cases. We are all familiar with the universal *greenness*, but who of us can recall the particulars from which he originally abstracted it? But even if we could recall them, it would not mend the matter. For if this is the right way to test the Empiricist Principle, it follows that the Principle—whether it survives the test or does not—can be nothing but an inductive generalization, like the proposition about the origin of images which I mentioned a few minutes ago; and it too would be a psychological proposition, not a philosophical one.

Let us therefore try to reformulate the Principle yet again. And let us start once more from the side of language, from the consideration of general symbols. First we will divide general symbols into primary and secondary. A secondary general symbol is one which is definable in terms of other general symbols; for example, *murder* is defined in terms of *malice*, *killing*, and *human being*, and *dragon* is defined in terms of *winged*, *fire-breathing*, and *reptile*. Eventually, perhaps after a number of stages, we shall come down to certain primary general symbols which cannot be defined in terms of other symbols at all. Now we can re-state the Empiricist Principle. It says that the meaning of a primary general symbol is given, and can only be given, by pointing to a particular which we are acquainted with in sense or introspection, and saying "*That* is an instance of what I mean by the symbol 'so-and-so'." This process of giving the meaning of a general symbol by pointing to an experienced instance is sometimes called *ostensive* definition. So we may say that since secondary general symbols are reducible to primary ones, *all* our understanding of general symbols, according to Empiricists, rests ultimately on ostensive definition. To put it more vulgarly, the contention is not so much that all our "ideas" are derived from impressions, but rather that they all have to be *cashed* by means of impressions. If any idea is not thus cashable, it is a pseudo-idea; that is to say, the symbol which purports to stand for it does not really stand for anything, though of course this symbol may still be a very useful instrument for arousing emotions in one's hearers or oneself. It is like a forged cheque, which you can't exchange for coin of the realm. We may suspect that there are many such pseudo-ideas which pass current in the world, and that some of them have played no small part both in philosophy and in politics.

This then is the Empiricist programme: to show that all ideas are ultimately cashable by impressions, that is by data which we

are acquainted with in sense or introspection, or in any other sort of acquaintance there may be.[1] This programme works admirably up to a point. There are a very great many general symbols whose meaning rests ultimately on ostensive definition. But on the face of it there do appear to be certain ideas, perfectly familiar to all of us, which are *not* thus cashable by reference to impressions. The three which interested Hume most are the ideas of Self, Material Thing, and Cause. The Self is not a datum of introspection (an impression of reflection, in Hume's language); introspection reveals only mental events, not the Ego which is supposed to own them. Again a material thing is not a datum of sense: it is not a patch of colour, or a sound, or a smell, or a tactual pressure, nor even a series composed of these. And the causal relation is not a sense-given relation, like the relation of sequence within a single specious present, or the relation of right to left within a single visual field. What is Hume to do about these recalcitrant ideas? He must try to show that though they are not themselves directly cashable by reference to impressions, yet they are reducible to others which are so. In the terminology used above, he must try to show that these words are *secondary* symbols (like *murder* or *dragon*): that though they cannot themselves be ostensively defined, they are analysable in terms of other symbols which *can* be ostensively defined. For example, if *cause* is definable in terms of *constant conjunction* and *confident expectation*, *constancy* and *conjunction* might be cashable by reference to sense-experience, *confidence* and *expectation* by reference to introspection.

But Hume also formulates his problem in another way which is in some respects more instructive. He says that he is going to analyse our knowledge of *matters of fact*. The firm and clear distinction he drew between knowledge of matters of fact and other sorts of knowledge is one of his most important services to Philosophy. It is true that once the distinction is drawn, it seems perfectly obvious. But all the great philosophical discoveries are discoveries of the obvious. The great philosopher is the man who first formulates in clear and unmistakable words, and in as general a form as possible, something which has always been hazily familiar to everybody in particular instances. If we say afterwards that he has told us nothing new, that only shows how right he was.

What then does Hume mean by "knowledge of matters of fact"? He uses the phrase in a somewhat technical sense, which requires explanation. His view is this: There are two spheres, and only

[1] Hume, and most modern Empiricists with him, assumes that there are no other sorts of acquaintance besides these two. It is difficult to see what reasons they can have. Mystical experience, for example, might be—or include—a kind of acquaintance which is neither sensory nor introspective.

two, in which certainty in the strict sense is accessible to us. (1) There is the sphere of the sensibly and introspectively evident. There are some facts about present sense-impressions and present introspectible data which are obvious or manifest. When I am acquainted with a red patch, it is obvious or evident to me that it *is* red. (2) There is also the sphere of what Hume calls *relations of ideas*, which includes the truths of Arithmetic, Algebra, and (I suppose) Formal Logic.[1] For instance, we know by this sort of knowledge that $2 + 2 = 4$, or that if A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C. Hume says very little about knowledge of the relations of ideas, though he fully admits its importance. His view seems to be that such knowledge is *analytic*: e.g. in order to see that $2 + 2 = 4$ you only have to know what the symbols "2," "4," "+," and "=" mean (or in the other example what the phrase "greater than" means). Once you do know what they mean, you can see that the denial of "$2 + 2 = 4$" would be a *contradiction.* I say that this seems to be his view; though here as elsewhere he is greatly encumbered by the idea-terminology, and the consequent confusion between concepts and images.

About these two sorts of knowledge—knowledge of the sensibly evident and the analytic knowledge of Pure Mathematics—Hume sees no difficulty. But obviously we *claim* to know a great deal more besides. We claim to know a great many facts about particular material objects, observed and unobserved, and about particular selves; and among these facts there are some which concern necessary connections, as Hume calls them. Whenever we say that A causes B, we are asserting a necessary connection between them. Nor is this the only case of necessary connection, though it is the most striking. There are also necessary connections in the way of concomitance, for example between the proportion of Natural Kinds: because this is lead, it is therefore heavy and has a low melting point, or because this is iron it is therefore magnetizable.

This kind of knowledge—concerned with selves, material objects, and necessary connections—is what Hume calls knowledge of matters of fact. And he points out that such knowledge (if indeed it deserves the name) is not reducible to either of the other two sorts. Certainly not to knowledge of the relation of ideas. These matter-of-fact propositions are synthetic, not analytic. The cat in the next room is actually a black and white cat. But if it had not been black and white, but yellow or tabby, or for that matter green or purple or transparent, there would have been no *contradiction.* As Hume puts it, "the contrary of any matter of fact is still possible." Indeed, if there had been no cat there at all, and no next room, there would

[1] In the *Inquiry* Hume adds (Euclidean) geometry to the list, though in the *Treatise* he says that it is empirical.

have been no contradiction. Again, if water had *not* frozen at 32° F. or if iron had *not* been magnetizable, there would have been no contradiction. The statement that water does not freeze at 32° F. is utterly unlike the sentence "2 + 2 = 5." It is false, but it is not in the least absurd or self-contradictory. These matter-of-fact propositions are what Leibniz called *contingent*. We cannot say that they are true in all possible worlds (as the propositions of Arithmetic are, or of Formal Logic) but only that they happen to be true in this one.

But perhaps our knowledge of matters of fact is somehow reducible to our acquaintance with impressions? It is difficult to see how it can be, though of course it presupposes such acquaintance. Necessary connections, whether of the causal sort or the concomitance sort, are not apprehended by the senses, as colours or sounds are, or again as relations like "above" and "to the right of" are. It might perhaps be thought that material objects are apprehended by sensation. But are they? When I make a statement about an observed material object, I am not *merely* recording certain sense-impressions actually sensed by myself or other people, even though this is part of what I am doing. By "a cat" or any other material-object word or phrase I mean an entity which is a three-dimensional spatial whole, which persists continuously through a long period of time, which remains in being even when observed by no one, which possesses permanent causal properties, and is public to an indefinitely large number of observers. Whereas our sense-impressions are occasional and fragmentary, discontinuous in time, spatially incomplete (for they lack back and insides) and moreover it is commonly supposed that each of them is private to the mind which senses it. Thus though the impressions which I sense might perhaps be constituents of the cat, they cannot possibly be its *sole* constituents. They are altogether too few and too fragmentary. And we think that there are many material objects which are never observed at all. Clearly *they* cannot be composed of sense-impressions.

Thus in both cases—necessary-connection propositions and material-object propositions—we have what may be called a transcendence of the given. We are not just asserting that such-and-such impressions are or have been sensed. We are extrapolating beyond them.

Lastly, we turn to the third class of matter-of-fact propositions, those about the Self. Here the difficulty, as Hume sees it, is rather that we assert something actually *inconsistent* with the given. We attribute to the Self an identity which the data of introspection not only fail to warrant, but actually contradict. Our data are a series of diverse psychical events, which "succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement." When

I look into myself as carefully as I can, all I seem to find is that flux of numerically and qualitatively diverse particulars. What reason can there possibly be for saying that I am "the same" person as I was yesterday or last year? Yet each of us does say this, with the utmost confidence.

We may notice in passing that the last two problems—those of material-object propositions and personal-identity propositions—are not so different as they look. In material-object statements too we have identification of the diverse, as Hume himself insists. When I come back to my rooms after two hours' absence, I say that the things I now see are "the same" as those I saw before I went out. But the sense-impressions are by no means the same as they were. The ones I sensed two hours earlier are in any case past and gone by now; the ones I sense now are new ones, even if exactly like them. In technical language, they are at least *numerically* different from the old ones. And nearly always they are qualitatively different as well. For instance, the light has altered since I went away, and where I previously saw reds, greens, and browns, I now see nothing but varying shades of grey.

Conversely, though Hume is not so clear about this, statements about the self, no less than statements about material objects, commit us to a transcendence of the given. We think that the self remains in being even when we are not introspecting anything, as in dreamless sleep. Even when we are awake, we think that processes go on in it which we are not introspectively aware of, just as we think that the cupboard has a back and insides which we are not seeing as well as the front which we do see. Moreover—and this he does explicitly point at—we are quite sure that our self has had a continuous existence through a long period of years, even though there are enormous stretches of our history about which we can now remember nothing.[1]

We have now considered two ways in which Hume formulates his problem. On the one hand he asks what is the source of certain ideas, namely those of material object, self, and necessary connection? What impression do they arise from? (As we saw, he ought rather to have asked, what are the impressions by which these ideas are cashed? to what *ostensively definable* symbols can the symbols "material object," "self," and "necessary connection" be reduced?) On the other hand, he asks what is the nature of our knowledge of matters of fact. We can now see that these two formulations are partially equivalent. A matter-of-fact proposition is precisely a proposition into which one or more of these three puzzling ideas enters. Nevertheless, the second formulation of the

[1] *Treatise*, Book I, part iv, section 6 (Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 262. Everyman edition, pp. 247–8).

problem goes farther than the first. For in asking what knowledge of matters of fact is, we are not merely asking for an analysis of certain puzzling ideas: we are also asking what justification we have for using them. Suppose for instance that we have given a satisfactory account of what the phrase "necessary connection" *means*, by reducing it somehow to other symbols which are ostensively definable; we have still to inquire what right we have to assert that there are in fact any necessary connections. No doubt in ordinary life, and in science too, people would claim to know that there are many necessary connections. But how seriously are we to take this claim? What the plain man or the plain scientist calls knowledge is perhaps no more than confident belief. Indeed, we are already entitled to suspect that it is no more. For this alleged knowledge is neither sensibly evident, like our knowledge of present impressions, not yet is it analytic, like our knowledge of the relations of ideas. And if after all it *is* only confident belief, we shall have to ask what reasons, if any, we have for it.

We must now consider how Hume solves the problem he has set himself. He has three puzzling ideas on his hands—those of necessary connection, material-thinghood, and personal identity. And he analyses all three by appealing to something which he calls *the imagination*, and more particularly by reference to certain processes which he calls "transitions of the imagination" or "passages of the mind." I am afraid I have far too little time to discuss all three analyses in detail. I shall therefore confine myself to the most celebrated of the three, the analysis of Necessary Connection. But I do so with reluctance, even though this is the one to which Hume himself attached most importance. It would be a great mistake to suppose, as perhaps some do, that his discussion of Necessary Connection is his only valuable contribution to Philosophy. On the contrary, his remarks about Personal Identity are not less original and not less penetrating; while the discussion of Material-Thinghood in the section called *Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses*,"[1] though it has attracted much less attention than other parts of his work, is in some ways the most brilliant thing he ever wrote.

I turn then to Hume's analysis of Necessary Connection. Let me remind you once again that the sort of necessary connection here in question is the *synthetic* sort, as between flame and heat, or between the different observable properties of lead. It is not the analytic or formally certifiable sort, such as we have in the necessary propositions of Arithmetic, Algebra, and Formal Logic. It is not guaranteed by the Law of Contradiction; the denial of it results in no logical inconsistency whatever. If a necessary connection of this

[1] *Treatise*, Book I, part iv, section 2.

synthetic sort is to be established, it must be established somehow or other by observation.

But now the difficulty is that we never *observe* a necessary connection at all. The most we can observe is constant conjunction: whether in the form of repeated sequence, as of heat upon flame or motion upon impact; or in the form of repeated concomitance, as of the visible properties of iron with its magnetizability. Then where does the idea of necessary connection come from? From what impression is it derived? (Or, as he should have asked, by what impression is it cashed?) Is there perhaps no such impression at all? Yes, Hume replies, there is; but you are looking for it in the wrong place. The right place to look for it is not among the data of *sensation*. You will never find it there; you will only find constant conjunction. The right place to look for it is in the observing mind, among the data of introspection. Suppose you observe the character B accompanying the character A in a number of instances, and never observe an exception. Then, when you observe A again, you will find your mind passing to the expectation of B, its usual attendant. This passage of the mind is something actually felt, though seldom attended to; it is a datum of introspection, or in Hume's language an impression of reflection. And it is this felt passage which is the source of the idea of necessary connection. Accordingly Hume says that "necessity exists in the mind, not in objects." All that the "objects" (that is, the data of sensation) have done is to get you into the habit of expecting B whenever A is presented. "Necessary Connection" then is not the name of any objective bond, but for a habit of imaginative transition: the felt transitions from the observation of A to the expectation of B, or even (as we must now add) from the bare thought of A to the thought of B, its usual attendant. It is what one might call *of-course-ness*. When we say "this is lead, so of course it is heavy," "when flame occurs, then of course heat occurs as well," the phrase *of course* denotes exactly that felt passage of the mind which Hume is thinking of.[1]

This theory seems at first sight exceedingly paradoxical, as Hume himself predicted that it would. And we are not surprised to find that some people have thought he was denying the existence of necessary connections. But this is a gross error, much like the error of those who think that Berkeley is denying the existence of chairs and tables. If Hume had failed to find any impression from which the idea of necessary connection could be derived (or by which it could be cashed) then certainly he would have been obliged to conclude that the phrase "necessary connection" is a *vox nihili*, standing

[1] *Treatise*, Book I, part iii, section 14. "Of the idea of necessary connection." Cf. also the parallel discussion in section 7 of the *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

for nothing at all. And then, if you like, he would have been denying the existence of necessary connections, or more strictly he would have been saying that it was nonsense—not even false—to talk about them; though even so, the analytic or formally certifiable necessitations of Arithmetic and Formal Logic would have remained perfectly intact. But actually he does not fail to find the requisite impression: only he finds it in an unexpected place, among the impressions of reflection (introspection), not among the impressions of sensation.

In short, he is not abolishing Necessary Connection; he is analysing it. The analysis he gives is a peculiar one, certainly, and perhaps it is entirely mistaken. But still it *is* an analysis, and we cannot judge it fairly if we suppose that it is something else.

Let us now consider certain objections to it. First there is one which he himself discusses.[1] It may be thought that the idea of necessary connection arises from (or rather is cashed by) our own experience of voluntary action, and is then transformed, by some shaky sort of analogy, to the physical world. Do we not observe directly that a volition to move a certain limb *necessitates* the movement of that limb? Or if this is claiming too much, do we not observe that the volition is a *part* of what necessitates the movement of the limb, even if other factors, e.g. processes in the brain, nerves, and muscles, enter in as well?

In spite of all that has been said on this matter since, Hume's own answer seems to be substantially right. Even in this case, he says, you apprehend nothing but constant conjunction. It is only experience, not any kind of direct insight, which tells you what movement will follow what volition. It is true that you may be aware of a feeling of muscular strain or effort—"animal nisus" as he picturesquely calls it in the *Inquiry*. But after all, this is only a peculiar sort of sense impression; it differs from others in belonging to the sphere of organic or bodily sensation, but it is a sense-impression still. And scrutinize it as you will, you will find no "mysterious bond" between it and the bodily movement which follows it. (Nor will you find any between volition plus muscular strain on the one hand, and bodily movement on the other.) You will only find constant conjunction, together with a tendency to expect that when one of the *conjuncta* occurs, the other will occur as well. And as a matter of fact the conjunction is *not* perfectly constant either; it is only exceedingly frequent. There is such a thing as paralysis, when the volition and the effort occur, but the expected movement fails to follow.

This answer, I said, seems to me substantially right. Still there

[1] In the Appendix to the *Treatise* (Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 632) and more fully in section 7 of the *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

is something which Hume has left out, and until it is dragged into the light of day, his answer leaves us with a feeling of discomfort. There *is* something peculiar about the experience of voluntary movement. That something is not the felt muscular strain, which is sometimes present and sometimes not; many voluntary movements are so easy that we feel no discernible strain or effort in executing them. It is something belonging to another sphere altogether, something epistemological, and in respect of it a man's own volitions do differ from all the other causes or cause-factors which he knows of. A volition is not, so to speak, a mere push of the will. It has an intellectual side; it includes the *entertaining of a proposition*. I am sitting in my chair writing this lecture, and I decide to get up and use the telephone, which is on a table three yards away. This decision of mine includes a piece of thinking, the entertaining of the complex proposition "I get up, walk to the table, and use the telephone." And when I act, I bring into being a series of events which *verify* this proposition. Thus between the volition and the result there *is* a further relation over and above that of mere sequence in time. There is a relation of verification. Every voluntary act, or rather every successful one, is among other things the verification of a proposition entertained in the act of making the volition. But although Hume failed to mention this factor in the situation, the omission does not spoil his argument. For *this* relation between volition and result is not the "mysterious bond" which he was searching for and could not find. My entertaining of p does not entail the occurrence of events which make p true. To suppose that it does is precisely what Freud calls "the fantasy of infantile omnipotence." We merely find by experience that when we will p to be verified, the situation does often alter in such a way that p *is* verified.

Another and more interesting objection to Hume's analysis of Necessary Connection is this. Suppose that during the year 1937 B is repeatedly observed to follow A, and never fails to follow it. We shall then form the habit of passing from the observation of A to the expectation of B, and from the thought of A to the thought of B. Once the habit has been formed, it will follow from Hume's definition that A is the cause of B. The two conditions laid down by him have been fulfilled. A is constantly conjoined with B, and there is a felt passage from A to B in the mind of observers. But now suppose that in 1938 A again occurs repeatedly, but is *not* followed by B. The constant conjunction has ceased, the habit of mental transition is broken; and so, according to Hume's definition, A does *not* cause B any longer. Thus A was the cause of B in 1937, but in 1938 it was not.

Now of course common sense has a simple solution to the difficulty. It says "You were making a mistake in 1937. You did believe

that *A* was the cause of *B*, but really it never caused *B* at all. No doubt they did go together a great many times, but that was just a coincidence."

But Hume himself, it may seem, cannot accept this simple solution. His definition of "cause" obliges him to say that *A* really *did* cause *B* in 1937. For, by hypothesis, there *was* the required constant conjunction, and there *was* the required habit of expectation: and that is all that causation is.

There is a somewhat similar difficulty about *unobserved* causal connections (and unobserved connections of the con-comitance sort). We all think that *A* can cause *B* even though nobody has observed either of them. But if nobody has observed them, the required mental habit can never be set up. And therefore although *A* is repeatedly followed by *B*, and never occurs without it, they cannot be causally connected according to Hume's definition of "cause." There is a like difficulty with regard to constant conjunction which you observe but I do not. In relation to you they will be causal connections (or necessary concomitances, as the case may be); in relation to me they will not. In relation to Sir Isaac Newton, the motions of the moon cause the tide to rise; but in relation to other people, who have not noticed this conjunction and so have not acquired this particular habit of expectation, they will not cause the tide to rise. It is all very well to say as Hume does that "necessity exists in the mind, not in objects." The trouble is that according to him necessity may exist in one mind and not in another.

In short, his account of Necessary Connection seems altogether too subjectivist to be tolerable. It seems that according to him a necessary-connection statement *cannot be mistaken.* For if we have the required feeling of of-course-ness, we do have it; if we haven't, we haven't; and there is no more to be said. And if we have this feeling, we must know that we have it. So when Jones says that *A* causes *B*, or is necessarily concomitant with it, his statement must be true: unless he is just lying about his own state of mind, in which case the words he utters misrepresent the knowledge which he has. But is it not obvious that people constantly make false causal statements, and make them in good faith?

To all this I think Hume would reply: I admit that these consequences follow my definition, but I do not see any difficulty in them. They only seem paradoxical, he would say, because we start with a twofold prejudice: the prejudice, first, that causality and necessary concomitance are wholly objective relations; and secondly the prejudice that causal statements and necessary-concomitance statements are simple, whereas in fact they are complex. Statements about *conjunctions* can be mistaken, and you may easily believe that a certain conjunction is constant when actually it is not. Also

there are doubtless many constant conjunctions which some people have observed and others not, and many more which no one has observed at all. When the plain man insists that there are objective causal sequences which go on regardless of people's feelings and habits, he really only means that there are objective *constant conjunctions*; and here (Hume would say) I thoroughly agree with him. We must, however, remember that every causal statement, and every necessary-concomitance statement, is complex, not simple. Every such statement contains two parts, which must not be confused: an objective part concerning constant conjunctions, and a psychological or introspective part concerning the speaker's habits of expectation. The latter part cannot be mistaken, unless the speaker is just lying about his own feelings. But the former part can be, and frequently is; we very often think that conjunctions are constant when in fact they are not. Again, when we experience the felt passage from an observed event to the expectation of its usual attendant, the expectation to which we pass may very well be mistaken. Nevertheless, we do pass to it; and as we pass, we do feel the feeling of which "necessity" is the name (the feeling of of-course-ness). And in so far as our statement merely says that we feel it, it is perfectly true.

But I think that in spite of this explanation we shall still be dissatisfied with Hume's analysis. We might restate our difficulty as follows: It would appear that if Hume is right all statements of necessary connection are partly autobiographical. When I say that *A* is necessarily connected with *B*, I shall be telling you something about myself, as when I tell you that I like custard with prunes. But *are* necessary-connection statements autobiographical at all? When I say that flame causes heat or iron is magnetizable, am I talking about myself? Am I revealing to the world a slice of my own mental history? Is this even a part of what I am doing? It seems clear that it is not.

Now we might try to get Hume out of this difficulty by drawing a distinction which he never draws himself, though he often needs it, in his Ethics not less than his Theory of Knowledge: I mean the distinction between the *autobiographical* and the *expressive*. I will explain it by an example. If I say on a snowy afternoon "it is an abominably cold day," I am not *saying* that I am disgusted at the weather. If I were, you could appropriately answer "No, you're not" or "So am I." On the other hand, neither am I attributing an objective characteristic of abominability to the day, a characteristic additional to its coldness, darkness, etc. What I am doing is to *express* or *give vent to* my feelings of disgust. It is much as if I had said "it is a very cold day. Boo!"

Now it might be that statements of necessary connection, though

certainly not autobiographical, are nevertheless in part expressive. They may *give vent to* a certain feeling of mine, though they do not *state* that I have it. When I utter the sentence "*A* causes *B*" or "*A* is necessarily concomitant with *B*," all I am *stating* is perhaps that *A* is constantly conjoined with *B*; and perhaps what I am doing over and above this is just to express or give vent to the feeling of of-course-ness which I have when I pass, as I habitually do, from the observation of *A* to the confident expectation of *B*. Thus it will be true that I am not *talking about* myself; I am only talking about *A* and *B*. But my sentence will also have an expressive function, of expressing or giving vent to the state of mind which I am in.

I think that this revised version of Hume's theory is an improvement, and one which he would himself be ready to accept. It is really quite clear that whatever causal statements may be, they are not pieces of autobiography. Nevertheless, it would not be quite fair to make him say that the word "necessary" functions in exactly the same way as words like "abominable" and "disgusting," which are purely and simply expressions of feeling. The word "necessary," he would hold, is not *merely* expressive of a feeling. It expresses something more complicated. It does give expression to a felt passage of the mind. But we must remember that what we pass *to* is a belief, something which is either true or false. Thus our causal sentence really does *three* things, not two: (1) it *states* that *A* has been constantly conjoined with *B*, which is true or false; (2) further, it *states* that when *A* occurs again, *B* will occur again, which is likewise true or false; (3) it *expresses* the comfortable feeling of of-course-ness which we have when we pass, as we habitually do, from the one of these beliefs to the other. Finally we must notice that the belief to which we pass is not necessarily a *prediction*. Frequently enough it is; having seen many strikings of matches, always followed by flames, I predict that if you strike this match a flame will again follow. But it may be what Mr. Ryle calls a *retrodiction*, as when I infer from marks seen in the snow that a cat has passed that way. And sometimes it is a *juxtadiction* (if I may invent a queer word myself); as when on touching the top of a table in the dark I believe that there are legs now underneath it which I do not feel or see, or on seeing the back of your head I divine the presence of eyes, nose, and mouth now existing on the far side of it.

So much for Hume's analysis of Necessary Connection. What has it done for us? We can see that at least it has completely transformed the question with which we began. We began by supposing that the problem was to analyse a puzzling sort of objective relation (a "mysterious bond" as Hume calls it) somehow subsisting between events or characters *in rerum naturâ*. But it turns out at the end that the only objective relation in the case is constant conjunction.

And this conclusion seems unavoidable, once Hume has pointed out to us that the necessary-connection statements in question—causal laws and necessary-concomitance statements—are *synthetic*, and quite different from the *formally-certifiable* statements of necessary connection which we find in Pure Mathematics or Formal Logic.

The problem which we now have on our hands is quite a different one: how, if at all, we can *justify* the transition which we make from observed conjunctions to unobserved ones, the "of-course-ful" transition of which the word "necessary" is the expression? As a matter of psychological fact, we all do make this transition. If we believe that A has been conjoined with B in many observed instances and has never been observed without it, then we all do proceed to believe that any other A you please is also conjoined with B. But what *right* have we to make this jump? Given that flame has been constantly conjoined with heat throughout our experience, is this a *reason* for believing that other instances of flame—past, present, or future—are likewise conjoined with heat?

This is the Problem of Induction; and Hume was the first person to see the extraordinary difficulty of it. By what right do we generalize from experience? Have we any right to do it at all? The process of forming an inductive generalization may be regarded as an inference, of which the premise is the observed constant conjunction and the generalization is the conclusion. But what sort of inference is it? The more we reflect on it, the less we like the look of it. This much at least is perfectly obvious—once Hume has pointed it out—that an inference of this kind can never amount to proof. It is utterly unlike the kind of inference which occurs in Pure Mathematics. For if it were like that, the assertion of the premise (the observed constant conjunction) would be *logically inconsistent* with the denial of the conclusion. But when we generalize from experience, there is no logical inconsistency whatever in admitting the premise and denying the conclusion. If we write p for the premise of our inductive inference and q for the conclusion, the conjoint assertion *p and not-q* is not a contradiction. Even though flame has been accompanied by heat five million times and never once found without it, it may still perfectly well be false that *all* flames are accompanied by heat. Indeed, the matter is worse than this. It may still be false that *most* flames (more than not) are accompanied by heat. It may even be false that *any* other flame, even one, is accompanied by heat. The hitherto observed conjunction, though frequent and exceptionless, might still be just a very long run of coincidences; anyone who says it is may outrage common sense, but he has broken no rule of Logic. Thus the difficulty is not to show how generalizations from experience can be certain. It is obvious that they can never be, however confident we may feel about them. The difficulty is to show how

they can be probable; that is, how they be *rendered probable by* the evidence of observed conjunctions.

But perhaps it may seem to some of you that Hume is making a fuss about nothing. When we observe an event E, you may say, we know beforehand that it must have had *some* cause. It may be very difficult to discover just what the cause was. But, you may say, we also know beforehand that the cause must lie somewhere or other in the immediately preceding block of events. So we proceed to look for further instances in which E occurs. And we find that the block of events which precedes it is somewhat different in different cases. In this way we can hope to *eliminate* all those events which are causally irrelevant to the occurrence of E, until we are left with that one event—it may be simple or it may be very complex—which *is* the cause of E. It is rather like hunting for the needle in the haystack. You do it by taking away the haystack, stalk by stalk, until there is nothing left but the needle.

This is the familiar eliminative notion of induction, with its axiom the Law of Universal Causation. I have stated it in its traditional form, which still lingers in our text-books, though in recent times it has been improved out of all knowledge by such writers as Mr. J. M. Keynes and Professor Broad.[1] I do not at all want to deny its importance, any more than Hume himself did (witness the section in the *Treatise* on *Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects*).[2] Elimination does play a very prominent part both in scientific inquiry and in the pre-scientific inquiries of ordinary daily life. But I want to say, as Hume himself would, that the eliminative process is secondary, not primary: subordinate, not fundamental. There are two points to which I would like to draw attention. The first is that according to the eliminative conception of it, induction is not really inductive at all. For it contains no process of generalization. We are supposed to know beforehand that some one of a certain group of generalizations is true. Our only task is to discover which one it is. And this we do by disproving all the members of the group except one. The whole process is just a disjunctive argument, and it is perfectly deductive throughout. It is enabled to be so, because even one negative instance suffices to *disprove* a universal proposition, although no number of positive instances will prove it. That is the point of the Baconian maxim *Major est vis instantiae negativae.*

My second remark concerns the axiom upon which the whole eliminative procedure is based, the axiom "every event has a cause." What are we to say of this? Is it self-evident? So far as I can see,

[1] J. M. Keynes, *Treatise on Probability*, part iii. C. D. Broad, *Mind*, 1918 and 1920.

[2] *Treatise*, Book I, part iii, section 15.

Hume is right in saying that it is not. (We may notice that the advocates of Free Will agree with him in this, though they disagree with him in everything else.) The axiom may indeed seem self-evident, because of a terminological muddle. It is possible to use the word "event" in accordance with its derivation from the Latin verb *evenire*, to mean something which "comes out of" something else—a consequence, or a result. And of course it is a tautology to say that every *result* has a cause, and "coming out of" is only a metaphor for "being caused by." But we have then to ask, as Hume does, whether it is self-evident that every *beginning of existence* has a cause. Is it self-evident that every beginning of existence *is* an "event" in this queer though etymological sense; that every beginning of existence does "come out of" something else, in the sense of resulting from it? So far as I can see, it is not self-evident Then is it demonstrable from self-evident premises? I can only say that Hume's refutation of the alleged demonstrations which were current in his own time seems to me absolutely conclusive.[1] and I do not know of any better ones which have been produced since.

But even if this axiom were self-evident or demonstrable, it would not do the trick. In any case it will only apply to causal inductions. It has nothing whatever to say to inductions concerning concomitances. But even if all inductions were causal, which they are not, this axiom would be insufficient. Eliminative induction is a process of selecting one hypothesis out of a list of hypotheses: you establish one of them by knocking out all its competitors. But you cannot do this unless the list is of *finite* length. If it is infinite, you will get no nearer to establishing your law, no matter how many competitors you knock out. And you must *know*, or at least have reason to believe, that the list is finite. Even this is not enough. The list must be not merely finite, but *manageably* finite; the eliminative process must be one which falls within human capacities. We therefore need a further axiom to limit the number of permissible hypotheses[2]: we have to assume that, given any character C, the number of characters which are *capable* of being necessarily connected with C is finite, and manageably finite. Let us call this assumption the Axiom of Limitation. Will anyone contend that *this* axiom is either self-evident or demonstrable? Perhaps, however, that is asking too much. Perhaps we only require that this axiom should have a finite probability, not that it should be certain. But

[1] In the section called *Why a cause is always necessary* (*Treatise*, Book I, part iii, section 3). Hume examines three alleged demonstrations—those of Hobbes, of Locke, and of Clarke—and shows that all three are circular.

[2] The need for this axiom seems to have been first discovered by Mr. Keynes and Professor Broad. I have stated it in my own way, and in a simplified and inaccurate form. Mr. Keynes's name for it is "The Principle of Limited Independent Variety."

is it *self-evident* that it does have a finite probability? I think anyone who says this is self-evident is a very rash man. And anyone who offered to demonstrate it from self-evident premises would be equally rash. If we do attribute a considerable probability to the Axiom of Limitation, at least in some fields of inquiry, the reason surely is that experience supports it. In short, it is itself an induction, reached not by elimination (for elimination presupposes it) but by direct generalization from experience.

But perhaps there may still be some who will deny that Hume's problem is a genuine one. They may say that Hume is pretending to be ignorant of a fundamental fact which he, like everyone else, knows perfectly well: the fact namely that *the Universe is rational.* This, we shall be told, is a necessary presupposition of all our thinking. And what leads Hume into this wilful and almost wicked blindness? Every second-year undergraduate knows the answer: it is the *atomistic* character of his philosophy.

These two contentions, that the universe is rational and that Hume is an atomist, are constantly repeated from one generation to another. They must have great emotive potency, for when we ask what they mean, we find that both of them are sheer muddles. Let us consider them in turn.

If we take it literally, the statement that the universe is rational is plainly false. Only a conscious being can literally be called rational, or irrational either, and the Universe is not a conscious being. Let us suppose, however, that "rational" here means "intelligible." Now of course it is obvious that the universe must be intelligible in *one* sense of the word "intelligible"; it must consist of objects which are instances of universals. This certainly is a presupposition of our thinking; for if objects did not instantiate universals, no proposition about any object could be true, or even false. Further, any universe which we can think about must be subject to the laws of Formal Logic. If the universe were such that p and not-p could both be true, then we certainly could not think about it. But what has all this got to do with induction? Absolutely nothing. Every entity in the universe might be an instance of one or more universals, and be subject to the laws of Formal Logic; and yet there might be no laws whatever with regard to the *co*-instantiation of universals—no laws whatever of the form "whenever there is an instance of A-ness there is also an instance of B-ness." And if there were none, the universe could still be thought about, and propositions would be true or false, but induction would be impossible. How can we tell *a priori* that our universe is not like that? We cannot. Indeed, we have good grounds for thinking that in some respects it *is* like that. For instance, there seem to be no rules with regard to the co-instan-

tiation of specific shapes with specific colours: no rules of the form "whatever is cherry-red is also circular," nor again of the form "all shrill sounds are followed by acrid smells."

Why then has this argument about the intelligibility of the universe appeared so conclusive to so many high-minded persons? Because they have mixed up this wide sense of the word "intelligible" with another and narrower sense, the sense in which it means "orderly" or "systematic." Now if the iniverse is intelligible in *this* sense of the word, then certainly induction is possible. For to say that "x is orderly" is just another and more noble-sounding way of saying that it is subject *not* just to the laws of Formal Logic but also to laws of the synthetic sort, laws of sequence or of concomitance: in short, to what we call *natural* laws, the laws which inductive reasoning seeks to establish. But what reason have we for thinking that the universe *is* intelligible in this narrower and more specific sense? That is precisely Hume's problem. And you do not advance one step towards the solution of it by pointing out that the universe is intelligible in the other and wider sense of instantiating universals and being subject to the laws of Formal Logic.

I now turn to the other contention, that Hume errs by being an Atomist. This is an even more extraordinary muddle, and I shall not attempt to unravel it in detail. I will simply ask, what is the positive alternative to Atomism? What do non-atomistic philosophers assert? I suppose they assert that what we are aware of is always a *continuum* of some sort, a continuous stream of events, or of presentations, or what not. Now I am not quite sure that Hume would have denied this, in so far as it is true. (It clearly needs some qualification. On the face of it, there is plenty of *dis*continuity in our experience as well; for instance, the stream of visual data is interrupted by blinking, and by intervals of sleep and other unconsciousness.) But whether he would have denied this continuity-doctrine or not, it is utterly irrelevant to the problem of induction. Let the world which we experience be as continuous as you please: let it be as continuous as M. Bergson would have it. Let us suppose that in the course of the continuum there are many stretches in which B succeeds upon A. Does this give us the right to conclude that if there is *another* stretch of the continuum which contains A, it will also contain B? Not in the least. Whatever follows upon A will have to follow upon it without a gap or break; nevertheless, it may perfectly well have a different successor each time. And the same applies equally obviously to concomitances. If there are stretches of the continuum where A and B occur together, the mere fact that it is a continuum does absolutely nothing to ensure that if A occurs in *other* (as yet unobserved)stretches B will be there as well. In short, there is no argument whatever from continuity to regularity or

lawfulness. The world might be perfectly continuous and yet perfectly lawless—that is, subject *only* to the Laws of Formal Logic. There is no argument either way. The world might be perfectly discontinuous, and yet as lawful as the most ardent Determinist could desire.

Why then has the charge of Atomism appeared so damaging? Because the word "atomism" has two quite different senses. An atomist is sometimes a man who denies *continuity*; but sometimes he is a man who denies not continuity but *connectedness*. These two denials are quite different and logically independent. There might be connections (i.e. lawful correlations) between items which were spatially, temporally, and qualitatively discrete. And in a world in which everything was continuous with everything else, there might be no connections at all. Accordingly since "atomism" may mean two quite different things, it has two positive opposites, not one. If the "-ism" terminology pleases, we may call them *continuism* on the one hand, *connectivism* on the other. Perhaps Hume did deny continuism. If so, he was wrong: since the world, or some parts of it, does display continuity. But if it is wrong to deny continuism, we cannot conclude that it is also wrong to deny connectivism, or at any rate to be doubtful about it. If "atomism" is equivalent to "anticonnectivism" it is still perfectly open to us to ask, Is not atomism a good thing? What is wrong with it?

I am afraid that these considerations have been tedious. But I hope that I have managed to convince you that the problem of Induction is a genuine one. I must now point out, however, that Hume himself did not see its full extent. There are the following defects in his formulation of it.

(1) He seems to have thought that all generalizations from experience are *universal* propositions—such as "all flame is accompanied by heat," or "no cows are carnivorous." But this is not true. There are also statistical generalizations, such as "the proportion of male to female births is approximately fifty-two to forty-eight" or "more than fifty per cent of Englishmen have dark hair." It would indeed be queer to describe these as statements of necessary connection; we need some wider phrase such as "reliable correlation." Nevertheless, they are certainly generalizations from experience, and they do raise the problem of Induction. Nor is it essential that the proportion be numerically formulated. If I say "most trains reach their destination safely," this too is a generalization from experience; and I use it to guide my conduct and to make predictions, though I certainly do not believe that *all* trains reach their destination safely. So too with the statement "influenza is sometimes fatal," which despite its purely historical appearance—

as if it merely summed up past observations—is in fact intended to apply to hitherto unobserved cases of influenza as well as to past ones. (We can see this if we translate it into the equivalent statement "influenza is a dangerous disease.")

We may notice in passing that this type of generalization does not fall under the Baconian maxim *major est vis instantiae negativae.* The occurrence of even one A which is not B does disprove the proposition that all A's are B. But the proposition that a penny falls heads in approximately fifty per cent of cases is not refuted by any finite "run" of tails. And the proposition that eighty-five per cent of swans are white would not be refuted if I found that all the swans in Regent's Park were black.

(2) Hume often seems to think that all inductive generalizations are causal; and those who make it their business to refute him nearly always think so. Certainly in the *Treatise* he first introduces the Problem of Induction in a causal context. But it is not true that all inductive generalizations are causal. Some concern concomitances, not sequences. I have already given examples. The most obvious are those concerning the properties of natural kinds, which are of the form "anything which has the properties A, B, C also has the property D"; for instance, anything which has the conjunction of visible and tangible properties connoted by the word "iron" also has the property of being magnetizable. This statement does assert a *dependence,* if you like, but the dependence does not involve sequence in time. In the same way, there are many statistical generalizations which concern concomitances, not sequences; e.g. "more than fifty per cent of Englishmen are dark-haired."

(3) The third defect is one I have mentioned already. Hume seems to have thought that an inductive generalization must be either certain or nothing. But, he asked himself, how can they be certain, since it is logically possible for them to be false although the premises (the observation-statements) from which we infer them are true? Now this is not the right way to put the problem. If we state it in this way, it is obviously insoluble. The right question to ask is, how can generalizations from experience have a finite probability, and how can this probability be increased by an increase in the number of favourable instances? This point may be put in another way, by reference to the reasonableness of beliefs. We should not ask "what right have we to believe inductive generalizations with absolute and complete assurance?" For it is obvious that we have none, as Hume himself has shown. We ought rather to ask "what right have we to rely upon them with some degree of confidence?" We may still have to confess in the end that we have none; but at least the prospect of a favourable answer is more promising.

(4) There is still another defect which I must mention, although

it concerns Hume's view of causation rather than his view of induction. He holds that every cause is spatially and temporally contiguous with its effect. Gravitational attraction and the interaction of mind and body are glaring examples to the contrary: for in both we have causation without spatial contiguity. Telepathy is another. Whether there can be causation without temporal contiguity—action at a distance in time—is a more difficult question.[1] Perhaps it would be wrong to call it causation. But why should there not be ultimate and irreducible regularities of sequence where the antecedent event is separated by an interval of time from the consequent, even if you refuse to call them causal? An Empiricist at any rate is in no position to rule out this suggestion *a priori*. He may maintain that there are in fact no such non-contiguous regularities, or that they are reducible to regularities of the ordinary kind. But if he does, he is in danger of having to postulate unverifiable entities (e.g. "unconscious" mental events) and this he will not like doing.

It is commonly thought, rightly in my opinion, that Hume's greatest service to Philosophy is his discovery of the Problem of Induction. No doubt scholars may find that he had been partly anticipated by others; but on this I will only remark, with Professor Whitehead, that "everything has been said before by someone who did not discover it." The defects which I have pointed out in Hume's formulation of the problem can easily be amended, without sacrificing any of his fundamental contentions, and they do not seriously diminish the magnitide of his achievement. If modern logicians have a rather clearer and fuller view of the problem than he had, it is because they stand on his shoulders. A very distinguished authority has recently expressed the suspicion that Hume was "not a great philosopher but only a very clever man." With all respect, I should like to suggest that the discovery of the Problem of Induction is one of the most important advances in the whole history of thought. And if the man who made it is not a great philosopher, I cannot think what philosophical greatness can be.

What solution does Hume offer to the problem which he has discovered? He seems to be in two minds about the matter. Sometimes he holds a purely sceptical view. He then says in effect that the problem is insoluble. It is a psychological fact that we all do make generalizations from experience, and cannot help doing so—as he puts it himself, it is "natural" to make them—but (he says) we have no justification for them whatever; again, we do all feel great confidence in many of these generalizations, but we have no right to feel any at all about any of them. I do not think it would be

[1] Cf. Mr. Russell on "Mnemic Causation" in *The Analysis of Mind*.

fair to say that according to this view induction is an *irrational* process, in the sense in which the committing of logical fallacies is irrational (or contra-rational if you like). The contention is rather that it is *non*-rational, like sleeping or breathing, something which falls outside the sphere of rationality altogether. "All our reasonings concerning causes and effects" [he should have said "all our inductive reasonings whether concerned with causation or not"] "are derived from nothing but custom . . . and belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature.[1] And again: "Nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel,[2]" where the "judgements" in question are predictions or retrodictions based upon inductive generalizations.

But though Hume is often a sceptic, and always enjoys calling himself one in order to shock his more dogmatic readers, I think there are at least traces in his work of another and more constructive solution of the problem. In this other mood, his view is not so much that induction *has* no justification but rather that it *needs* none. He seems to suggest that it is an autonomous form of thinking, having its own internal standards or norms, which are not reducible without remainder to the rules of deductive inference. We can ask whether a given *piece* of inductive inference accords with these standards, whether it was the right and proper one to make on the evidence which the thinker had before him. But provided that a given piece of inductive inference does accord with the inductive standards, there is no further question to ask. It would be meaningless to ask *again* whether it is a valid inference; you have already discovered that it *is* valid, that is, that it accords with the only standard by which inferences of that type can meaningfully be judged.

I do not say that Hume states his view at all clearly. But certainly he is very far from holding—as a consistent sceptic should—that there is nothing much to choose between science and superstition, good sense and silliness. On the contrary, he is prepared to admit, indeed to insist, that some transitions of the imagination are good and others bad; even though all alike are incapable of being justified by the canons of deductive logic (for in all of them alike the denial of the conclusion is logically consistent with the assertion of the premises), and even though all alike may in some sense be called "natural." There is a remarkable passage in the *Treatise* where he distinguishes between two types of imaginative transition, and two corresponding senses of the word "natural." He says: "I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary

[1] *Treatise*, Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 183; Everyman edition, p. 179.

[2] *Ibid.*, the same page, a little above.

transition from causes to effects and from effects to causes: and the principles which are changeable, weak, and irregular . . . . The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and reasonings, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful for the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observed only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy and the latter rejected."[1] (We must notice that the word "philosophy" in Hume's time included what we call "science.") He then proceeds to distinguish the two senses of the word "natural." "One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons *justly* and naturally; though that conclusion be derived from nothing but custom, which infixes and enlivens the idea of a human creature, on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. But one, who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too: but then it must be in the same sense that a malady is said to be natural."[2]

This passage makes it quite clear that Hume is as well aware as anyone of the difference between science and superstition, good sense and silliness. What is the difference? Whether we are scientific or silly, sane or mad, our inductive inferences are none of them demonstrative; the denial of our conclusion, whether it is a sensible or a silly one, is always logically consistent with the assertion of our premises. What then *is* the difference? I think it is this. The sensible or sane or scientifically minded man frames his generalizations, and consequently his predictions, retrodictions, and juxtadictions, in accordance with *observed constant conjunctions*. He says "All *A* is accompanied by *B*" only when he has observed a lot of *A's*, and all of them have been accompanied by *B*. The silly or unscientific or superstitious man frames his generalizations and predictions in some *other* way—in accordance with his whims and fancies, hopes and fears, or because he "feels in his bones" that it must be so. He does not look at the barometer or the clouds or the meteorological map before predicting this afternoon's weather. He says it is going to be fine because he wants it to be fine; or if he is of another temperament, because he has promised to play cricket and would much rather it were wet; or because some man with a loud voice and a big stick told him it would be fine; or because he

[1] *Treatise*, first paragraph of Part IV, section 4, "Of the Modern Philosophy" (Selby-Bigge, p. 225; Everyman, pp. 215-16).

[2] S.B., pp. 225-226, E., p. 216. I have italicized the word "justly."

has consulted the *Sortes Vergilianae* and come upon a passage about the Sun-God Apollo.[1] The one thing he does *not* have regard to is what we call the "lessons of experience." We all behave in this way about some things. But if any one behaved in this way about most things or all things—if he framed his predictions and retrodictions about them without any regard whatever to observed constant conjunctions—then we should class him as a lunatic. I think indeed that it is part of the *definition* of 'lunacy' to form one's beliefs without regard to observed constant conjunctions. It is certainly not part of the definition of 'lunacy' to be indifferent to the rules of Deductive Inference and other rules of Formal Logic, though no doubt some lunatics do assert mutually inconsistent propositions. For it is notorious that many lunatics are excellent deductive reasoners; the very peculiar propositions that they assert do follow logically from the premises they believe. What makes them lunatics is the nature of their premises. And the objection to their premises is that they are not framed in accordance with the lessons of past experience, but (if Freud is right) in accordance with their own suppressed desires.

To complete this account we need to mention statistical inductions as well as "all or none" generalizations. Suppose we are told that there are a number of swans now residing in the University Parks; and we are asked to bet on the chance that a certain one of them, called *Abraham*, is black. How are we to bet? If you are a sensible man, you will hunt up such facts as the following: that over a long period of years the proportion of white swans to black ones in the Thames Valley has been (say) about ninety-five to five. You then conclude, if this is all the information you have, that the chances of Abraham's being black is small, about one-twentieth, and accordingly you bet against his being so. But now suppose that I on the contrary am silly or unscientific or superstitious. I shall not bother to hunt up statistics, or to recall what ornithologists and other observers of swans have told me. I shall reflect, for example, that "Abraham" is a Non-Aryan name, and I shall conclude that its owner must certainly be black, and bet accordingly. Of course he may *be* black after all. Nevertheless, my estimate of the chances was silly, even though I happen to win my money: and yours was sensible, even though you happened to lose by it.

Now suppose some philosopher asks us *why* it is sensible or scientific to frame our generalizations and consequently our forecasts in accordance with observed conjunctions. We shall answer that the

[1] In this strange method of prediction, in case any of my readers are unfamiliar with it, one opens the works of Vergil at random and reads the first line on which one's eye falls. There are also *Sortes Biblicae* and, I believe, *Sortes Koranicae*. If civilization breaks down, our successors will no doubt use the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the same way.

question is an improper one. To frame them in that way is part of the *definition* of the terms "sensible" and "scientific"; not part of an arbitrary definition of them, invented *ad hoc*, but part of what everyone in fact means by those words. If you ask "*why* is it sensible to generalize and predict in that way" you are really asking "why is it sensible to be sensible" which is a meaningless question: that is, your utterance is not a question at all, though it has the verbal form of one.

You notice that I have carefully refrained from saying that it is *reasonable* to frame our generalizations and predictions in this way. Instead, I have used more humdrum (dare I say "less emotive"?) words such as "sensible" or "scientific." But, you may insist on asking, is induction a reasonable process or isn't it? To this I answer, it all depends on the definition of the term "reasonable." According to one definition of "reasonable," a process of thought is reasonable if it exemplifies the principles of formal or deductive inference, laid down in Formal Logic; and the great exemplar of reasonableness is Pure Mathematics. It is *not* reasonable to assert first p and then q where p and q contradict one another. And it *is* reasonable to infer r from p if (and only if) p and not-r contradict one another. Now according to *this* definition of "reasonable" inductive inference certainly cannot be called reasonable, since (as Hume pointed out) the denial of the conclusion does not contradict the assertion of the premises. Of course it cannot exactly be called unreasonable either, for the generalization we assert, or the prediction we make, is *consistent* with the observed conjunctions which are our premises; only it does not logically follow from them. We have to say that an inductive inference is just a series of logically unconnected assertions; in fact that it is not an inference at all, but just a *non*-reasonable transition from one proposition to another.

Now this was the definition of "reasonable" which prevailed in Hume's time, and it was this that made him a sceptic. For so long as he was under its influence, he was obliged to say that inductive generalization is natural but *non*-reasonable, as we have just remarked. But it is possible to contend that there is a non-deductive sense of the word "reasonable" side by side with this deductive sense of it. At any rate as a matter of ordinary English usage there certainly is. In ordinary life everyone would say that it is *reasonable* to frame your generalizations and your forecasts in accordance with observed past conjunctions, and *unreasonable* to frame them otherwise. The capacity to learn the lessons of experience, to frame one's generalizations (and consequently one's predictions and retrodictions) in accordance with the constant conjunctions which one has observed, and not in accordance with one's whims and fancies, hopes

and fears, suppressed desires and the like—this capacity is most certainly an essential element in the make-up of a "reasonable" man, as common sense conceives of him. Thus there is an inductive sense of the word "reasonable" as well as a deductive one. And in everyday usage the word covers the combination of both; if a man is lacking in respect of either, we call him unreasonable, or in extreme cases insane. But I think that, of the two, it is the *inductive* sense which is the more prominent in the ordinary everyday usage of the word.[1]

Now I do not say that Hume himself would accept this solution of the problem. On the whole he inclines more to the sceptical view, according to which induction is natural but non-reasonable and there is no more to be said. Still, there are hints in the *Treatise* of the more constructive solution which I have been outlining; and it seems to be presupposed by the *Essay on Miracles*, which is among other things a sketch of the Methodology of History. I have already quoted the passage at the beginning of Part iv, Section 4, of the *Treatise* about the man who hears an articulate voice in the dark and infers to the presence of another human being. Hume tells us that such a man "reasons justly" as well as naturally, although he is reasoning from nothing but a frequently experienced conjunction. Whereas the man who is tormented he knows not why with the apprehension of spectres in the dark does *not* reason justly; *his* reasoning is, so to speak, morbid or abnormal, and is only "natural" in the sense in which a malady is natural. What is this "justness" which is present in the one process of thought and absent from the other? It consists precisely in the fact that the one man infers in accordance with previously observed conjunctions, while the other man does not. Thus Hume is here maintaining that there is another criterion of "just reasoning" over and above the principles of deductive inference enunciated by Formal Logic; he is saying in effect that there is an inductive sense of the word "reasonable" as well as the deductive one.

Now suppose that Hume had stuck to his view throughout his discussion, instead of merely hinting at it in one or two passages. Could he then claim to have solved the Problem of Induction, which he himself discovered? I shall not venture to answer this question. Probably the solution is in any case far too simple, even if adequate as far as it goes. But it does have this much to be said for

[1] This sense of the word "reasonable," as Cardinal Newman hints in his *Grammar of Assent*, corresponds fairly closely to Aristotle's usage of the word *φρόνησις* (commonly translated "practical wisdom"). Unfortunately Newman, like Hume, is obsessed by the purely deductive sense of the word "reasonable," and therefore has to credit the man who makes sensible predictions with a mysterious faculty invented *ad hoc*, which he calls the Illative Sense.

it, that it solves the problem, so to speak, by *dis*solving it[1]: by suggesting that the problem itself has got something wrong with it, and is really a muddle, arising from an erroneous preconception—the preconception that all valid inference ought to be deductive. Now I think that it is pretty clear that the Problem of Induction *must* somehow be a muddle. Nor is this any disparagement to Hume who invented it. It takes a man of genius to formulate the fundamental muddles. All the great problems of Logic and Theory of Knowledge are muddles, or puzzles if you like a kinder name; they are not problems in the sense in which we speak of scientific or historical problems, which can be solved by the progress of empirical research. They are dissolved, rather than solved, by dragging to light ambiguities, confusions, and unconscious preconceptions; and further (a thing which goes very closely with this) by inventing a more flexible and less equivocal terminology, in which alternatives can be distinguished which were previously confounded, and others perhaps formulated which were previously overlooked altogether.

Of course, even though the Problem of Induction be a muddle, the solution—or dissolution—of it which Hume advocates in the passages I have referred to is not necessarily the right one. Perhaps it is on the wrong lines altogether. But I should like to say a final word about it, addressed to those who think that the business of Philosophy is to *analyse* the basic convictions of common sense and science, not to establish or refute them: or (what comes to much the same thing) to those who think that the business of Philosophy is to analyse the rules according to which ordinary language functions, not to justify them. Such philosophers—and almost all contemporary empiricists are among them—ought to be favourable to the line of thought which I have sketched; they are obliged by their principles to admit that it goes in the right direction, even if it does not go all the way. For there is no question that in ordinary life we do think that there is an inductive sort of reasonableness ("sensibleness" if you prefer) side by side with and distinct from the deductive sort; and this conviction is certainly embodied in the rules which govern our everyday usage of such words as "reasonable," "intelligent," "sensible," "scientific," on the one hand, and "unreasonable," "silly," "foolish," "insane," on the other.

In this lecture I have made no attempt to estimate the value of Hume's philosophical achievement as a whole. I have said nothing at all about his Moral Philosophy, though I think it would be generally agreed that the *Inquiry concerning Morals* is about the most plausible version of Naturalistic Ethics yet suggested. Nor

[1] This distinction between "solving" a problem and "dissolving" it is due, unless I am mistaken, to Dr. Wittgenstein.

have I mentioned his contributions to subjects which lie on the fringes of Philosophy, such as Psychology, Political Theory, Anthropology, Economics, and (not least) Natural Theology. I have confined myself entirely to his Theory of Knowledge; and even there, the only topics I have dealt with in detail are his analysis of Necessary Connection and his treatment of the Problem of Induction. But I hope I have succeeded in showing—in case any one doubted it—that his contribution to these two problems is of absolutely fundamental importance. He has not said the last word on either of them, but he has said the indispensable first word. For he was the first man to see that they are puzzling; and having seen it, he stated what he had seen with a candour and a trenchancy unequalled in the whole history of philosophical inquiry. His work is, and will remain, the inevitable starting-point for all further investigation of these subjects.

ETHICS, CHRISTIANITY, AND NATIONALISM

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In the first part of this article I propose to describe two strongly contrasted situations in the world of thought, one of fifty years ago and the other of to-day. In the second I shall submit to my readers some reflections suggested by the contrast between the two.

In 1888 four years had passed since the publication, two years after its author's death, of Thomas Hill Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*. It was then at the height of its influence in the University of Oxford, and, as it was in that year that I took my degree there, I have chosen it to represent the attitude of thinking men at the time toward the problem of human conduct. I am of course well aware that the moral philosophy therein maintained was by no means that of many, or even of most of those who, at the date of which I am speaking, enjoyed the greatest reputation among the thinkers of this country. But, as I recollect one of my teachers in those days, the late Professor J. A. Stewart, remarking (the remark puzzled me as an undergraduate, but I now appreciate the truth which it contained), Mill and Green alike belonged to the school of the nineteenth century, and the features of Green's ethical doctrine to which I especially wish on this occasion to call attention were in principle common to him with most of his contemporaries, although in details and in emphasis their theories might be widely discrepant from his; while, as regards one particular point, in which, in consequence of the influence exerted upon his thought by certain German philosophers, he did differ from the majority of British moralists in his day, his attitude was, as I shall endeavour later on to show, peculiarly significant in view of the contrast with opinions now widely current upon which I am in this article concerned to insist.

The features in Green's teaching to which I here desire to call attention are three: (1) his conception of an obligation common to all rational beings based upon the recognition of a good common to them all; (2) his view of the relation of the Christian religion, and (3) of the national State to this doctrine of a common good.

(1) In affirming that in the consciousness of all rational beings there is present a "categorical imperative" binding upon them in virtue of their common rationality, Green is of course a follower of Kant. It will be remembered that it was by the study of Rousseau that Kant, according to his own account, was converted to the

conviction that all men, educated and uneducated alike, were equal before the moral law written in their hearts; and if Green (as I have elsewhere[1] attempted to show) went back, as it were, from Kant to Rousseau, and weakened the force of the Kantian appeal to the unescapable consciousness of moral obligation by his deduction of that consciousness from the conception of a "common good," in asserting a universal ethic for mankind he is in agreement with both Rousseau and Kant, and also in accord both with the Stoic affirmation of the unity of the practical reason in all men and with the proclamation of the Christian Gospel to all men, whether Jews or Gentiles, barbarians, Scythians, bond or free, whom God hath made of one blood to dwell on all the face of the earth.[2] I shall refer later on to the doubt which has recently been cast by M. Bergson, in his book *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, upon the legitimacy of the progressive "extension of the area of common good" from that of a small "closed" society to a universal fellowship embracing all mankind which plays so important a part in Green's ethical theory. But at present I only wish to lay stress upon the universalism of Green's ethics, and their agreement therein with the moral teaching of Christianity; and to point out that it would not be easy to find among the principal thinkers contemporary with Green—with the, no doubt, important exception of Nietzsche—any who would have repudiated this universalism, even though they might not have reached or justified it by the arguments and considerations on which Green himself relied.

(2) As to the relation of the doctrine of a common good for all men to Christianity there would have been found among the thinkers of Green's time, in this country at any rate, along with a considerable divergence, yet a still greater measure of agreement; for it would have been generally held that, so far as Christianity teaches a moral obligation to seek a good common to all mankind, its teaching is in accord with that of all serious thinkers, whatever their attitude to the claim made by Christianity to be considered as a divine revelation. Further, it would have been admitted, I think, by most that such was in fact the character of the teaching given by the Founder of Christianity and exemplified in his life; and that, where the tenets of the Churches which professed to speak in his name did not correspond therewith, we had to do with a corruption of the Christian religion from its original purity. It was precisely on account of what in these tenets seemed to be inconsistent with the universalism of philosophical ethics—for example, assertions which appeared to confine "salvation" to the baptized, to the elect, to the converted, or to any category more restricted than that of

[1] *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 131.

[2] Col. iii. 11; Acts xvii. 26.

those who walk by the common reason of mankind—or, again, emphasis upon the necessity to salvation of belief in any article, historical or metaphysical, in respect of which those equipped with that common reason are not upon a level—that not a few would have denied the value of Christianity as a guide to human conduct.

Green himself was a deeply religious man, whose religious experience had been moulded by the Christian traditions in which he had been brought up. He was profoundly in earnest with a criticism of current opinions in moral philosophy, which, whether they were "utilitarian" or "evolutionary," appeared to him to have the Christian life without a rational justification. But he was convinced of the soundness of Lessing's principle that religion is concerned with eternal truths of reason, which can never depend for their validity upon historical happenings; and he was impressed by the difficulties discovered by the Tübingen school of New Testament critics in accepting the account of Christian origins given in the Bible as a faithful record of historical fact. Consequently he was on the whole content to see in the dogmas of Christianity an imaginative presentation of that immanence of God in the human spirit which was to him the open secret of human life as its story unveils itself before the philosophic "spectator of all time and of all existence." Nevertheless, he recognized the appearance of "a person charging himself with the work of establishing a kingdom of God among men, announcing purity of heart as the sole condition of membership of that kingdom, and able to inspire his followers with a belief in the perpetuity of his spiritual presence and work among them,"[1] as, whatever doubts might be justifiably entertained as to the accuracy of details in the extant accounts of that person's life, marking the climax of the development by which the "area of common good" was at last extended in principle to all mankind. Others might attach less or greater importance than he to the share of Christianity in bringing about this climax; but it would hardly have been thought possible half a century ago that a relapse from the ethical universalism common to practically all schools of moral philosophy and deduced by Christianity from its doctrines of creation and redemption could find defenders among professed teachers of ethics. No doubt there were not a few white men who did not in practice admit the equality with themselves of their dark-skinned fellow-men; but the whole tendency of serious thought was against ascribing to any actual inequality among different races of men such a fundamental character as to affect the recognition that an ultimate unity of all mankind as, in Kant's phrase, a "kingdom of ends in themselves" was the ideal to which all ethical and political progress pointed forward.

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 285 (p. 307).

(3) It is probably true to say that, fifty years ago, English-speaking thinkers in general tended to approach ethical questions in an individualistic spirit. The religious and political traditions which had exercised the greatest influence upon the development of British and American life had told in this direction; and neither the very genuine patriotism which characterized the majority of Englishmen, nor yet that insularity and provincialism in their intellectual life which had lately received a brilliant castigation at the hands of Matthew Arnold, had expressed itself in this country in such a theoretical emphasis on the sacredness of the national State as to affect the underlying assumption, natural to those educated in Christian traditions and in surroundings wherein Christianity was taken for granted, that a universal brotherhood of all mankind was the only society a recognition of which was implicit in the ideals proposed as a guide to individuals in the conduct of their lives. Green, however, although not in any strict sense a Hegelian (notwithstanding that the epithet was often applied—with or without the qualification "neo"—to him and to other thinkers of his school), had yet undoubtedly been deeply impressed by Hegel; and had, moreover, under the guidance of the Oxford curriculum of his day, taken as the starting-point of his thought the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, who, in their exploration of the principles of morality, envisaged the man with whom they were concerned as the citizen of a Greek city State. The importance of the State and its claims in relation to the moral life of its members was thus thrust upon his attention by his study of his Greek and German masters. It is also to be borne in mind that both his political and his theological liberalism disposed him to look rather to a State inspired by Christian ideals as the proper sphere of moral activity than (with the High Churchmen to whom he found himself frequently opposed in the academical and educational controversies of his day) to a Church claiming, in virtue of a sacramental succession from the historical founders of the Christian society, an authority more directly divine than that of the State under whose protection it lived. Thus he was ready to acknowledge in the national State the highest actually and effectively organized representation of the social principle which Plato and Aristotle had affirmed to be essential to a truly human life. But two things are here to be remembered, the importance of which will become apparent when we come to contrast the attitude of which we are taking him as a representative with that of certain forms of nationalism which are conspicuous in the world of to-day. The first thing is that, while no doubt physical kinship has indisputably been an indispensable factor in the constitution of nations (as even more obviously in that of families), it would, I think, have been regarded by most thinkers of Green's generation as beyond

dispute, however much inclined they might be to lay stress upon the importance of the part played by the nation and its institutions in the moral life of its members, that the possibility of the "naturalization" of aliens (as of "adoption" in the family) marked an advance in the development of the community, which thus recognized its true basis as being rather cultural and spiritual than racial and physical. The other thing to be borne in mind is that the spiritual unity of the nation would not, I think, have been regarded at that date, even by those thinkers who valued it most highly, as other than an element, however indispensable an element, in a wider fellowship, as yet indeed unorganized, to which our moral consciousness of "law universal" pointed forwards. To this fellowship the appeal of the Christian Gospel would have been generally acknowledged to bear witness, even by those who rejected the pretensions put forward on behalf of any existing ecclesiastical organization, under the name of the "Catholic Church," to represent that wider fellowship in the present.

So far I have endeavoured, taking Green as a representative of the ethical thought of fifty years ago, and attending less to what was most distinctive and original in his teaching than to that in it which was in harmony with the views of men to whom he was on points of great philosophical importance opposed, to show how firmly established was at that date a general conviction that the unity of mankind in a single fellowship was a moral ideal. For the Utilitarians, whose then widely accepted theories Green assailed, it was in the susceptibility of all men alike to feelings of pleasure and pain that the ultimate springs of all human actions were to be sought; and it was precisely because this susceptibility is common to all that the Utilitarians were able, notwithstanding the self-regard which, as their critics were not slow to point out, they held to underlie the altruism which they recommended, to be effective reformers in the field of law, where pleasures and pains, which all men may feel, were by them preferred, as the standard whereby our dealings with others should be regulated, to a regard for distinctions which, though established by law or custom, ignore the fundamental facts of our common humanity.

Thus concerning the universal applicability of fundamental ethical principles to all mankind there was no controversy between the Utilitarians and their "idealistic" critics. Of this all parties were convinced. That Christianity endorsed this conviction would generally have been allowed; as also that this conviction could be supported by reasons independent of any acceptance of Christianity as a divine revelation. There were, no doubt, differences of opinion between those who laid more and those who laid less stress upon the services rendered by Christianity in introducing and maintaining

the ideal of a universal human fellowship; but even those who doubted whether the confidence of Christians in the exclusive claims of their own religion had not caused that religion to be more of an impediment than of an assistance in promoting the reception of the idea in question would seldom have denied that, in its best and purest form, Christianity had proclaimed it. On the other hand, even those who would have asserted that the surest grounds for embracing the ideal were those provided by the dogmas of Christianity would generally have allowed that these could be reinforced by reasons accessible even to minds unenlightened by revelation. Furthermore, there might be differences as to the importance of the part played by the national State in training the moral consciousness of mankind; but, here again, few would have ventured to deny, on the one hand, that the moral consciousness pointed to a fellowship not less wide than humanity; on the other, that the recognition of such a fellowship as the ideal did not exclude that of special claims upon individuals arising from common membership of lesser communities, of which the national State was one, and perhaps of all such communities the one which, as it touched the individual's life most continuously and at most points, had the best right (as it certainly had the most power) to enforce its particular claims.

Fifty years have gone by since 1888, and a Rip Van Winkle who had then gone to sleep and waked in the present year of grace would find himself in a new world, new in many ways, and not least in its outlook on the three related subjects of ethics, Christianity and nationalism, the attitude toward which of Green and his contemporaries I have been attempting to describe.

Unscientific as may be the use of the word "Aryan" in Germany to-day and the "racial" doctrine associated therewith in that country (and, strangely enough, imported thence by Italy)—so that the adoption of the theory now enforced upon such teachers as are constrained to submit to dictation from the Nationalist Socialist Party renders those who enforce it as ridiculous in the eyes of the learned world as the persecution for which it serves as an excuse makes them odious in the eyes of civilized humanity in general—it is nevertheless worth while to observe the bearing on the philosophical situation of the fact that the doctrine in question is professed by the dominant parties in two great European countries. Nor can we overlook the possibility that a position more or less akin to it might be stated in terms less indefensible than those which find favour with the present gainsayers of the moral unity of mankind. We may neglect for the moment what to many constitutes the peculiar perversity of the situation, the fact that the "race" and "blood" singled out as unfit for assimilation are those which were "after the flesh" his in whom, according to the religion which for centuries has

been professed by the civilized nations of the west, Jew and Gentile were to be made one and the nations of the world constituted a spiritual fellowship. We may profitably recall that in the history of the British Empire and of the United States of America (two communities in which the "racial" doctrines imposed in Germany and Italy are especially out of favour) a belief in the permanent superiority of the "white" man to the "black," and the consequent importance of discouraging intermarriage and sexual intercourse between them has often played an important part. Many, again, even of those who are least sympathetic with such a belief would readily allow the intermarriage is generally undesirable where dissimilarity between the parties in respect of inheritance, physical and social, is very great; and would admit that the absorption, by means of such unions, of a more highly civilized breed of settlers into the mass of an indigenous population at a lower stage of cultural development is a disaster to humanity at large which may be, without impropriety or abandonment of the ideal of an ultimate universal human fellowship, counteracted by measures designed to preserve the immigrant community from such a fate. But, when all is said, there is a great difference between recognizing that there are difficulties in the immediate realization of ideals, or even that the full realization of certain ideals is not to be looked for under conditions which are likely to endure for a period longer than any for which practical provision can be made, and the rejection of a spiritual unity of mankind as a moral ideal at all, on the ground of an ultimate physical disparity among its component parts, any attempt to lessen which is to be regarded as in principle inadmissible.

Very different, again, is the acknowledgment of the need of regulation in the intercourse of peoples separated from one another not only by physical dissimilarity, but by the levels of cultural development which they have respectively attained, from the sudden breaking off of intercourse between peoples who have for centuries frequently intermarried, have co-operated in the same political and economic system of life, and participated in the same material civilization and the same scientific and artistic culture; especially when the community which is repudiated and driven into exile has made a contribution of supreme value to the spiritual inheritance of humanity; where that contribution has included the religion which, till the other day, was professed by the great bulk of both the nations now responsible for the violent interruption of relations; not to mention the work of artists and thinkers who have shed the highest distinction on the nation under whose government they lived, among them a man of genius who has been universally reckoned as one of the three greatest poets of a country which has now proscribed his writings. The anti-Semitism which has, within

the last year, so profoundly shocked, by the cruelty and injustice of its activities, the conscience of the civilized world beyond the borders of the lands infected by its poison, is no mere measure of domestic policy, justified by peculiar considerations of the economic, cultural, or political order. It cannot indeed be reasonably denied that there have existed circumstances which might have justified legislation (with due regard to individual interests) directed to diminishing a predominance of Jewish influence in certain spheres wherein it was disproportionate to the numbers of the Jewish community and unfair to those who did not belong to it. But these circumstances have been made the excuse for a savage attack on multitudes who did not even in any intelligible sense belong to the Jewish community, though they counted kin with those who did, in the name of a principle diametrically opposed to that of the ultimate unity of mankind as potentially a single spiritual fellowship, which is fundamental to Christianity and was assumed by the moral philosophy taught by practically all schools of thought in Europe half a century ago. Even if the theory of blood and race which is invoked in support of the new anti-Semitism were better based scientifically than it is (whereas in the eyes of most dispassionate critics it is no less a quackery in science than it is for Christians a heresy in theology), it would still imply a relapse on the part of its upholders into a conception of the physical basis of the unity of society as of more importance than the common reason or the interest in a common redemption on which the philosophy and the religion of Europe have respectively laid the principal stress in what we may call the humanism common to both alike.[1]

So far I have contrasted the general assumption made fifty years ago that the ultimate unity of mankind in a spiritual fellowship is the ideal implied in our consciousness of moral obligation with the repudiation, implicit when not explicit, of any such ideal by the believers in the supreme claim of "blood and race" on the allegiance of a *Volk*; and the consequent humbler estimate of the ethical significance of nationalism, even by those most disposed to emphasize it, at the earlier date with that which is attributed to it at the present day in the "totalitarian" States of contemporary Europe.

[1] The persecution of Jews by Christians in the past, cruel, and unjust as it was, and contrary to the spirit of Christ himself, was based on no such principle as is put forward to justify that which is now in progress in Central Europe. It was in theory, at any rate, intended to promote the interest of the Jews themselves by driving them to accept the only conditions on which (as it was believed) they could attain to eternal salvation; while the acceptance of Christianity at once removed any Jew from the category of those liable to persecution. From this category nothing that he or she can do can remove a person of Jewish blood in Germany to-day; and no pretence is made that the persecution is in the interest of anyone but the persecutors.

It remains to call attention to the difference observable between the views then prevalent of the relation of Christianity to the ideal of which we have been speaking, and some which are entertained to-day both by believers in that religion and by its critics.

There were, no doubt, already, fifty years ago, thinkers—the late Lord Balfour was one of them—who maintained that the ethical principles then generally acknowledged, as well by those who professed what he called "naturalism" as by others, rested on no secure foundation so long as the view of the world taken in the natural sciences or derived from them was regarded as an adequate account of its nature as a whole; and who looked to religion to suggest a conception of that nature more capable of affording satisfaction to other demands of the human spirit than those which the natural sciences are adapted to meet. When Balfour spoke of religion it was Christianity—or rather perhaps it would be more accurate to say, Christian theism—that was in his mind; he was too much out of sympathy with the idealistic philosophy of Green seriously to consider whether the religion which unquestionably lay for Green at the heart of it might not also have served as a background for the values which naturalism, in his view, could only regard as chance by-products of a process essentially indifferent to them. Speaking generally, it may be said with substantial accuracy that the ethics historically associated with Christianity were, in their main outline, accepted by the great majority of serious thinkers in this country at that date, although they would have alleged various grounds for their acceptance of them; that most of them would have allowed that Christianity had on the whole done good service to mankind by its ethical teaching; and that, on the other hand, even those who were most concerned to defend the claim of Christianity to be a divine revelation would have welcomed the support thus given by the common reason of mankind to its teaching as a valuable testimony to its origin from that living source and inspiration of that reason to which they gave the name of God.

It is otherwise to-day. M. Bergson has shown in his remarkable work, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, that the expansion of the "area of common good" from a "closed" society to the "open" society of all mankind is not so simple a matter as it appears to be in Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*. The ethics of a "close" society are bound up with the contrast between members and non-members of it, those of an "open" or potentially all-inclusive society depend upon the religious consciousness of a universal life in God which its members share. Such a consciousness need not indeed be in a distinctive sense Christian. Yet it cannot be denied that belief in the potential universality of the religious community (belief in a "holy Catholic Church") is an article of the Christian

faith in a sense in which it can hardly be said to be a tenet of any other among the historic religions. It would probably be now allowed far more generally than would have been the case fifty years ago that the influences practically making for universal good will among men are definitely Christian, at least in origin.[1] On the other hand, when we turn to the professors of Christianity to-day, we find, in contrast with the "liberalism" which half a century ago characterized the thought of those Christian theologians who were alive to the problems of their age and in touch with its scientific and social movements, a far more widespread tendency among cultivated defenders of Christianity to insist upon its distinctive character as the revelation of a "transcendent" God, whereby are communicated from above truths intrinsically inaccessible to the common reason of mankind, even when carried by genius to the greatest height of which it is capable.

Thus we find a remarkable revival of Thomism, and that not only within the Roman Catholic Church. I myself heard not long ago an able young philosophical tutor in Oxford, not himself a Roman Catholic, affirm with conviction that he spoke for not a few seekers of truth in his own generation, the generation which was in infancy during the War, in saying that they were finding a guide in St. Thomas rather than in Kant. But St. Thomas, although he certainly drew a sharp line of demarcation between truths attainable by the natural reason of man and truths which could only be learned from a supernatural revelation, was profoundly in earnest in regarding a "natural theology," yielding truths demonstrable—and demonstrated—by reasoning carried on in independence of any such revelation as the necessary foundation or presupposition of a "revealed" theology. A contemporary school of thought which at present seems to be predominant in Protestant circles—especially in German-speaking countries—goes farther. It denies the existence or possibility of a "natural theology," and declares the Christian Gospel to be wholly independent of any foundation in the common reason of man, whether speculation or practical. It is difficult not to recognize a certain spiritual kinship between the Barthian theology and the "National Socialist" ideology to which, partly in virtue of that very spiritual kinship, it finds itself at present diametrically opposed.

[1] Cp. Bergson, *Les Deux Sources*, p. 304. La démocratie est d'essence évangélique et a pour moteur l'amour. Ibid., p. 45. Posez, par exemple, l'émotion que le christianisme a apportée sous le nom be charité; si elle gagne les âmes, une certaine conduite s'ensuit, et une certaine doctrine se répand. Ni cette métaphysique n'a imposè cette morale, ni cette morale ne fait préferer cette métaphysique. Métaphysique et morale expriment la même chose, l'une en termes d'intelligence, l'autre en termes de volonté, et les deux expressions sont acceptées ensemble, dès qu'on s'est donné la chose à exprimer.

For in both there is apparent a readiness to renounce connection with all past history outside of a certain sacred enclosure, and to flout the common reason and morality of mankind, although the interest in which this is done is not at all the same in the two cases. In a word, there is in both a certain "totalitarianism," rendered possible by a tendency which does not now appear for the first time in German thought, although it has perhaps never been carried to such lengths, to develop the extreme logical consequences of an idea, unchecked by what we in this country are apt to regard as a salutary respect for common sense. But, however this may be, we must take notice that in the Barthian theology, more unreservedly than in the Thomist, Christianity is presented not as an anticipation or confirmation of truths otherwise attainable (though this, at least according to Thomism, it may also be), but as the bearer of a message coming from a region transcending altogether that with which the common reason of man is conversant, yet a message without whose aid that common reason is incapable of fashioning or discovering a satisfactory environment for the human spirit. It challenges such ideologies as now go by the names of "Dialectical Materialism" and "National Socialism" on the ground that they fail to meet the demands of the human spirit not so much because they ignore principles which are within the reach of every man of sound and cultivated understanding as because they refuse to avail themselves of the only light in which the problems of human life and destiny can be rightly judged, although that light has by the gracious intervention of God been made available to man in his revealed Word.

To sum up briefly the first and longer part of this paper. Fifty years ago the ultimate unity of mankind as a spiritual fellowship was an almost universally acknowledge ideal in ethics. The nation, although its importance as an element in such an ultimate unity might be variously estimated, was by many recognized as an element, by some as an indispensable element therein; but only as an element in a larger whole. Lastly, Christianity was generally regarded as pointing to the same ideal; although in the eyes of some it might be looked upon as supplying its principal sanction, by some only as indicating it in an imperfect and qualified fashion, while many positions intermediate between these were adopted by others. Few would have been found to affirm that the ideal itself, which so obviously commended itself to the common reason of mankind, was solely the creation of the religion which had given to it the greatest prominence in its creed.

To-day, on the other hand, more than one great nation has adopted an ideology of "blood and race" which is in principle opposed to the assumption that the unity of mankind as a spiritual fellowship

is the ultimate ideal of moral and social progress. Nationalism has assumed a "totalitarian" form in which not merely any political allegiance, but any sort of allegiance whatever except that to the national State, is regarded as treason thereto; and Christianity is on the one hand disparaged or discouraged because, or in so far as, it is committed to an ideal excluded by totalitarian nationalism; while, on the other, by many who still uphold that ideal, it, rather than the common reason of mankind, is regarded as the true source and sanction thereof.

I promised at the beginning of this article, after contrasting two historical situations, to offer some remarks upon the contrast thus described. Some have been already offered in the course of describing the contrast; those which remain will be but few.

Behind the change marked by the contrast to which I have called attention lies a movement, characteristic of the last half-century, away from that confidence in the common reason of mankind which lay at the heart of the "liberalism" which was dominant in philosophy, theology, and politics fifty years ago. This movement, observable in many departments of thought, concerns us here as it appears in theology and politics. Witness, in the former sphere, beside the Barthian theology, the favourable reception accorded to the late Rudolf Otto's insistence on the "otherness" of what he has taught us to call the "numinous" factor in our experience. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the tendency, inherent in such a movement, to diminish the control exerted by a regard for principles of universal validity over the divisive passions aroused by the vivid consciousness of peculiarities unshared by those of a different race or with a different religious experience from our own. But it is worth while to consider whether the reaction which we have witnessed against the old "liberal" consciousness in a common reason was not rendered inevitable by a conception altogether too narrow of that reason which men have come, often with disastrous results, to despise and disregard. This point has been well urged, so far as religion is concerned, in the Gifford Lectures recently published by Professor de Burgh with the title *From Morality to Religion.*

In the case of Green, and of the idealistic school of which he was an eminent representative, reason was no doubt envisaged in a fashion far more comprehensive than by the contemporary "naturalism" whose philosophical inadequacy they made it their business to expose. But (despite their indebtedness to Hegel, who had, one may say, given to history a standing in philosophy which it had not before) the historical element in human experience received from them, I think we must admit, less than its due share of attention. A fuller realization, again, of the difficulties which, as we have seen, M. Bergson has so impressively pointed out, in the way of a continuous

expansion of the "area of common good" (to use Green's own phrase) from a "closed" society to one embracing all humanity, might have led to a clearer perception of the disruptive possibilities of nationalism; and a better appreciation of the distinctive character of Christianity as a religion based on a unique historical revelation might have saved philosophical liberalism from provoking what I cannot but regard as an unfortunately extravagant reaction against what had sometimes, no doubt, amounted to the obliteration, in the interest of a broadminded sympathy with all religions, of the features which enabled that particular religion to render to the spiritual life of humanity a service which no other could render in its stead.

It would be out of the question in these concluding sentences of an article already too long to enter further into this subject. But I would venture to suggest that a way may be found, without either denying the legitimacy of a "natural theology" with the Barthians, or, with the Thomists, drawing a hard and fast line between certain rationally demonstrable *praeambula fidei* and certain dogmas accepted purely on the authority of revelation, to reconcile the acknowledgment of the capacity of the common reason of mankind to discover God with a recognition that there is in the acquisition of all truth a historical element the perception of which enriches rather than baffles reason. This recognition would, in the particular region of human life with which this article is concerned, allow us frankly to accept, on the one hand, the national communities based upon (but not limited by) "blood and race" as training grounds provided by nature or Providence for the development of morality, and, on the other hand, the actual existence of a universal society, tracing its origin to him of whom Green speaks in a passage already quoted, as "charging himself with the work of establishing a kingdom of God among men," which is no mere ideal incapable of realization under actual conditions but the promise and destined focus of a community adequate, as no "closed" society can be, to the demands implicit in the moral consciousness of mankind.

HEGEL AND PRUSSIANISM

PROFESSOR T. M. KNOX

DESPITE the efforts of Bosanquet,[1] Muirhead,[2] Basch,[3] and many others, it is still frequently stated or implied, in both popular and scholarly literature, that Hegel (*a*) constructed his philosophy of the State with an eye to pleasing the reactionary and conservative rulers of Prussia in his day,[4] and (*b*) condoned, supported, and, through his teaching, became partly responsible for some of the most criticized features in "Prussianism" and even of present-day National-Socialism.[5] In this article I propose to give reasons for denying (i) that Hegel the man is justly accused of servility to the Prussian Government, and (ii) that there is any warrant in the text of his *Philosophie des Rechts* for the charge that Hegel the philosopher was an exponent of "Prussianism" and "frightfulness."

I

After occupying a philosophical chair at Heidelberg for two years, Hegel was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Berlin in 1818, and delivered his Inaugural Lecture on October 22nd. During the winter he lectured on "Natural Law and Political Science" (*Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft*) as well as on his *Encyclopaedia*, and at this time or a little later he must have started to write his *Natural Law and Political Science in Outline, or Fundamental Principles of the Philosophy of Law*[6] (*Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse —Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*) as a text-book for future courses of lectures on this subject, which really comprised jurisprudence, ethics, and political philosophy. The book was not published until 1821. The evidence that he started to write it shortly after his arrival in Berlin is contained in a letter from him to

[1] *Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1930), pp. 230 ff.

[2] *German Philosophy and the War* (London, 1915).

[3] *Les doctrines politiques des philosophes classiques de l'Allemagne* (Paris, 1927), pp. 110 ff.

[4] E.g. S. Hook: *From Hegel to Marx* (London, 1936), p. 19.

[5] E.g. Aldous Huxley: *Ends and Means* (London, 1938), pp. 58, 171; E. A. Mowrer: *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (Penguin Books, London, 1938), pp. 38–39.

[6] This is the work referred to in this article as the *Philosophie des Rechts*. The only English translation—*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, by S. W. Dyde (London, 1896)—has long been out of print. A new translation, with commentary, by the writer of this article is in preparation.

Friedrich Creuzer, formerly his colleague in Heidelberg. Creuzer had sent to him a copy of the new edition of his work on ancient mythology, and Hegel replies (October 30, 1819) that his acknowledgment has been delayed because he had hoped to send as a return —though too poor a return—"some sheets of my §§ on the Philosophy of Law." He had been ready to go to press with his book when the Carlsbad decrees were issued. "Now that we know where we stand with our exemption from censorship, I propose to print at once."[1] Since the *Philosophie des Rechts* is divided into sections, it is plain that it is to this book that Hegel refers. To enable us to understand the rest of his statements, a short excursion into history is required.

The Congress of Vienna which settled the map of Europe in 1814 was a triumph for conservatism, for diplomats to whom the revolutionary ideas emanating from France were anathema. It was a defeat for Stein, who for years had laboured to make the Germans a united people, and who by his reforms had tried to give them civil and political liberty. He retired into private life, but it was his ideas which led in 1815 to the formation of a German Students' Association with "Honour, Liberty and Fatherland" as its motto. Two years later some hundreds of students from all over Germany held a festival on the Wartburg as a demonstration in favour of freedom and German unity. Fries, Hegel's predecessor in his Heidelberg chair, was one of the speakers on this occasion, and his enthusiastic address is the subject of some criticism in the preface to Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts*.

In 1819 Kotzebue, the writer, was murdered by a student named Sand on suspicion of being a Russian spy whose activities were inimical to the cause of German liberty. This event caused such a sensation that the Governments of the German States felt that they now had an opportunity to take action against revolutionary ideas prevalent in the universities. After a conference at Carlsbad they issued what are known as the "Carlsbad decrees" on September 20, 1819. These provided for a strict censorship of periodicals and pamphlets as well as for the suppression of the Students' Association. At the same time Fries was dismissed from his chair at Jena. On October 18th university teachers in Prussia were officially made aware of the decrees, and they were also informed that *all* their publications would be censored; the exemption from censorship which the Prussian universities, together with the Prussian Academy, had enjoyed would now be suspended.

[1] The letter is printed, with an introduction and notes by E. Crous (on which I have drawn for the facts about the Carlsbad decrees and the subsequent censorship), in Lasson's *Hegel-Archiv*, I, 2 (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 18 ff. This letter was first brought to my notice by Professor Sidney Hook of New York, whose kindness I acknowledge all the more readily in that I have come to different conclusions from his about Hegel's political objectivity.

It is clear from what Hegel says to Creuzer that his book on the *Philosophie des Rechts* was completed by September 20, 1819, the date of the Carlsbad decrees. Between that date and October 30th, the date of Hegel's letter, he had been officially informed of the position about the exemption from censorship hitherto enjoyed by university professors, i.e. he had been informed that the exemption was suspended; but now that the atmosphere of uncertainty had passed he proposed to go ahead with his book and submit it to censorship in the ordinary course. The manuscript was sent to the publisher, and some of it may even have been printed at this time, because there is a receipt, signed by Hegel and dated December 15, 1819, acknowledging a payment on account of royalties on his forthcoming book on *Naturrecht*.[1] On second thoughts, however, he must have decided to withhold the book until the excitement arising from Kotzebue's murder had died down, because the date appended to the preface is June 25, 1820, while the date on the title-page is 1821.[2]

What emerges from these facts is that (i) despite the title-page date, Hegel's book was begun almost as soon as he arrived in Berlin. This might at first sight lend plausibility to the conjecture that, on entering the service of Prussia, he decided to write a book on political philosophy supporting the Prussian *status quo*. But his interest in the subject was not new in 1818; it had been a dominant one ever since his student days. Nor were the conclusions embodied in his book new in substance. His opinions developed, as one might expect, with advancing years; but there is no radical change. From first to last he is fascinated by what he regarded as the unity of Greek life, and his problem remains the same: how is it possible to combine the individual Greek's complete devotion to his city with the modern emphasis on the paramount importance of individual freedom? There is hardly anything in the *Philosophie des Rechts* to surprise a reader of Hegel's earlier writings on political philosophy; in particular, the theory of the State contained in the book published in 1821 is simply a working out in detail of the material already contained in the relevant portion of the *Encyclopaedia* of 1817. Hence there is no ground for supposing that, when Hegel went to Prussia, he began by reconstructing his philosophy of the State to suit the mind and practice of his new masters.

(ii) The reason why publication was delayed for eighteen months after the book was ready can hardly have been anything except fear

[1] *Hegel-Archiv*, I, 2, p. 57. (Here again the writer is indebted for the reference to Professor Hook.)

[2] Copies were in Hegel's hands, however, before the end of 1820. See a letter to him (*Briefe von und an Hegel* (Leipzig, 1887), vol. ii, pp. 32–33), dated December 18, 1820, acknowledging a complimentary copy of the book.

of the censor. But if it had been written to gratify the Prussian Government, how could he have had such fears? Their very existence implied that his book contained matter which might be unpalatable to the authorities on the score of its liberalism.

How did Hegel overcome any difficulty that might have been expected from the censor?[1] Two courses were open to him. He might have revised his book and accepted Prussian conservatism; or he might have written a preface explaining that, while his ideas were more liberal than those of his Government, he shared its opposition to revolutionary ideas and the dangerous excesses to which they might lead their advocates. It was the latter course which he actually chose. The preface, however, has been called "servile" because it (i) denounces Fries, (ii) condemns the Wartburg Festival, and (iii), by identifying the real with the rational, justifies the *status quo*.

(i) Now it may be admitted that, in writing as he did, Hegel had his eye on the censor; and it was a cruel thing to attack Fries—a former colleague as *Privat-Docent* in Jena—when he was in disgrace and suffering personal hardship. But is Hegel using servility, or is he using legitimate explanation of his own independent position in order to satisfy the censor? "The latter" is the only answer which fits the facts.

His poor opinion of Fries was of long standing. In 1811, on the publication of Fries's *Logic*, he jotted down his impressions of the book: "Superficiality, vague chit-chat—wholly platitudinous—trivial argumentation, like that used to children—empty narrative, devoid of philosophic precision, etc.[2] These unpublished remarks are more sweeping than those in the preface to the *Philosophie des Rechts*, but their content is the same. The criticisms of Fries in this preface were thus not made to order; nor were they the first criticism of Fries which Hegel *published*. There is a caustic footnote about him in the introduction to the *Science of Logic*,[3] published in 1812.

(ii) If Hegel's attack on Fries is nothing new, is the condemnation of the Wartburg Festival a departure from his convictions in order to please a censor? At first sight it may seem that it is. At this festival the writings of von Haller were burned, and in the body of the *Philosophie des Rechts* (§ 258) there is a trenchant criticism of von Haller's book—"this welter of crudity." The Festival was a demonstration in favour of liberty—the *leit-motiv* of Hegel's book—

[1] By 1824 the censorship was considerably relaxed (Lenz: *Geschichte der Universität zu Berlin*, II, i—Halle, 1910—p. 183), but I cannot find that it was relaxed earlier, and I therefore assume that it was still rigid in 1821, and that Hegel's book was submitted and passed.

[2] *Hegels Nürnberger Schriften*, hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1938), p. 470.

[3] Eng. Tr. (London, 1929), vol. i, p. 63.

and German unity, of which he was the prophet in his essay on the German Constitution, written in 1802, though not published until 1893. But it is not the objects of the Festival to which he raises objections in his preface; it is the methods adopted to obtain them. Feeling and enthusiasm, he holds, are dangerous guides: in this instance they led to the murder of Kotzebue, and murder, however conscientiously committed, is still murder. This is the theme of much of the second part of the *Philosophie des Rechts*, and the condemnation of the Wartburg Festival follows from the argument there; the assumption of adaptability to a conservative régime is not required to account for it. The Festival is specifically condemned in the preface in order to obviate the misunderstanding that the only alternative to von Haller, condemned in the body of the book, is Fries.

(iii) The statement that "the real (*wirklich*) is the rational" was misunderstood by some of Hegel's contemporaries to imply that what exists (e.g. the Prussian State) is rational, and he inserted some explanatory sentences into the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia* in 1827 in order to remove the misapprehension. It should have been clear, however, to readers of the *Philosophie des Rechts* that, whatever Hegel meant by his identification of the real and the rational, he did not mean to justify the *status quo*, because the rational State described in the third part of his book was not a description of any State actually existing at that time. (It is sometimes said to have been a description of Prussia, but the differences are so striking, as we shall see in Part II of this article, that no contemporary of Hegel's could reasonably have made such an assertion.) Hegel doubtless gave a meaning of his own to the word *wirklich*, and he had explained this meaning as early as 1812 in the *Science of Logic*, but it could have been gathered by an attentive reader from the *Philosophie des Rechts* itself (e.g. Preface and § 1) without knowledge of Hegel's other books.

Against this view that the preface is simply explanatory of Hegel's general position in the body of his book, and not "servile," there is sometimes adduced a sentence which occurs in it as follows: *Bei uns die Philosophie . . . eine öffentliche, des Publikum berührende Existenz, vornehmlich oder allein im Staatsdienste, hat* ("with us—i.e. in Prussia as distinct from Greece—philosophy has an existence in the open, an existence in touch with the public, an existence principally or only in the service of the State"). What does Hegel really mean here? Mr. Carritt, for instance, interprets the words as an assertion that "the proper exercise of philosophy is in the service of the State,"[1] or that "philosophy is to be the servant of the State."[2] Now since

[1] *Morals and Politics* (Oxford, 1935), p. 107.
[2] *Proc. of Arist. Soc.*, 1935–6, p. 230.

Hegel, in the *Encyclopaedia*, ascribes philosophy to the section on Absolute Mind, which transcends Mind Objective, the section in which the State appears, it would be odd if he were to maintain in the *Philosophie des Rechts* that the higher is the servant of the lower. What Mr. Carritt's interpretation seems to overlook is the sense in which Hegel normally uses *Existenz*. In speaking of the *Existenz* of philosophy he is speaking of philosophy's existence as an institution, as an organization in the objective world. The difference between Prussia and ancient Greece, so far as philosophy is concerned, is that in the former philosophy is an organized study in the universities, whose professors are *ex officio* civil servants, i.e. "in the service of the State." Hegel is simply stating an obvious fact about philosophy as an organized study in Prussia; he makes no assertion about the "*proper exercise*" of philosophy or about what philosophy "*is to be.*" I can find nothing in the German to justify Mr. Carritt's use of the words italicized, and nothing in Hegel's meaning to justify a charge of servility against him on the strength of his use of this phrase.[1] There is no "servility" in holding that, if a civil servant cannot reconcile his philosophy and his political allegiance, he should demit his office, if his office consists in teaching philosophy.

The question whether Hegel was a man of a cringing disposition is relevant to a consideration of the charge that he truckled to the Prussian Government. To answer such a question a whole biography would be required, but reference may be made here to some of Hegel's actions during his Berlin period (1818–1831) when he was at the height of his powers and his fame, and when he was being accused of servility by Fries and others who were jealous of his success. In youth he had been an enthusiast for the French Revolution as the assertion in practice of man's natural right to freedom. In 1826, on the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, he drank a toast with his students in honour of the event; "he explained its significance and said that a year never passed without his celebrating the anniversary in this way."[2] In youth he had advocated the unification of Germany; in Berlin he remained faithful to this ideal and had not forgotten that he was a South German himself. In 1826, for instance, when he founded his *Jahrbuch für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, he endeavoured to secure the co-operation of Bavarian scholars and hoped that the periodical might help the cause of

[1] Haym, who, in his *Hegel und seine Zeit* (1857), employs every available weapon to attack what he holds is Hegel's "servility" and conservatism, and makes much use of this preface, never mentions the sentence which I have been endeavouring to explain. Had he interpreted it in Mr. Carritt's sense, would he not undoubtedly have added it to his armoury?

[2] The evidence for this is quoted in a note by H. Falkenheim in Kuno Fischer: *Hegels Leben und Werke* (Heidelberg, 1911), p. 1232.

German unity.[1] When he was leaving Heidelberg for Berlin he said in his letter of resignation that he hoped, in going to Prussia, to have administrative as well as teaching responsibilities.[2] Perhaps he hoped to have charge of the Academy or to have some share in the Ministry of Education, but any such hope was vain. If he was so sound a conservative as some have held, why was he never given such an administrative post?

When his colleague de Wette was dismissed from his chair for writing a letter of sympathy to the mother of Kotzebue's murderer, Hegel was one of the subscribers to a fund to help him in pecuniary difficulty.[3] He brought with him from Heidelberg an assistant, Carové, whose membership of the Students' Association made him suspect to the Faculty in the University as well as to the Government, and Hegel was forced to dismiss him. In his place he appointed von Henning, but it took him ten weeks to get the appointment confirmed, because von Henning also was suspected of demagogic sympathies. In 1820 he went bail for a student arrested on suspicion of disaffection.[4] Another Berlin student was for the same reason inhibited from attendance at the University in 1819. He appealed to Hegel for aid and, despite Hegel's continued efforts, his reinstatement could not be secured. When he was eventually reinstated in 1823, it was not Hegel's but another's pleadings which secured this result. Von Wittgenstein, von Kamptz, and other "demagogue-hunters," who might with some fairness be called "servile," attacked Hegel and attributed the "disordered" minds of students in part to the unhealthy "mysticism" and "pantheism" of his philosophy.

It is difficult to fit facts like these—and Dr. Hoffmeister adduces others—into a picture of Hegel as a reactionary conservative, the trusted ally of the Prussian régime. Like other men, he had his faults, but servility was not one of them.

II

So far we have been concerned with Hegel the man and his relations with the Prussian Government. We now turn to the *Philosophie des Rechts* in order to discover whether it actually contains adulation of Prussia or approval of those aspects of Prussianism and National-Socialism which are commonly criticized in this country. If it did contain these things, it would be hard to explain why Hegel's influence in Germany waned so rapidly after

[1] This fact and those in the next paragraph for which I have quoted no reference are taken from an article by Dr. J. Hoffmeister in the *Geist der Gegenwart* supplement of the *Kölnische Zeitung* for December 12, 1937.

[2] Rosenkranz: *Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844), p. 318.

[3] *Hegel-Archiv*, I, 2, p. 21.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 31–33.

his death, or why his works went out of print during the heyday of Prussianism. English readers sometimes forget that when Hegel was being translated into English in the 'nineties of last century his philosophy was dead in Germany.

The rational State wlich he describes in the last part of the *Philosophie des Rechts* is not, he explains, any existing State; political philosophy is not the same as the empirical study of political institutions. Yet he is often said to have identified the rational State with the Prussia of his own day. This is impossible; the differences between what he regarded as "rational" political institutions and those under which he actually lived are too many and too striking. Three of them may be briefly mentioned here:[1] (i) He holds that "subjective freedom" requires trial by jury; questions of fact should be settled by the defendant's peers (§§ 219 ff.). In Prussia there were no trials by jury when his book was published. (ii) He advocates parliamentary government, and is at some pains to describe in detail the constitution of the two Houses and the manner of appointment of their members. Further, he advocates the publicity of their proceedings—all this in the interests once more of "subjective freedom." He is a supporter of monarchy, but only of monarchy of a kind so limited (*constitutionelle Monarchie*) as to be compatible with liberty; i.e. although the monarch is at the head of the State, his functions are to be restricted; he is one organ of the body politic, the executive and the legislative being the other two (§§ 275–315). Prussia in Hegel's day was an absolute monarchy, and the Estates did not meet as a Parliament. Stein had proposed to give Prussia a "Constitution," but it did not receive one in Hegel's lifetime. (iii) He argues for the freedom of the Press and allows the expression of public opinion. It is true that he thinks that there are limits to this freedom, but the important point is that he does hold that personal freedom is robbed of its rights if the individual is not at liberty to hold opinions of his own and to utter them (§§ 316–319). We have seen already in this article that such freedom was not enjoyed in the Prussia of his day.[2]

Hegel thought that Plato had described in the *Republic* not a Utopia or a castle in the air, but the rational essence (the τί ἦν εἶναι) of Greek political life, and in more than one place he develops his own views in contrast with Plato's in a way which suggests that he

[1] These three are singled out for mention by Treitschke in his *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1919), vol. iii, p. 721. In what follows references in brackets to numbered paragraphs are to the paragraphs of the *Philosophie des Rechts*.

[2] In his Berlin lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel says that Prussia is *auf Intelligenz gebaut*. This remark is doubtless to be explained in the light of the passage, in his *Philosophy of History*, treating Prussia as the embodiment of *Protestantism*.

was trying to do for the modern world what he took Plato to have done for Greece. His rational State, then, is a description of the essence of modern political life, exemplified to some extent in existing States, however bad, just as the essence of manhood is exemplified to some extent even in the cripple. Now he holds that in anything finite there may be a discrepancy between what it is implicitly and what it is overtly; e.g. a man is a man, as distinct from an animal, in virtue of his rationality, and implicitly or in essence or in principle any particular man is rational; actually, however, he may act in defiance of this rationality, though he does not thereby cease to be man, i.e. he remains rational in essence. If he learned, however, that rationality *was* his essence, and believed this, he would bring his conduct more into line with his genuine manhood, i.e. his rationality. Similarly, a bad State is still a *State* only because the conception or the essence of political life works within it; and if it comes to recognize that its actual institutions or actions clash with the conception or essence which makes it a State, it will proceed to reform itself and bring itself more into accordance with that conception or essence. It is this essence which Hegel describes in the *Philosophie des Rechts*, and his book amounts therefore to an invitation to statesmen to reform their States in accordance with his principles, principles which he professes not to have invented but to have discerned already at work (*wirkend*, i.e. *wirklich*) in varying degrees within existing States, and in virtue of that fact entitling them to be called States. It is, then, a precise reversal of the truth to regard Hegel's book as a justification of the *status quo*.

But surely, it will be said, even if this interpretation be sound on the whole, still there are detailed passages in Hegel's book where he (i) asserts or implies that might is right, (ii) defends the suppression of freedom of conscience, and (iii) holds that the individual is a mere means to the State's ends. (i) Mr. Carritt, for instance, says that by adopting Schiller's epigram, *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*, Hegel "frankly identifies might with right."[1] It is true that the epigram might be adopted by a thinker who intended to make this identification, but did Hegel intend to make it? In the *Philosophie des Rechts* (footnote to § 258) he distinguishes between von Haller's advocacy of the rule of the mighty, or the rule of force, and his own doctrine that it is the right which is in the long run mighty. What triumphs in history, he thinks, is the right or God's purpose, the rightness of which is intrinsic to itself, not dependent—as the might is right doctrine implies—on its might. (See, e.g., the closing para-

[1] *Morals and Politics*, p. 114. Citations could have been made from authors other than Mr. Carritt, but I take them from him because of recent English scholarly writings on Hegel his are probably the best known of those which adopt the point of view attacked in this article.

graph of his *Philosophy of History*, where he contends that the true theodicy is the demonstration, provided by the philosophy of history, that the history of the world is the process of the realization of *Mind*, not force or might.) Hegel's belief that it is possible to discern in history a progressive development—a development of mind—is doubtless open to numerous difficulties, but it is to turn his doctrine upside down to hold that he thinks that the triumph of one "world-historical" nation over another is a triumph of mere brute force (or *Naturgewalt*) when he thinks in fact that it is a triumph of reason. Had he held that might was right because it was mighty, he would surely have advocated despotic government, or absolute monarchy. As it is, when he treats of sovereignty (§ 278) he clearly distinguishes, like Aristotle, between the sovereignty of a despot who rules by whim, and so by force, not by law—the type of sovereignty which he rejects—and the sovereignty of limited monarchy which implies law and constitution, and so rests on rationality, not whim or force—the type of sovereignty which he advocates. He speaks there of the common misunderstanding which confuses might with right and tries to remove it, but despite his plain words, he seems so far to have failed to convince some readers that he himself distinguished these two conceptions and gave priority to the second.

(ii) While he repudiates the doctrine that might is right, he does not repudiate freedom of conscience. He specifically allows conscientious objection to service in warfare (second footnote to § 270) and speaks of man's conscience as a "sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to violate" (§ 137). It is true that this is not his whole teaching about conscience; it is not enough, he thinks, that a man should be conscientious; mere conviction does not ensure infallibility. To be justified a man must be conscientiously convinced of what is inherently right (§ 141). This, however, is a long way short of advocating the suppression of conscience altogether.

(iii) But did Hegel not maintain that the individual was a mere means to the ends of the State? Mr. Carritt confidently gives an affirmative answer,[1] though it seems to me that Hegel's own answer is negative. Not once only but repeatedly in the *Philosophie des Rechts* (Preface and §§ 46, 185, 206, 299) Hegel criticizes Plato, and each time the point of his criticism is that in his Republic Plato did not allow enough freedom of choice to the individual. He objects to Plato that he makes the State everything, the individual nothing (*Zusatz* to § 184), that he stifles individuality by denying private property and family life to the guardians and by refusing to allow members of the lower classes to choose their own walk in life. Self-subsistent individuality, Hegel continues, was unknown to the Greeks and was introduced into the world by Christianity, and it is

[1] *Proc. of Arist. Soc.*, 1935–6, p. 236.

to make room for this principle in his State that he advocates, e.g., a parliamentary constitution and facilities for the expression of public opinion. Whether his criticism of Plato be justified or not is not here in question, but the fact that it is directed against Plato's alleged subordination of the individual to the State is surely sufficient reason for refusing to ascribe to Hegel precisely what he asserts is Plato's chief error.[1]

The view here put forward that Hegel rejects the doctrine that might is right, allows freedom of conscience and does not make the individual a mere means to the ends of the State is supported by his explicit statements in the passages already cited. These statements, moreover, are not mere incidental remarks or casual phrases inconsistent with his main doctrine: on the contrary, they are integral to that doctrine itself. He tries to find a place in the State *both* for individual liberty *and* for strong government, and he holds that it is a sign of the strength and depth of the modern State that its subsistence is compatible with allowing its particular members to develop to "self-subsistent individuality" (§ 260). His political doctrine of the State and the individual accords with his logical doctrine of the universal and the particular and his metaphysical doctrine of the infinite and the finite. The all-powerful State in which the individual counts for nothing, or which "absorbs into itself the strength of its individual members" (*Zusatz* to § 184), would, in his view, be just an analogue of Schelling's Absolute—"the night in which all cows are black." In the *Philosophie des Rechts* he attempts to steer a course between the Scylla of individual licence on the one hand and the Charybdis of despotism on the other, and hence it is only to be expected that, in some passages taken by themselves, he should seem to founder on one or other of these rocks. Any such passages, however, should surely be interpreted in the light of his main thesis, and while this thesis has perhaps been sufficiently indicated by citations already, it may be worth clinching the matter by quoting Hegel's own summary (§ 260) of his general view of the State: "The State is the realization of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only attain their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their rights (in the family and the system of 'civil society'), but pass over of their own accord into devotion to universal interests. When that happens they know and will the universal . . . and are active in its pursuit. The result is that the universal does not prevail or attain perfection except along with the interests of individuals and through the co-operation of their

[1] I am glad to find my argument here supported by a recent keen critic of Hegel—Mr. J. P. Plamenatz—in his *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation* (Oxford, 1938), p. 33.

knowledge and will. Individuals likewise do not live like private persons for their own ends alone but, in willing them, will the universal at the same time." How far Hegel succeeded in his endeavour to do justice to the rights of individuals is a matter for philosophic criticism; but any such criticism will misfire which, despite e.g. the passage just quoted, maintains that in his view the individual is a mere means to the ends of the State.

"Prussianism" is associated not only with the suppression of conscience and individuality and the doctrine that might is right, but also with the glorification of war. Hegel's view on this subject is summarized by Mr. Carritt as follows: "War is justified on the grounds that by it domestic discontent and hankering after liberty are quelled and the inconsiderable nature of human happiness demonstrated by 'hussars with shining sabres.' "[1] What Hegel actually says is: "War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil"—the emphasis is on the word "absolute"—"or as a merely external accident resulting it may be from the injustice or the passions of nations or their rulers. . . . It is a matter of necessity that the finite, i.e. life and possessions, should be definitely established as something merely contingent, because the notion of the finite is the contingent. . . . Edifying sermons are preached about the vanity of temporal goods, but war is the state of affairs which makes us take this vanity in earnest. . . . Everyone thinks when he hears such sermons, however much he may be moved by them, that he will be able to preserve his own possessions. But if their insecurity is made a serious matter by hussars with shining sabres, then preaching turns into curses against the invader" (§ 324). It is true that Hegel goes on to affirm that peoples stagnate if they remain at peace and that war does result in the composing of domestic feuds, but his main point is that war is an unavoidable necessity. "In time of war," he continues, "right has lost its sway; might and chance rule." And yet "combatants regard it as a passing phase which ought not to be, and for this reason, even in war-time envoys are respected and war is not waged against private individuals or family life." "In modern times" (1820!) "war is humanely waged" (§ 338). In face of these quotations, can it be maintained either that Mr. Carritt's summary is fair or that Hegel is an apostle of frightfulness?

Finally, how does the teaching of the *Philosophie des Rechts* compare with the practice of Fascism and National-Socialism? So far as these ideologies make the unity of national life an ideal, Hegel is at one with them. In Italy the use of corporations in the organization of industry is strikingly reminiscent of his proposals, and the resemblance is doubtless not accidental. The relation between the *Deutsche Christen* and the German Government recalls Hegel's

[1] *Morals and Politics*, p. 108.

proposed partnership between Church and State. But it is only if half its doctrine is ignored that the *Philosophie des Rechts* can be interpreted as an apologia for the most criticized aspects of National-Socialism. Above all, where in the totalitarian States are his safeguards of "subjective freedom"? Where in his book is there any warrant for a secret police? What would he have thought of the treatment of the Jews? An answer to this question may be inferred from a passage in the *Philosophie des Rechts* itself, where he says that those who would exclude the Jews even from civil rights on the ground of their race forget that the Jews are *men*, with the rights of men, and that in fact experience has shown that thus to exclude them is the worst of follies (second footnote to § 270).

IS THERE A SOCIAL CONTRACT?—I

H. D. LEWIS, M.A., B.Litt.

It is easy to dispose of the historical aspect of this question. When Aristotle affirmed that the family is more natural than the State, in the sense of original rather than final or necessary, and taught his contemporaries to regard the State as the result of a gradual development through the family and the tribe, he adopted a viewpoint which would probably find universal endorsement to-day. Only a particularly perverse writer would endeavour to revive the controversy as to whether or not the institution of the State began with explicit resolutions concluded at a specific date. No doubt there are plentiful instances of the establishment of particular States through some agreement or contract on the part of its members. The case of the Pilgrim Fathers is often cited as a classical example. But this does not give us an *original* contract. We should seek one in vain.

This leaves us with a more strictly philosophical problem. Does the doctrine of the social contract represent something of importance with regard to the structure of the State or the nature of its authority?

It is evident that the majority of the thinkers with whom we especially associate the theory of the social contract had little interest in history as such. For reasons which are not easy to discover, or, it may be, simply under the influence of a prevalent habit of thought, they usually regarded the historicity of the contract as important to their political theories. But their real interest was in the theories themselves. And ultimately, the argument as to the motives of the original founders of the State, etc., was based on some belief as to the present purposes of men in their maintenance of the State, or some principle to which those purposes should conform—a procedure which makes any emphasis which was placed on the historical question particularly futile.

Moreover, it was rarely that present political obligations were regarded as resting on the terms of an *original* contract. Such an attitude would even be fantastic at a time of theoretical extravagances. As Hume remarked with reference to the "agreement by which savage men first associated,"[1] "being so ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes; it cannot now be supposed to retain any authority."[1] Besides "that it supposes the consent of the father to bind the children, even

[1] *On the Social Contract*, Works, p. 499.

to the most remote generations (which republican writers will never allow), besides this, I say, it is not justified by history or experience in any age or country of the world."[1] Even Locke, notwithstanding his confident assertions about the contractual origin of the State,[2] considers an "argument from what has been to what should of right be, of no great force."[3] And he criticizes severely the doctrines of his contemporary Filmer with regard to paternal power, insisting that a contract has to be re-enacted in the case of each individual on his coming of age, if it is to bind him.

Wherefore, then, the importance attached to this idea of a contract? Shall we say that it is an idea entirely incidental to the theories of the thinkers in whose writings it appears? Is its persistence due to influences that have no real bearing on political problems, for example the unscientific and almost idolatrous attitude of the medievals to the scriptures, and the intrusion of theology into every sphere of their thought? Was it an adjunct of the feudal system surviving into the early period of the Reformation and becoming inflamed before its final collapse? Or shall we say that the idea of a contract proved a convenient peg upon which to hang one's particular political predilections, and account for its popularity accordingly? Failing these and kindred explanations that repudiate the intrinsic value of this idea, to what element of truth does it owe its importance?

According to the view which prevails to-day, the theory of the social contract has little importance in itself. It is allowed that, in the absence of more adequate ideas, this theory provided a means of expressing resentment against tyranny and emphasizing the importance of social as well as political freedom. But it was, seemingly, only a step in the development of a sounder explanation of political obligation. For this latter we are referred to some form of utilitarianism or to the idealistic doctrines of the general will. If, however, this attitude is justified, we can but marvel at the long and varied history of the belief that civil society presupposes some kind of a contract, and its persistence through fundamental changes in political practices and temper. As W. J. Gough allows, in the conclusion to his valuable study of the history of the social contract, "it would indeed be surprising if a theory which had commanded such widespread support for so many centuries was wholly erroneous."[4] Especial significance attaches to the fact that thinkers who differ so substantially as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, resort without hesitation to the notion of a contract. There is, at any rate, the presumption that this notion represents some fun-

[1] *On the Social Contract*, Works, p. 499.
[2] *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, book ii, sect. 102.
[3] *Op. cit.*, book ii, sect. 103. [4] W. J. Gough: *The Social Contract*, p. 224.

damental and obvious feature of the State, a feature which it never occurred to these thinkers to question but which, on the contrary, they made the starting-point of their further contentions. That this presumption can be vindicated I have little doubt. The doctrine of the social contract needs to be *supplemented* by considerations such as those which impressed the thinkers of the last century, but it has not been superseded by them. Until this is realized political philosophy will entangle itself in many confusions.

In the book to which I have already referred Mr. Gough makes an interesting attempt to indicate "the elements of truth" which the contract theory contains. He observes that "while politically organized society has a duty to respect the individuals of which it is composed, individuals have a duty to support the organization on which social life depends, quite irrespective of any agreement to do so."[1] For him "it is this reciprocity which is the truth that underlies the contract theory, but there seems no good reason for expressing it as the product of a mutual agreement."[1] And I readily allow, not only that this reciprocity is real, but also that persistent emphasis upon it encourages healthy public relations. That the doctrine of the social contract served this latter purpose can hardly be disputed. Moreover, the reciprocity in question is only one instance of the general principle that rights and duties are correlative, and any attempt to equate this correlation with mutual agreement leads us "to confuse once more the existence of rights and duties with the recognition of them."[2] Nevertheless, I am certain that more is involved in the theory of the contract than Mr. Gough is disposed to allow. *Some* of our duties are *conditioned* by mutual agreement, although their ultimate ground consists in a purpose which is promoted by the observance of this agreement. That political obligation falls within this category is the main theme of this essay. If I am right, it follows that the contract theory does not merely express in an indirect and inadequate way what is better expressed otherwise. There is more than an "analogy" in its use, since the State, on my view, *is* the maintenance of a special kind of agreement. And the theory needs thus to be reinstated in its former position of importance. To the elaboration of this view I shall devote the remainder of these articles.

The plausibility of the criticisms of the theory of the social contract arises from the supposition that this theory throws the entire weight of the explanation of political relationships on the idea of consent or agreement. Let me quote from Hume's essay on this subject: "We are bound to obey our sovereign, it is said, because we have given a tacit promise to that purpose. But why are we bound to observe our promise?"[3] This question cannot be answered

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 230. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 231. [3] *Works*, p. 510.

without going beyond the mere idea of a promise. We shall have to say, for instance, that we have a moral obligation to keep a promise as such, or that the honouring of promises, especially certain promises, is indispensable to the furthering of ends which we ought to realize. It may even be the case that we abandon *moral* considerations altogether and regard the fulfilment of some private aims as the purpose which is served by our fidelity. But the necessity of appealing to considerations of this kind does not nullify the significance of the fact that it is the honouring of a promise that finds its justification (using this word in the most general sense) in such considerations.

Whether anyone advanced the contract theory in the form which I have allowed to be specially vulnerable seems highly doubtful. The nearest approach, so far as I know, appears in the contentions of the extreme individualists who wrote towards the middle of the last century. Owing to their preoccupation with the rights of individuals they became wholly unmindful of duties. They would thus recognize no strictly moral obligation towards the State. Yet, most inconsistently, it was affirmed emphatically that there *should* be no interference with the freedom of the individual to live as he pleased. And therefore, the restrictions to which the individual was subjected would only be justified in terms of his own consent. But this position could not have been sustained for long had not its futility been obscured by the further inconsistency of adhering, at the same time, to some form of hedonism, yoking an uncompromising individualism most uneasily with utilitarianism. As regards the advocates of the contract theory generally, they seem to have been well aware that they could not rely entirely on the idea of agreement or covenant. With the writers of the Middle Ages, for instance, the contract was never more than one feature of a political theory which embraced also the belief that the maintenance of the State was willed by God as a means of counteracting the effects of sin and the fall.[1] Occasionally, during that period, more specific forms of the theory of "divine right" were combined with the idea of a contract. And the emphasis on inalienable rights marked the individualism initiated by the Reformation more distinctively than the insistence on consent as the basis of rightful government. This is well illustrated in the work of the most representative advocate of individualism, namely Locke, for whom the social contract is of quite secondary importance. Indeed, it is one of the main weak-

[1] Mr. Gough reminds us of the tendency "to regard nature or the will of God as merely a *causa remota* or *causa impulsiva*, which required the co-operation of human will and action for it to be translated into effect. This necessary human action was identified with the contract of subjection, by which the people set up a government to rule over them" (*The Social Contract*, p. 37).

nesses of Locke's theory that the contract, as conceived by him, conferred no powers on the officers of the State beyond the execution of the law of nature with which they could not interfere in any measure, even with a view to its more effective preservation in essentials. In this he contrasts with Hobbes, whom we may also mention as an advocate of the contract theory who subordinated the contract to another principle, in this case the selfish aims of the members of the State. For Hobbes, the contract has a very important role; the civil rights which it creates are, for him, fundamentally different from the "right of nature." But in addition to realizing the importance of the contract, Hobbes seems to have understood its relations to other features of a successful political philosophy more accurately than any other classical writer on these topics. We shall have to return to him again. In the meantime let me conclude my instances with a reference to Rousseau, for whom the social contract is connected in a specially intimate way with the doctrine of the "general will."

If the necessity of supplementing the idea of a contract in the manner intimated be understood, the criticisms of that idea, as used in explanation of political relationships, can easily be met. Before I substantiate this claim, however, let me indicate in what way the State involves a contract or agreement.

No society can flourish without extensive compromises on the part of its members. This necessity is paralleled in the way an individual is forced to organize his desires within a universe or system, repressing some in the interests of others when he purposes effectively. In both cases our power on the whole is increased at the expense of restrictions on our power to do what we please in every regard. As finite beings we are subject to many limitations; in the more technical language of philosophers, all determination is negation, and since conduct has thus to be invariably selective, we effect our purposes best when we reckon with our limitations by making our selections as consistent as may be.

Owing to the distinctness of persons, there arises, in the case of society, a further necessity. Means must be found whereby particular persons can come to *agreement* with regard to the way each one is to suit his purposes to those of his fellows. Independently of antagonisms and the desire to have our own way, we always need to come to an understanding, since it would be preposterous to suppose that a number of human beings, however amiably disposed to one another, should form the same conclusion as regards the detailed course to be followed by each one in all matters that pertain to their joint enterprise. It is in these respects that social usages, often unimportant in themselves, serve us so well. They constitute an easy way of making it plain to one person what others expect

of him and what he may expect in turn himself. Underlying the most informal gatherings are certain conventions, and it is only our ready acceptance of these that obscures their extent and importance. Informality is itself a special kind of convention. There can be no society without some form, and thus an ordinary tea-party contains the germ of political sovereignty in the way of an agreed method of settling differences.[1]

Such a method involves entrusting some person or persons with the power of making decisions on behalf of others. Where there is antagonism and reluctance to defer to the wishes of our fellows, in addition to ignorance of one another's wishes and intentions, the necessity for placing someone in this position of authority is more evident. And some form of antagonism, springing from differences of principle, if not from self-interest, is hardly to be avoided where the more permanent associations of men are concerned.

The authority constituted in this way does not necessarily involve a *moral* title to obedience. Its basis is the consent of the persons over whom it extends, and I emphasize it at the moment simply as one condition of effective co-operation in the meanest as well as the most exalted assemblies. Its maintenance is the "honour" which is as necessary among thieves as among the members of a charitable organization.

The importance of agreeing to be bound by the decision of specific persons, or, at least, the equivalent of this in the way of a constitution which confers special powers on certain members of the community, is particularly evident in the case of the State, in view of the fact that the State provides that framework of society as a whole, within which all other organizations function. In one sense the State is superior to every other society. I do not mean that it makes the greatest direct and positive contribution to the welfare of its members. In this latter respect the palm goes easily to such institutions as the family, the church, the university, trade unions, and similar vocational fellowships. Directly, we derive more benefit from these societies, and their impress on our characters is more obvious. The State loses in intimacy what it gains in impartiality and comprehensiveness. Its unique position prescribes for it peculiar methods of operation, whose efficiency with regard to the sphere of human interests as a whole is very limited. Its demands and prohibitions normally loom larger than its services in the thought of the bulk of its members, and where the State functions healthily the average subject is explicitly conscious of it only intermittently. Nevertheless, disparage the State as we will, its position of vital importance is unique. If the analogy is not pressed too closely, we

[1] For a more elaborate statement of this point, see A. D. Lindsay's essay on Sovereignty, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1923–24.

may mention the beating of the heart of which a healthy person is not conscious. "Minor" associations cannot function independently of the State, which is, accordingly, indispensable in a way that is not true of any other institution. If the individual or society decides to repudiate such relationships as that of one member of a family to another, of believers within a church, and of workers within a trade union, however impoverished their experience may be as a result in some cases, life can still be maintained at a civilized level. Renunciation of one association is not normally fatal to the ministrations of others. But the maintenance of the State conditions the operation of every other public body. This is due to certain relationships in which every person, both in his more private capacity and as a member of various societies, stands with respect to every other person or society. Such relationships are only to be avoided by repudiating all contact whatsoever with one's fellows, an extremely difficult project in the modern world. It is the weakness of political pluralism that it overlooks those inter-relationships of all the members of society in every aspect of their lives. According to this doctrine, various authorities should function exclusively within different spheres of human activity. But the affairs of men cannot be pigeon-holed in this way. Our interests overlap and conflict. The conduct of one industry, for example, affects others, and industry as a whole affects every other feature of the life of the community. Similarly, churches and cultural institutions stand on a common ground with other institutions and with individuals in private capacities, not merely because they own property and are the means of livelihood for some of their members, but also because their influence is liable to affect every sphere of conduct. The spiritual, the moral, and the so-called material affairs of men do not fit into water-tight compartments. A field within which the material and the spiritual are nicely balanced is that of the higher forms of entertainment, such as the theatre. But what need to multiply instances? As has been well shown by P. W. Ward and K. C. Hsiao, the advocates of pluralism are themselves compelled, at some stage in their discussion, to reinstate the principle of which their argument generally takes such little account.[1] With the need for decentralization of authority most students of contemporary politics will agree. Hence the plausibility of pluralism and the element of truth preserved by its advocates. But this requirement finds its complement in the fact that the complexity of modern life also intensifies the inter-connections of every sphere of human activity. And herein lies the vital necessity of regulating and co-ordinating the life of society as a whole. No association or private person can ignore this necessity. Notwithstanding the differences

[1] See especially K. C. Hsiao, *Political Pluralism*, chap. i.

in our aims, as regards moral and kindred qualities, no section of the community can thrive, in the way it desires, unless it submits along with others to some all-embracing organization which defines the powers and limitations of other bodies, acts as supreme arbiter in all disputes, and has the force of the community thus organized at its disposal. It is in this sense that the State is superior, for example, to the Church. The interest of the Church itself is best served by co-operating in maintaining the State in that position of superiority. No doubt it will be unpleasant to be constrained oneself. Misgovernment may, moreover, reach a point where resistance with a view to reforming the existing system is advisable. But normally the advantages in the way of order and protection make abundant recompense for the inconveniences which government imposes upon all its subjects. Accordingly, men co-operate in their several ways —some, it may be, simply by not agitating against the State—in maintaining government. And it is the undertaking to co-operate in this way that makes it meaningful, in the first instance, to speak of the *authority* of the State. So used, the term has no moral significance, any more than the authority which a band of thieves confer on their leader is moral. It implies nothing beyond the acceptance by all of the will of a few as a condition of co-operation. Of moral matters I shall speak in a later reference. But first let me relate the substance of this passage to the theme of my paper. Is it not obvious that the agreement of members of society as a whole, which I have described, is what the doctrine of the social contract in its various forms embodies?

The foregoing account is not offered as a complete analysis of the State. It would be impudent, for example, to pretend to dispose of political pluralism finally in a few sentences. But I think I have said enough to show that the essence of the State is to be sought in something which may properly be designated a contract, provided the term is not used in a specialized technical sense. With all the implications of my contention, I cannot deal in a short essay. But I shall attempt to indicate the merits of the present approach to the problems of political philosophy by dealing with four possible objections.

1. It will be urged that the social organization to which I have referred can be effected without the consent of even the bulk of the individuals involved. This will happen where some person (or body of persons) is sufficiently powerful to enforce his will on the remainder of the community. In such cases obedience to any command that is resented will be due to fear of a tyrant and not to fear of the consequences of undermining the basis of social co-operation and protection—of the return to the condition of nature, as Hobbes would have expressed it.

Incidentally, it is important to distinguish between the obedience rendered by a particular individual to specific injunctions and the readiness of the members of a community generally to conform to a certain system of government. When a person obeys solely out of fear of the penalties attached to a law, he may, nevertheless, remain free in an important sense to the extent that he prefers to suffer such inconvenience rather than witness the dissolution of civil society. Constraint in some matters is a price we deem it well to pay for safety and the enhancing of our powers generally.

The neglect of this distinction, while it has complicated the difficulties of political thinkers, has also been responsible for grievous misunderstandings. In the case of Hobbes we have an excellent instance. The view of Hobbes is often identified with that of Thrasymachus in the *Republic*.[1] Actually, they are poles apart. The sovereign, according to the *Leviathan*, does not rule by sheer force. While he needs to be strong, it is for the people to make him so. That this is Hobbes's view appears equally in his advice to the subjects and to the ruler. Chapter 30 gives the sovereign sound instructions as to how to avoid rebellion by governing well, and the passages which seem to suggest the rule of force are seen, on close inspection, to conform better with the view that political obligation rests on fear of the consequences of a dissolution.[2] But many commentators regard the social contract of Hobbes as a case of burning one's boats, of surrendering the power of the community irretrievably to the sovereign, and, on this supposition, take the historicity of the contract as the foundation of Hobbes's political theory.[3] Had the alternative interpretation, resting as it does on

[1] E.g. by Rousseau, *Contract Social*, book i, chap. 2. Rousseau's criticism of Hobbes's real view appears in book i, chap. 4. "What do they gain, if the very tranquillity they enjoy is one of their miseries? Tranquillity is found also in dungeons."

[2] Consider the passage on p. 116, Everyman edition of *Leviathan*: "The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them." While this suggests the view that government is based on force, the context proves the meaning to be different, namely, that the obligation to obey ceases when the sovereign fails to observe that minimum of order which makes his rule preferable to the state of war. An ineffective government loses its title to our allegiance.

[3] C. E. Vaughan is vague on this point. While he mentions the threat of a "return to the miseries of nature," he also makes such declarations as these, with reference to Hobbes's contract: "It is therefore impossible for the subject to turn round at any later moment and quarrel with the inevitable consequences of the step which he, or his forefathers for him, deliberately took" (*History of Political Philosophy*, p. 26). "If there is one writer above all others who pins his faith to the reality of the state of nature, to the authenticity of the facts he relates about it, it is the author of *Leviathan*. The whole form which he gives to the contract, the whole force of the reasoning which he builds upon it, depends upon the assumption that the state of nature was a terrible reality" (*op. cit.*, p. 29).

the above distinction, clearly presented itself to them, they would hardly have adopted a standpoint which is, in fact, inconsistent with the profoundest elements in Hobbes's political theory. The matter is rectified to a large extent, however, by the emphasis that other critics have placed on the utilitarian aspect of Hobbes's thought. But we must avoid the equally vicious extreme which asserts with J. W. Gough that "though the social contract occupies a prominent place in Hobbes's doctrine, it is not really essential to it, and, in fact, is fundamentally inconsistent with it."[1] If we understood by the social contract a particular historical event, this statement is true. But, as has been indicated earlier, the view that a contract is involved in the structure of society, as this is elaborated in the *Leviathan*, seems to me to have special importance for political philosophy.

The view of Austin, as I shall show in a moment, provides us with another case where the usefulness of the present distinction is emphasized.

And now to meet the objection. I allow that the few are sometimes in a position to dominate the many. But I refuse to dignify a community where such conditions prevail with the name of State. In such cases the relation between master and slave has supplanted that relation which is alone befitting the dignity of human beings, namely that of ruler and subjects. We shall do well to remember that every superior is not a ruler. He may receive "habitual obedience" in the Austinian phrase. But the Austinian theory of sovereignty, albeit excellent so far as it goes, needs to be amplified. The "habitual obedience," on which emphasis is rightly placed, must be of a special kind, namely, that which is prompted by an appreciation of the merits of government. We must press beyond the external fact to the motive. Only then will our differentia of sovereignty be complete.

It will perhaps be urged that the distinction I have drawn would be represented best as a distinction between a good and a bad State. Freedom, in the present sense, would thus be one of the marks of a good State, but not a *sine qua non* of States. This view, so some suppose, has the merit, by contrast with my definition, of extending to all the communities we normally describe as States.

The plausibility of this attitude is due to a misconception with regard to the extent of freedom, again in the special sense mentioned in this section, among civilized peoples. We shall thus be asked, "Were the serfs in the Middle Ages ruled by their own consent? Is it not truer to say that they could not throw over the yoke of their masters, however they may have wished to do so?" In answer let us first remind ourselves that, in the words of MacIver,[2]

[1] *Social Contract*, p. 107.

[2] *The Modern State*, p. 115.

"With the downfall of Rome the 'state' actually disappeared from Western Europe. Traditions of overthrown order lingered here and there in the welter of barbarian disorder. But, in the long unhappy centuries which followed, the state had once more to be built within a primitive society." With the gradual emergence of the feudal system out of the barbarian disorder bare force was supplanted increasingly by the acceptance of a political order. The serfs thus owed their position to their own ignorant belief that it was right for them to remain in subjection, that it was their proper lot to belong to another. The extensive restrictions on their freedom were due, not to the power of a few, but to the habit of mind of the Middle Ages, with their misconceived and exaggerated respect for authority, an attitude which proved as obstructive in religious and intellectual matters as in more specifically social and political spheres. Occasionally, no doubt, a serf would have a glimmer of higher things, and his more enterprising spirit would be curbed by tortures and threats. But this would not have been possible were not the system under which he suffered acceptable to his fellows. Occasional outbreaks are, moreover, recorded. These would happen when the prince or sovereign violated a certain code or accepted standard in his treatment of his subordinates. The serf, after all, was conscious of rights, however limited and elementary, and was not always averse to insisting upon them. This proves that the barrier which the Renaissance and the Reformation had to break down was a moral and intellectual one. The political change which followed upon these movements, in particular, prove that the medieval lords could have been resisted were the people so minded.

It is true that the masters encouraged the ignorant apathy of their serfs. And this raises an extremely difficult problem. How far is that person free who is persistently imposed upon by another? Is he less a slave than his fellow who moves in chains? In one sense perhaps not. He is also the tool of another. And I do not wish to minimize the viciousness of this kind of servitude. Nevertheless, there seems to be a significant difference between securing the obedience of a man to a command that repels him, by threats of worse injuries if he defaults, on the one hand, and, on the other, maintaining those conditions, within which, albeit foolishly, a man desires to do that which we also desire of him, and sees no necessity to have the alternatives presented more fully. Carried to an extreme degree, this latter despotism approaches the former, but where a man is allowed to develop the normal faculties of a human being, he retains a certain kind of freedom when he elects to do something without threat of punishment, however subject to deceit. The serfs were free in this sense. While individuals were forced to obey their masters in particular regards, this was only possible because it never

occurred to them to question or challenge the system which placed their masters in that position of superiority.

This applies also to more recent instances of serfdom and to the despotisms of the East. How impossible it is to rule in the teeth of the people has been well shown by Green in his lecture on *Sovereignty and the General Will.*[1]

Let me quote a statement from that lecture:

"It is by no means an unlimited power of compulsion that the superior exercises, but one dependent in the long run, or dependent for the purpose of insuring an *habitual* obedience, upon conformity to certain convictions on the part of the subjects as to what is for their general interest. . . . The ostensible sovereign is only able to exercise this power in virtue of an *assent* on the part of the people, nor is this assent reducible to the fear of the sovereign felt by each individual. It is rather the common desire for certain ends—especially the *pax vitaeque securitas*—to which the observance of law or established usage contributes. . . . Let this sense or desire—which may properly be called general will—cease to operate, or let it come into general conflict with the sovereign's commands, and the habitual obedience will cease also."[2]

The same point has been stressed by Ritchie in his account of the distinction between legal and political sovereignty.

"All government must have force at its disposal, but no government can last which has merely force at its disposal, even the force of a veteran army of professional soldiers. All government implies consent as well as force. These are the two elements which are recognized separately and in one-sided fashion in the theory of the social contract on one hand and in the theory of law and sovereignty maintained by Thrasymachus, Hobbes, and Austin on the other. A law, to be a law in the true sense, must have the regulated force of the community behind it; but in order to be habitually obeyed and permanently enforced, it must be recognized not merely as "good law" (in the lawyer's sense), but as *a* good law (in the layman's sense); i.e. it must be in accordance with the general will, it must be thought to promote the common good, or, at least, its tendency to injure the common good must not yet be recognized."[3]

To identify the consent instanced in these passages with the general will, as the term is used in idealist writings, appears to me a very grave mistake, as I shall attempt to show in a later reference where my quotations will again be seen to be significant. But that does not weaken the support which these passages give to my present contention.

Let me instance, finally, Austin himself and Hume. Notwithstanding their renowned criticism of the theory of the social contract, these writers admit that condition of government which the theory seems to me to have the merit of expressing.

1 *Principles of Political Obligation,* Lecture F.
2 *Op. cit.,* sect. 84; see also sect. 90.
3 *Darwin and Hegel,* p. 259.

In a passage, which it would have been well for him to relate more closely to his definition of sovereignty, Austin writes:

"The habitual obedience to the government which is rendered by the bulk of the community, partly arises, therefore, in almost every society from the cause which I have described; namely, a perception, by the bulk of the community, of the utility of political government, or a preference by the bulk of the community of any government to anarchy."[1]

It is unfortunate that Austin gravely distorts this admission on the page following, where it is confused with a different point, namely, "that every party who obeys wills the obedience which he renders, or is determined to render it by some motive or another." The act of the criminal who elects to "come quietly" rather than struggle with the policeman[2] is willed in this sense, but is, nevertheless, on a very different plane from the consent to be governed which I have instanced as a feature of the State, and which, according to my present contention, is found in every large civilized community.

Austin's repeated insistence on "utility" as the basis of government is tantamount to an admission of the point which I am stressing. It presupposes the acceptance of government in view of its advantages. This applies also to Hume, who, moreover, makes the following admission, with which I conclude my quotations:

"As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular."[3]

That these passages are as true to-day as they were at the time of their composition is not very certain. The recent advance of science, the invention of machine guns, wireless, bombing planes, etc., has improved very substantially the prospects of a few unscrupulous persons, who, having secured for themselves the control of all the available military equipment, proceed to dominate an entire community, in violation of some of its deepest convictions and desires. But even to-day, and with the most auspicious beginning, I do not think that such a venture can prosper over an extended period. The cases of Germany and Italy and Russia suggest themselves. There can, indeed, be little doubt that Hitler, for instance, has ridden roughshod over many cherished convictions of the German people. Opposition is, furthermore, reported and

[1] *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, p. 303.

[2] Cp. above, p. 72. Austin's instance runs thus: "If a man condemned to imprisonment were dragged to the prison by the jailers, he would not obey or submit. But if he were liable to imprisonment in the event of his refusing to walk to it, and if he were determined to walk to it, by a fear of that further restraint, the man would render obedience to the sentence or command of the judge."

[3] *Works*, vol. iii, p. 28.

crushed before it leads to concerted action. A rigid censorship prevents the propagation of ideas that are not sympathetic to the present regime. Nevertheless, one doubts whether these measures could have been enforced, did not Hitler's policy as a whole, however repellent in some of its aspects, seem to the German people to meet their deepest longings and aspirations. It is thus with their own connivance that some of their profoundest thinkers are silenced, while the common people are overwhelmed with propaganda which they themselves know to be one-sided and irrational.

In so far as the peculiar conditions of the modern world do render it possible for a sufficiently ruthless minority to reduce the remainder of a large community to a condition of unwilling subjection, it would be best to deny that communities which suffer such a misfortune are States. There is precedent for adopting this attitude. Faced with a similar problem, T. H. Green, if I may refer to him again, wrote, "We only count Russia a State by a *sort of courtesy* on the supposition that the power of the Czar, though subject to no constitutional control, is so far exercised in accordance with a recognized tradition of what the public good requires as to be on the whole a sustainer of rights."[1] For the purpose of international transactions, powers that govern in the teeth of the people will have to be treated as if they were States. But they will not be so in fact.

In the main, however, I prefer the view that we have not yet come to the sorry pass contemplated in the preceding passage. Probably, the best way of describing the despotic systems which trouble us to-day is in terms of an Aristotelian distinction whose relevance to the present problems was pointed out to me recently, namely, that between perfect and faulty or perverted States.[2] It would conform more to ordinary usage to describe Russia and Germany as perverted States rather than deny that they are States at all. This procedure is compatible with my present contention, since the governments of the communities in question have the general consent of the people, although such consent is only obtained by deceiving the people and subsequently curtailing their freedom (of the press, wireless, etc.) to keep them deceived.

[1] *Principles of Political Obligation*, Sect. 132. Italics mine.

[2] Politics 1275 b. *τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν ἐιδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὔσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων . . .* Aristotle's problem is slightly different from the problem discussed in the text. According to his definition the citizen is one who participates in the government and its administration. Where this is only partially achieved, we have an erroneous or divergent, as distinct from a correct, form of state. The consent for which I have been arguing, however, does not require any direct influence upon the conduct of government.

Further points which may be made in connection with my answer to the objection under discussion are the following:

(1) By including the consent of the subjects to be governed in our definition of the State, we add emphasis to the claim for political freedom. Our procedure gives significant expression to the view that the union of men in a society which does not rest in any way on their own wills is an outrage to human nature. This, be it noted, is not a tribute to democracy. The question of democracy versus its alternatives does not arise in this paper. But it will clarify my present contention if I hasten to repudiate the argument that there is something inherently valuable in the participation of the members of a State in the government of themselves. By comparison with other interests, politics has little claim to importance where the enrichment of the lives of ordinary men is concerned. This may not have applied to the City State of the Greeks, but there can be little doubt of its truth with regard to the complicated social relationships of men to-day. It would be a profitable exchange to surrender our power of affecting the course of government if, as does not seem to be the case, this would involve greater freedom and fuller opportunities with respect to other interests, such as art, literature, religion, sport, and the ordinary arts exercised in our contacts from day to day. Although the maintenance of democratic practices seems, in actual fact, inseparable from the essential conditions of the good life, it will profit us, in considering the value of those practices, to bear in mind that the life of the ordinary man to-day leaves him little opportunity to train himself properly for the privileges of democracy, and that these in consequence are often exercised in a random and uninformed manner.[1] It is not on self-government, therefore, that I am insisting. But it seems certain that, if we are degraded to the position of slaves, however benevolent and wise our masters, our condition will not merely be revolting to our present feelings, but will, in truth, devitalize our personalities in every respect. We should acquire the mentality and temperament of slaves. However vivid and healthy our lives might appear outwardly, the poison of a deep irresponsibility would drip into our souls.

(2) If we do not regard the government of a State as based on the consent of its subjects as a whole, the State, on our conception, is not a sufficiently definite institution for us to be in a position to discuss it intelligibly; most of the fundamental problems of

[1] Cp. also the words of Archbishop Temple in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 1937, p. 4. "At any rate there is a great deal to be said for the view that actual freedom could be increased in most civilized countries to-day by a greater amount of control or coercion in the purely economic sphere. Regulated control, even if legally coercive, may be very much less tyrannical than the pressure of blind competition."

political philosophy will lose their significance. Consider, for example, the following questions: Are there circumstances which justify resistance to the State? What is the business of the State and what are the rightful limits to its interference with the lives of its members What is the proper relation of the State to minor associations? What is the best form of government? If the treatment of these questions had to be regarded as a way of advising our masters, notwithstanding their power to disregard such advice entirely, the purpose of such an undertaking would hardly compensate for its difficulties. The men who would procure absolute power over their fellows would, in all probability, be preoccupied with their own interests. In short, a study of political obligation, alike from the side of the sovereign and from that of the subject, is only meaningful on the assumption that government is, in the last analysis, subject to the control of the people.

There remain, however, some further objections with which I shall attempt to deal in another article.

(*To be concluded*)

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

NIHILISM IN GERMANY

GERMANY, situated in the heart of Europe, has no natural boundaries, and accordingly is geographically, racially, and socially indeterminate. This fact makes it extremely difficult for foreigners to understand the German character. The Germans have no fixed society, no stable traditions, no real being, but only becoming. They are undecided, they are able to say "yes" and "no" at the same moment. They are consequently full of contradictions and their history becomes a dialectical process. They are always changing and always the same, like every nation, but with this difference, that their form at any given time is not a sufficient, often not even a true, but rather a distorted expression of their real being. Thus the present official form of German being, National Socialism, is an experiment only. The army leaders and the great industrialists allowed it to come into existence because they thought it useful for the furtherance of their aims, rearmament, liberation from the bondage of the Versailles Treaty, and the establishment of German domination in Europe. They were right in this assumption; they were wrong in their general conclusion: their servant became their master.

Besides being a means of German militarism, National Socialism has three different aspects which must be distinguished if we really wish to understand the present development. First we have to see it as a stage in European history. To put it as briefly as possible: it would never have come into existence if Bolshevism and Fascism had not preceded. *National Socialism is,* in a Hegelian sense, *the synthesis, i.e. the dialectical unity, of both of them.* Bolshevism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, based on the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the replacement of the capitalistic system of free competition by a planned collective economy. Fascism is its direct antithesis. It believes in *action directe,* in violence, is without a clear cut programme, and only at a later stage invents an ideology in order to justify its terrible doings. Just like Fascism, National Socialism starts as counter-revolution against Bolshevism, but developing in a highly industrialized country must win the workers and therefore maintains socialist tendencies. It is full of contradictions and thus becomes a dynamic movement.

In order to win over the masses it develops (and this is its second, most obvious aspect), *Weltanschauung.* This transformation of philosophy into *Weltanschauung* is interesting, because it denotes a kind of dissolution of philosophy. It starts from the fact that philosophy is based on reasoning only, whereas it ought to be an expression of man in all his functions, feeling, will, etc. Therefore it ought to be *Weltanschauung.* This doctrine with the ideas of race, soil, blood, etc., is philosophically irrelevant. It is not intended for purely theoretical instruction but for practical use. It belongs to the second sphere of propaganda, it is a mere façade. It is pseudo-philosophy, pseudo-metaphysics, and pseudo-religion. It is no real religion, because religion presupposes the worship of something Transcendent and a faithful devotion to it, and both are missing here. Everyone who bases his account of the movement on its literature (even Hitler's book) or takes it as a religion is mistaken.

It cannot be religion, because it depends on a transformation in a deeper

sphere of historic development. Here we reach the third aspect of this movement, with which alone we are concerned in this paper, and the point at which the happenings in Germany arouse European interest. For here the crisis of man is reaching its catastrophic end. *European civilization is passing at present through its nihilistic phase.* It is the fate of Germany to experience it with all the *Gründlichkeit* characteristic of that nation. The study of nihilism has been neglected. No monograph or history of the subject exists, not even a collection of material relating to it. What then is nihilism? It is the standpoint of the *nihil est,* the belief that nothing exists, or as Gorgias puts it, if something were we could not know it, and if we could know it we could not express it. For nihilism truth in knowledge and obligation in morality have no objective reality. It seems as if about this "nothing" and about this nihilism nothing could be said because they are just "nothing." But, paradoxically, it is our fate to experience the "nothing" in its manifold expressions. Which of us has not experienced that what appeared to be alive—a state, a party, a marriage, a friendship—suddenly revealed itself to be nothing: or a man's rather pompous autobiography appeared as "nothing" because none of his thoughts and feelings were his own?

Difficult as it is to bring an order into this variety of nihilistic experience, certain types of nihilism are distinguishable.

1. *Religious nihilism.* It starts from the insight that the life which we are living is not worth living; that its usual pleasures are valueless; and that consequently liberation from the bondage of this world and the ascent to Nirvana is devoutly to be wished (Buddhism).

2. *Theoretical nihilism.* As a theoretical standpoint it may be metaphysical nihilism starting from the thesis: being is not; nothing does really exist, everything is mere appearance and fiction. Or it may be epistemological nihilism. This says something may exist, but we are unable to know it. All our knowledge is empty and meaningless. Or it may be nihilism regarding values. Here truth, goodness, obligation, etc., are arbitrary postulates which are nothing to us. This leads on to:

3. *Practical nihilism.* This may take two forms. It may cause a passive attitude. Because all values are meaningless our actions are too. As it does not matter what we do, we may just as well do nothing. Thus quietism arises. But quite the opposite conclusion may be drawn by others. Because the values are nothing all the institutions still based on this outworn order have to be destroyed. In this case the action itself becomes negative, its aim being the "nothing," the definite "nothing" of a certain man, group, party, state, etc.

It is a most significant feature of our time that wherever nihilism is alive to-day this active nihilism plays the leading part. Just as in Marx materialism was transformed from a theoretical into a practical form, so here nihilism progresses from theory to practice. There theoretical materialism changed into materialistic action: here theoretical nihilism changes into nihilistic action.

It is our fate to pass through a period of nihilism. Why? Because the process of the losing of faith which started at the beginning of the Renaissance reaches its natural end. This process is so complicated that its thorough analysis would demand a whole book. It is the dissolution of faith in God, in His love, redemption, even in the possibility of being redeemed. The result is mere atheism, as Nietzsche proclaimed: "God is dead." It is the dissolution of the belief in man who has no longer as bearer of God's image infinite value, but as a member of the masses no value at all. Science and philosophy, moreover, have destroyed the belief in nature, the goddess of the seventeenth century. Science substituted the meaningful unity of the universe by senseless mechanical movements of atoms and waves. Philosophy destroyed man's

belief in sense perception and the notions of his mind, such as substance, causality, absolute space and time, value, etc. The result is an absolute emptiness of human consciousness. Everything appears now meaningless and worthless. Thus nihilism is the necessary result of this process of dissolution. Reason is replaced by volition, faith by arbitrary decision.

This European process of dissolution has reached different stages in different countries and is most advanced (except in Russia) in Germany. Why has this stage of nihilism been reached earlier in Germany than in other countries? Because the German mind has an innate predisposition towards nihilism. This is deeply rooted in the above-named dialectic. For if the "yes" and "no" are indissolubly connected, the Negative has an equal right with the Positive. Thus "Nonentity" is an essential character of Eckehart's God: "God is His own Nought, and He is "Nothing" for the actions of all creatures." *Der Ungrund ist ein ewiges Nichts* are the opening words of Böhme's *Mysterium pansophicum*. Schelling's God is that being which can exist only through the negation of its contradictory being. Yet the "Nothing" is not only the "Nihil Dei," as "Nihil entis" it forms part of the Absolute. "Pure being and pure non-being is one and the same" in Hegel's logic, and nothing exists on earth and heaven which does not contain both, being and non-being. It is the "Nihil voluntatis" in Schopenhauer. For the will, his Absolute, must be denied if we want to reach the unity of all beings. The nothing is lastly the essence of man. Stirner's egotism confesses, "I am the Nothing, not in the sense of emptiness, but as the creative Nothing, out of which I, the creator, produce everything!" But if in Eckehart, Böhme, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Stirner nihilism forms only one element of their thoughts, in Nietzsche it is an outspoken doctrine and comes to its self-consciousness. If anybody really wants to understand the present issues, he ought to read the first book of Nietzsche's *Will to Power*, entitled *The European Nihilism*. He will be astonished to see that Nietzsche, in the midst of the Victorian age, in 1884–88, predicted a period of nihilism lasting about two centuries. His analysis of the phenomenon, his explanation, his historical remarks, his distinction of types and his effort to overcome it are likewise fascinating. He saw that it is possible to have an aim and nevertheless to believe in nothing but aimlessness (*Ziellosigkeit an sich*). He understands pessimism as the forerunner of nihilism. He recognizes its activist form. In one point only he was mistaken, he thought he could overcome nihilism by his will to power and the values based on it, whereas in fact he remained its slave.

That this is the case is clearly demonstrated by a book which deserves in the highest degree the attention of every student of our times, H. Rauschning's *The Nihilistic Revolution*,[1] translated under the misleading title *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*. It has a special importance because Rauschning, former president of the Danzig Senate and a member of the National Socialist party, shows complete nihilism to be the secret party doctrine. It will not be permissible in future to base an analysis of this doctrine on Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, because it is here revealed that the doctrine is meant for the masses only, whereas the élite stand above it. It is just this élite which count! They command, the masses have to obey. The secret of the unity of the élite is their lack of doctrine. "No allegiance to any sort of philosophy brought membership of the actual élite, but the simple fact of having fought for the party's power!" The élite do not believe in any ideas, but use substitutes for ideas which can be foisted on the masses by suggestion, and have little hesitation in imposing on them whatever they can swallow. They have no definite aims. There was and is no aim that National Socialism has not been ready

[1] *Die Revolution des Nihilismus*, Europa Verlag. Zürich, 1938.

for the sake of the movement to abandon or to proclaim at any time. Their tendency is nihilistic. They are like a column on the march which neither knows nor cares to what objective the march be directed. It is "action pure and simple, dynamics in vacuo, revolution at a variable tempo, ready to be changed at any moment." Consequently it has only impulses, no fixed political aims, but a mere system of tactics. Its only aim is power, more power for power's sake. In order to achieve this everything which can possibly be in opposition is destroyed. This movement is destructive only, not constructive. Hitler is a great destroyer, nothing more. His foreign policy is also nihilistic, its aim being universal unsettlement, revolution for its own sake. That no moral inhibition exists, that a given word is without any value, that character and the soul of the nation are either destroyed or in danger of being destroyed will surprise nobody.

Rauschning believes that the Russian revolution is likewise nearing its nihilistic phase, so that nearly all the revolutions of to-day are nihilistic. I do not think the facts are quite as simple as that. It is true, all the revolutions have a nihilistic element, but their original nihilism was directed against the state and society which they encountered at their beginning. Bolshevism started with a doctrine which it tried to realize. In a certain sense we live in the age in which collective philosophies try to realize themselves in practice. If nihilism now becomes visible as the kernel of these revolutions, it means that they have failed to realize what they promised. In their striving for mere power they have not solved the fundamental problem of our time, that of giving Mankind a new scale of values. On the contrary, they are in internal dissolution. Hitler's pact with Stalin is a step in the necessary dissolution of the German ideology.

Thus the study of to-day's nihilism has a double interest, theoretical and practical. Theoretically we become acquainted with practical nihilism in its activist form. This practical nihilism is no isolated phenomenon, it corresponds to theoretical nihilism, towards which Neopositivism seems to tend in all countries. It is no chance that in the last number of *Erkenntnis* (vol. viii, p. 32) M. Black speaks of Wittgenstein's "nihilist methods." Really, if there are no questions for philosophy to answer, if philosophy is "the struggle against the fascination exerted by forms of representation," the result must be nihilism. It would, therefore, be a great mistake to think that nihilism is no problem in this country. It is already visible underneath the surface. It must, moreover, be recognized that the dissolution of the values which underlie these movements is an internal process of the human soul which cannot be stopped by external force. Such movements cannot be annihilated either by the destruction of a single man or of a party, because it is a mass phenomenon connected with the very origin of this mass itself. Further, whatever is destroyed by nihilistic action, whether constitutions, parties, states, systems of production, churches, or religions, will never return to life in their former shape. Finally, because it is the fate of the Western Powers to pass also through a phase of nihilism, it is impossible for them to offer their unchanged traditions and values as a remedy for the crisis. The nihilistic phase of European civilization does indicate that it has to undergo an intensive change. An old system of values has to be replaced by a new one. But there is no reason for despair. On the contrary, the future of mankind demands categorically a new and stable foundation for those values without which mankind cannot live.

Perhaps even the terrible destruction brought about by the nihilistic action of the revolutionaries inside and outside their own territory may help generations to come. For nihilistic action must necessarily bring to the fore

the "nihil" immanent in itself. Because the nihilist believes in nothing, he cannot even believe in himself. Therefore he must dissolve his own words, creeds and—himself. It will be a great comfort to many readers to read Rauschning's prediction of the self-dissolution of the German revolution, in which, I think, he is right. It may further happen that the greatest nihilistic action of mankind, war, will be unmasked in its self-destructive form. It seems as if the nihilists, after having used to their advantage war or the threat of war against small nations, try to demonstrate the absurdity of war among great nations. If the great nations do not consent to this double morality but insist on the reparation of injustices done, it may not be quite utopian to hope that war, as an institution of human history, may dissolve itself. Then a new order would be possible which would try to avoid future wars, possibly in forming federal unions which step by step would lead to a true society of European nations.[1]

[1] I should like to draw the attention of readers interested in psychological analysis of social facts to Manes Sperber's book *Zur Analyse der Tyrannis*, Science et Litérature, 21 Rue Cujas, Paris. He thinks the will to power to be an escapist compensation for aggressive anxiety born out of fear of being ridiculed.

F. H. Heinemann.

NEW BOOKS

Foundations of Ethics. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935–36. By Sir W. David Ross. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939. Pp. xvi+328. Price 15s.)

This work is in the main a more systematic and detailed setting-forth of the theory of the author's earlier work, *The Right and the Good*, and with one exception does not include any new developments of the first importance in his opinions, but in view of the fact that the earlier book has been the very centre of ethical controversy in this country ever since its publication, this is perhaps rather a reason for than against the perusal of the present work, which gives his considered reply to criticisms besides working out the theory more in detail than was possible in the shorter work. The *Foundations of Ethics* displays the characteristics of detailed care and precision, fairness in controversy, lucidity and clear insight into the ethical situation that we should all expect from Sir David Ross, and may be heartily commended to students of ethics. Some will no doubt regret the absence of any mention, even as illustrations, of the terrible practical ethical problems which were agitating the world when he wrote before the outbreak of war and still more to-day, but the author's aim is to write a treatise not on applied but on pure ethics, and such a treatise is not, it may be retorted, the place for sermons or incursions into politics, but requires a certain detachment if it is to be successful. If we will accept what he intended to provide and not look for something else, we can certainly all learn much from what is the fullest treatment of Ethics as a pure science (using science in the widest sense) published in this country for the last thirty years.

All philosophical writers on ethics have first to deal with those who seek to reduce the subject to a mere branch of psychology or even deny ethical "judgments" the right to be regarded as judgments at all. Sir David Ross gives an excellent summary of the objections to such views, which all naturalists or subjectivists should certainly read if they wish to appraise the difficulties they have to face, but I shall not dwell on this part of the work since the more original features of the book lie elsewhere. The author holds the view that the fundamental notions of ethics, "good" and right," are indefinable, though this does not mean that they are unknowable or that nothing further can be said about them but only that they are *sui generis*, and that any system of ethics can only be reached by the sifting out through criticism of what is true in the opinions crystallized in ordinary language and ordinary ways of thought and the distinguishing of those elements in them which are pieces of genuine intuitive knowledge, those which are exaggerations and confusions and those which are reasonable opinions.

The author regards his chief problem as a discussion of the relation between the aspect of ethics emphasized by those who speak chiefly of duty and moral laws and the aspect emphasized by those who speak chiefly of good and ends. This may seem to some a question of purely professional interest, but this is by no means the case. The question whether we ought, e.g. to keep promises simply because of the good consequences produced by keeping them, or because it is a law known to be valid in its own right independently of consequences, is surely not without practical bearing in particular cases, and

further, the whole spirit and nature of ethics is likely to be different for a man who makes primary the notion of rigid ethical laws and for a man who regards right action as only a means to the production of good effects, though the antithesis is in practice toned down somewhat because philosphers generally make concessions to the opposing point of view. For reasons which I shall shortly summarize, Ross regards the second type of view as unsatisfactory, but he assumes the validity, as far as they go, of the two main arguments against the first type: (1) that we can probably state no universal law which it might not be right to break in certain exceptional circumstances, (2) that it is plain that at least one of the chief considerations in deciding whether an act is right is the good or evil which it is expected to produce. In his earlier work, as is well known, he met this situation by the conception of *prima facie* duties. These are obligations which hold not indeed under all circumstances, but under all circumstances except those in which we are confronted by a superior obligation, e.g. it is not always our duty to make reparation to the best of our ability for harm due to a fault of ours, but it is always our duty to do so where we are not subject to a stronger obligation to do something else. *Prima facie* obligations can be known intuitively and some of these, e.g. the keeping of promises, are independent of any good done by fulfilling them, but among the most important *prima facie* obligations are obligations to produce certain goods, so the good likely to be produced has to be taken into account very seriously in deciding what we ought to do and is merely denied to be *the only* relevant factor. This theory is retained in the present work, where the author replies to the numerous criticisms which have been brought since the publication of *the Right and the Good*. In particular the duty of promise-keeping is discussed in much detail, in reply to Pickard-Cambridge's criticisms of his theory, and an attempt is made to show that it cannot be adequately explained on the utilitarian view, including under this term not only hedonistic utilitarianism, but any view which makes the right exclusively dependent on the good. He says the same of the duties of returning good for good and of making reparation for wrong done, but does not discuss these in detail. He admits that the duty of just distribution can be explained adequately by the utilitarian if he allows that the enjoyment of happiness in proportion to merit is itself a good over and above the good of the happiness and the merit (p. 73), but he does not think that such an explanation is possible in regard to the other duties mentioned. For in these cases it is not only the result itself, but its achievement by the act of the person who, e.g. keeps his promise, that is felt to be good, and this is only felt to be good because of the prior thought that the agent has a duty to do it (p. 289). This point is so important that it seems to me unfortunate that it is not made plain in the centre of the discussion of utilitarianism, but reserved for a later chapter. For, while I am inclined to think that Ross's other arguments refute any form of utilitarianism which makes the rightness of an act dependent only on its consequences, they do not refute a utilitarian who admits that in computing the good producible by an action the goodness or badness of the action itself should be taken into account, and then claims that the keeping of a promise, etc., is itself intrinsically good, or the breaking of it intrinsically bad; but such a view would, if Ross is right here, involve a vicious circle. Other difficulties for the utilitarian which Ross points out are (1) that it would not be right to increase the population at the expense of greatly diminishing the average good of each person even if the total good was thereby slightly increased, (2) that I am under no obligation to pursue my own pleasure, (3) that the obligation not to do evil is much more stringent than the obligation to do good, so that it would be wrong to hurt one man in order to

give a pleasure to another if the pleasure was only slightly greater than the pain; but he is inclined to think that the first two of these objections could be avoided by the utilitarian. Regret will be felt that Ross has made no attempt to connect the different *prima facie* duties into some kind of system, but he replies to those more monistically inclined that "there is no more justification for expecting a single ground of rightness than for expecting a single ground of goodness" (p. 83).

But there is one important change in Ross's position since the publication of *The Right and the Good*, though it had already shown itself prior to the present work in his paper in the *Proceedings of the International Congress* in Paris in 1937. He is now satisfied that "good," even in the sense of intrinsically good, has not a single meaning, and that, in particular, pleasure and moral good are not both "good" in the same sense at all (Chap. XI). What is morally good is good in the sense of being admirable or commendable, but it is never in itself an admirable characteristic to be enjoying pleasure, though some pleasures, those which are marks of a morally good nature, are admirable. The pleasure of other people is good in the different sense of being a worthy object of interest, while the interest in it is good in the first sense. One's own pleasure, on the other hand, is not good in either sense, but only in the sense of being inevitably an actual object of interest. Intellectual and artistic activity and morally good dispositions are also good in the first sense, and a right distribution of happiness in proportion to merit good in the second only. Everything which is good in the first sense is also good in the second. While "admirable" or "commendable" is used as a synonym for "good" in the first sense, this does not mean that "good" in this sense is *definable* in terms of the attitude of admiration. Ross denies that it is on the ground that to admire or approve anything presupposes the belief that it has independently of our attitude a goodness which makes it fit to be admired or approved, but "worthy object of interest" is put forward by him as an actual definition of "good" in the second sense of the term. The only thing that the different senses of "good" have in common is that they express a favourable attitude to what is pronounced good, but what a word signifies must be distinguished from the mental state which it expresses, and they have no common signification.

These new developments seem to have more far-reaching implications than were realized by Ross. In the first place, if "good" is defined as meaning "a worthy object of interest," it seems hardly possible to maintain that it is not always right to pursue the greatest good, for a worthy object of interest is presumably also a worthy object of pursuit, and if so the proposition that we ought to pursue the greatest good will be little more than the tautology that we ought to pursue what is most worthy of pursuit. It follows that Ross's denial that it is always right to pursue the greatest good can only amount to the assertion that what is good in his first sense is not always or equally good in his second sense or vice versa. Now, as we have seen, he holds that what is good in the first sense is always good in the second, and he never suggests that something which is admirable ought not to be pursued in proportion to its admirableness, so the above contention amounts to little more than saying that pleasure is not as such worthy of admiration, though it may be worthy of pursuit. But surely no thinker of importance ever has held that a person was worthy of admiration because he was enjoying a lot of pleasure! This may suggest that I think Ross's contribution on this subject of small importance, but I certainly do not, for (*a*) the distinction which he has introduced seems to me to have been overlooked by previous thinkers and yet to be quite necessary for an understanding of ethics, (*b*) he has made a very strong case against the view that duties like promise-keeping are to be justified solely by

reference to their consequences as opposed to the character of the act itself, whether we call the latter "good" or "right," (*c*) he has now analysed in terms of "right" or "ought" the sense of good which is directly relevant to action and thus turned the tables on the utilitarian. For though this definition, if logically worked out, would have forced Ross to say that it is always our duty to produce the greatest good, this would have been only a verbal victory for the utilitarian, since the latter's point is that the right depends on the good, but such a view would now involve a vicious circle since "good" has been defined in terms of right. It seems plain to me that the sense of "good" which the utilitarian is considering is the sense which Ross seeks to define as "worthy object of interest," not the sense which he equals with "admirable." No hedonist would say that all pleasure was to be "admired" or that pleasure was the only thing which could fittingly be "admired." As regards Ross's whole distinction, I had perhaps better add that I may have approached it with certain prejudices because I had independently worked out a similar distinction, which appeared in the January number of *Mind* for this year.

For Ross "right" is indefinable as well as "good." He accepts approximately the view suggested by Broad that "right" or "obligatory" expresses a relational characteristic consisting in a kind of fitness or suitability to a certain situation, not indeed complete suitability, but the greatest amount possible under the circumstances (p. 51 ff.). It must not be thought that this contradicts the view that "right" is indefinable, for the particular species of fitness expressed by the term is not reducible to any other concepts. He regards it as quite different from the suitability to ends with which the utilitarian sometimes identifies rightness. The only thing these two kinds of suitability have in common, he says, is that we have a favourable reaction to both, but since according to him this is also the one thing common to all the different senses of "good," he seems to be saying very little when he calls rightness a kind of suitability, except that rightness is a relational property. Rightness is for him practically identical with obligatoriness, except that there may be two alternative acts A and B which fulfil our obligations equally and more than any other possible act, in which case they would both be right but could not both be obligatory. He recognizes that "ought" is also used in a wider sense in which it does not imply moral obligation, but only suitability in the adoption of means to one's ends, or covers what is not under the control of our will, but says that this sense is "loose and improper." But it is not at all clear what can be meant by this. "Ought" is commonly used in such senses by educated people, perhaps even more frequently in this sense than in the strictly moral sense, and Ross's condemnation of this sense can hardly be based on considerations of linguistic style, grammar, or dictionary usage. Then in what sense can it be said that the word is being used loosely or improperly? That one meaning of a word is proper and another improper cannot be determined by the objective nature of things.

In Chapter VI, Ross restates his view that we are not under a moral obligation to act from any particular motive rather than any other, and defends it against the severe criticism to which it has been subjected. But he avoids some of the paradoxical consequences which he had accepted in his earlier work by maintaining that what we are under an obligation to do is, not to perform a given physical act, but *to set ourselves* to perform the act. The main argument for his view still is, I think, that we cannot be under an obligation to do what is not in our power, and it is not in our power to alter our desires instantaneously, though we may choose to do an act to which one desire points rather than another. But might it not be our duty, not indeed to alter our desires instantaneously, but to "set ourselves" to alter them, as it is said by

Ross to be our duty, not to act physically, but "to set ourselves" to do so? The chief difference between Ross and his opponents perhaps is that he insists on confining himself to the moment of action and therefore denies that we can alter our motives, while they include in the action a time-span in which we might do so. Surely if we confine ourselves to an absolutely instantaneous moment there is not time to do anything, even physically, and if we take a longer time lapse we can at least begin to exercise some appreciable effect on our desires by thinking of those aspects of the act which excite good ones rather than those which excite bad ones. But my confidence that Ross was wrong was somewhat shaken by reading his argument in this book. I think that on these and some other topics Ross's account would have benefited if he had paid more attention to the sense of "ought" in which neglect to do what one ought does not involve moral blame of the action. This sense seems to me very important, even ethically, as it is presupposed by the other.

Ross's account of the different things which are good, of the ethical scale of motives, and of the decision what particular acts are right is on principle the same as that in *The Right and the Good*. He includes a chapter on *Indeterminacy and Indeterminism*, in which he emphasizes the strength of the determinist case, reasserting the self-evidence of the principle that every change must be caused, and points out that, while indeterminism agrees better than determinism with certain elements in our ethical thought, determinism agrees better with others, so that it is not simply a case of metaphysics against ethics, but that there are ethical arguments on both sides.

A. C. Ewing.

An Autobiography. By R. G. Collingwood, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 167. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is a most welcome book both as a visible sign of the author's recovery from the illness mentioned in it and as a record of his reactions to the two most important philosophical movements that have influenced British thought in our time. While we have had a stream of autobiographies by politicians, writers, artists, men of science, if we except Herbert Spencer's, there have been few, if any, since John Stuart Mill's by a philosopher pure and simple. Without claiming comparison with so great a book as Mill's *Autobiography*, there is much in what Professor Collingwood tells us of himself that reminds us of Mill: the influence exercised upon him by his father, his own precocity as a child who began Latin at four, Greek at six, about the same time began to read everything he could find about the natural sciences, found himself deep in Kant's *Theory of Ethics* at the advanced age of eight, and felt that thereby "a veil had been lifted and his own destiny revealed." To this we have to add the versatility that enabled him to combine with his interest in philosophy a no less eager one in history and archaeology and make all three interests minister to one another. The difference which mainly concerns us here is that, while Mill's story is one of emancipation from a narrow, soul-destroying naturalism, Collingwood's is one of the deepening hold, which the great philosophical tradition that stretched from Socrates, through Descartes, and Kant up to the present day, had taken upon his mind. Because of the above-mentioned spread of activity, in order to do justice to his book, short as it is, there would need to be reviews by at least three different hands. By reason of my own shortcomings, I must confine myself to what after all occupies the main portion of it.

Under the names of the New Idealism and the New Realism Dr. Rudolf

Metz has recently given us a large-scale picture of the movements of which we have here a thumbnail etching, but it is one that has the advantage of being made in intimate touch with the leaders of both in the place of their origin. The author agrees with Metz in his description of "realism" as not so much a reaction from idealism as an example of "the old stock shooting up from below the graft, the scion dying back, and the tree reverting to its original state." When, however, he describes the idealist writers about the year 1910 as "epigoni"or after-born, who "felt that what needed to be said had been said" and who "could not write because they did not feel that they had anything to say," he forgets what the larger picture so fully recognizes: that just at that time, so far from being a withered stump, the "scion" was putting forth in Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures sprouts of entirely new and fruitful applications of its root idea. Leaving this for the moment, the main interest of this part of the book is the attack it launches, not without a spice of malice, against those of his contemporaries who represented the "old stock," under the sobriquet (borrowed from Berkeley) of "Minute Philosophers." It is prefixed by a delightful picture of their leader John Cook Wilson, which I will not spoil by shortening, and followed by a fierce indictment of them, first as the victims of a false logic of "propositions" instead of the true one of "question and answer," and secondly as wanting "a background of sound scholarship" in the history of philosophy, not to speak of a philosophy of history. In illustration of the former of these counts he was able to appeal happily to his own experience of field-work in excavation, where the essential thing is not to dig in search of anything you may turn up but to know the precise question you seek to answer. The latter charge leads him on to an exposition of his own philosophy of history which, he claims, must develop into the demand of "a new kind of philosophy." His own Essay on *Philosophical Method* (here described as in "matter" his "best book," in "style" his "only book"), gives the best clue to what he means. Recalling its main thesis as that of the difference between scientific and philosophical method, namely the mutual exclusiveness of the concepts with which the former deals as contrasted with the overlapping and mutual implication of them in philosophy, while finding myself at this distance of time still in entire agreement, I nevertheless cannot help feeling that too much is made of its novelty. Philosophy has been from the beginning both analytic or dialectic and synthetic or synoptic, and there is nothing so characteristic of its great central tradition than its adhesion to Plato's saying that the true dialectician is the synoptist and *vice versa*. Yet it is true that it was a real advance when Croce insisted on the difference between conceptual *opposites* like being and not-being and *distincts* like the good and the true. Croce's name does not appear in the book on Method, nor, so far as I can discover, in the *Autobiography*, and I think it likely enough that the author developed his own ideas independently. But, even though he owed more to the great Italian than here appears, so far from detracting from the merit of his own work, it would only be a proof of its continuity with the *philosophia perennis* which they both seek to follow. If this is true, the issue which the second of the above criticisms of realism raises may well seem a wider one than that either of the origin or the validity of his doctrine of method, and is concerned rather with its application to what by general agreement is the most important problem of philosophy in our time, that of the relative status in the universe of the distincts (or are they opposites?) of existence and value. I am not likely to be accused of siding with the "realists" as against the author, but I cannot help thinking that, if he had realized this more fully, he might have taken a more sympathetic view of their contentions in ethics, on which he lays so much stress. However

unsatisfactory their treatment of moral values may be, they are here at least really fighting on the same side as he is against the naturalism that would define "goodness" and "rightness" of conduct in terms of any empirically given object of desire such as pleasure or survival. It is not at this point, but at the later one of the relation of these apparently different concepts that the inadequacy of their theory comes into view, as is shown by the conflict which exists within the realist school itself, the one party led by Moore, the other by Prichard, as to their relative claims to be regarded as the more fundamental. But I am perhaps forgetting that this is not a philosophical essay but an autobiography.

I spoke at the beginning of the need of three different reviewers to do justice to it. But a fourth would be needed to deal adequately with the last chapter in which the writer applies its main teaching to the antithesis between "Theory and Practice" and illustrates from the politics of the last fifty years, and particularly from the political situation as it existed when his book was sent to the publisher. Yet on a matter of such profound interest to everyone at the present moment anyone who reads the newspapers may have something to say. Nothing could be happier than the writer's description of the three R.G.C.'s, whom he found in conflict with one another in the course of these years (the disbeliever in the possibility of separating theory from practice, the professional thinker and the man of action who thirsted for a "gloves-off philosophy," such as he seemed to find in Communism), leading on to a comparison between Fascism and Marxism and a ferocious indictment of the Spanish policy of the National Government. But I should be false to the view I have myself elsewhere expressed if I did not add that I believe that both comparison and indictment have been largely discounted by the subsequent course of events and that the whole history of the last few years will require to be rewritten. But I do not wish to conclude this review on a note of criticism, and I will end as I began by expressing the gratitude with which I believe that philosophers of all schools and parties will welcome this gem of a book.

J. H. Muirhead.

Our Knowledge of God. By John Baillie. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. ix + 263. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The main theme of this interesting book by the Professor of Divinity at Edinburgh is indicated by the autobiographical statement on p. 4: "No matter how far back I go, no matter by what effort of memory I attempt to reach the virgin soil of childish innocence, I cannot get back to an atheistic mentality. As little can I reach a day when I was conscious of myself but not of God as I can reach a day when I was conscious of myself but not of other human beings." For Dr. Baillie our knowledge of God is primary in the same sense as that of self and of other selves; although it is not "innate," if by that word we mean being in the mind prior to intercourse of any kind with other selves and with God, but results "from the continuing living communion between God's Spirit and the spirit of man" (p. 41), which is a communion actually mediated to every individual human being through other human beings. When, however, this is expressed by saying that "all peoples have such an awareness of the divine as is sufficient to awaken in them what it is impossible to regard otherwise than as a typically religious response," it is difficult to believe that anyone has ever really intended to claim "innateness" for the idea of God in any other sense. Even Zeno, as Dr. Baillie himself points out (p. 40), regards the soul of man as *μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα* of

the divine being, and thereby places a divine self-communication at the very source of the thinking in which he held that idea as an ἔμφυτος ἔννοια to be from the first involved.

The difficulty which many feel in admitting it to be possible that they themselves possess a direct experience or knowledge which they are not conscious of possessing, nay, are ready expressly to deny that they possess, is countered by our author with the help of an appeal to the remarkable paper by the late Professor Cook Wilson on "Rational Grounds of Belief in God," which, read to an Oxford audience in 1897, was included in the posthumous collection of his philosophical writings published in 1926 under the title *Statement and Inference*. From this paper he quotes (p. 207), words which, in the present writer's judgment, effectually dispose, if their implications be thought out, at once of the "analogical" theory of our knowledge of one another and of any account of the idea of God which explains it as *wholly* an inference from our consciousness of things other than God: "We don't want merely inferred friends. Could we possibly be satisfied with an inferred God?" To the elaboration of the argument against these positions, which I agree with him and with Cook Wilson in rejecting, Dr. Baillie has made in the work now before us a valuable contribution.

It is from no lack of interest in, or of sympathy with, our author's examination of the doctrines of Barth and Brunner that I propose to leave it on one side in this notice, but because a discussion of it would be more appropriate to the pages of a theological review than to those of *Philosophy*. It may suffice to say that Dr. Baillie, noting that, in recent thought upon the subject, "revelation has not come to be regarded as a special kind of nature, but nature has come to be regarded as a more general kind of revelation" (p. 38), and what had been called an "unaided" natural knowledge of God "in the last resort a revealed knowledge" (p. 43), is decidedly opposed to the Barthian denial (even in the milder form espoused by Brunner) of a genuine knowledge of God possible to fallen man apart from the Christian revelation. It is, however, somewhat surprising that, such being his position, and so clear his perception (as may be seen on p. 18) that Barth's "Christocentricism" is exaggerated, he has, I think, unnecessarily weakened the force of his general defence of the reality of a universal experience of God, not limited to those to whom it is mediated through Christian tradition, by introducing in several places (pp. 153, 165, 175, 176) a reference to Christ which suggests that he is thinking of it only so mediated. I have no wish to deny that for those born and brought up in Christian homes, the idea of God cannot be unaffected from the beginnings of conscious reflection by association with the Christian conception of the divine character; nor that it is precisely the characteristic note of Christianity that the call of Christ is felt by Christians to come with the authority of that "haunting Presence" (p. 156), at once ultimate and intimate, in which I agree with Dr. Baillie in believing that it is natural to man to feel himself standing. Nor yet again do I forget that, for the orthodox Christian theologian, *all* divine revelation must be in fact mediated by the Person of the Divine Trinity whom he believes to have become incarnate in Jesus. Nevertheless, the appeal of Dr. Baillie's reasoning in favour of a universal, even if frequently unrecognized, experience of God will, I think to not a few of those whom one hopes may be his readers, be confused by what seems to me to be, in the context, a premature assumption that this experience is an experience of Christ. After all, the Psalm quoted on p. 155 in illustration of the closeness of God's approach to us "in Christ" is itself an expression of pre-Christian religious experience; and it is rather Marcionism (or Barthianism) than historical Christianity which is unwilling to set the Gospel against the back-

ground of a *praeparatio evangelica*, not confined to the Old Testament, apart from which it is not to be understood. Dr. Baillie is certainly neither Barthian nor Marcionite; and the criticism I have ventured to make is passed not on the essence of his teaching in this volume but only on what I have felt to be an unfortunate accident of its presentation.

C. C. J. Webb.

Christianity and Morals. By Edward Westermarck, LL.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1939. Pp. xiv+427. Price 21s. net.)

Professor Westermarck, who died a few months after this book was published, was well known for his anthropological and sociological studies. These made him the exponent of a moral relativism according to which "all moral concepts are ultimately based on one or other of the two emotions, moral approval or moral disapproval." Emotions, however, are "determined by cognitions," and "intellectual factors" exercise "a very great influence on moral judgments." It is these factors which produce differences in moral codes, but the "substantial similarities" between these codes are due to their emotional basis, a basis explicable because the emotions in question are "useful to the species."

It might have been expected that a thinker prepared to explain away the basis of moral experience in terms of emotion and biological utility, would hardly waste his time in considering criticisms offered by religion or theology. But the interesting thing is that Professor Westermarck seems to have regarded the history and the teaching of the Christian Church as such a formidable obstacle to the acceptance of his views that he had to write a long book to show, first, that the moral teaching of Christian theologians does not accord with our moral emotions and, therefore, must be rejected, and secondly that the influence of the Christian Church on moral conduct has been on the whole unfortunate.

So far as the first of these theses is concerned, the chief villain is St. Paul. He was "mainly a theologian, not a moralist," and despite certain passages where he inconsistently reverts to the " retributive" ethics of Jesus, the keystone of his teaching is that man is not saved by his own efforts but by faith, and that works do not matter. This led to the "moral absurdity" of Augustine's doctrine of salvation and the official doctrine of the Church in later ages. Perhaps the only comment required on this interpretation of Christian theology is that its author believes that the doctrine of original sin is "explicable by the conception of sin as a kind of material substance transplanted by propagation."

The demonstration of the immorality of the Christian Church presents little difficulty to the author. For example, the Church supported slavery and war, contributed nothing to the movement for preventing cruelty to animals, persecuted heretics and witches, etc. The ground covered here is familiar and the treatment smacks of the nineteenth-century publications of the Rationalist Press Association.

Professor Westermarck states his case with immense learning. The two or three thousand footnotes are like a card index to the reading of a lifetime; and yet what they really demonstrate is the melancholy fact that it is possible to read a library of books and still be debarred from an understanding of the subjects with which they deal. Professor Westermarck treats moral and religious experience as sociological facts to be investigated by the external method appropriate to the study of radiation or osmosis. The personal experience requisite for the illumination of the facts does not seem to have been his,

and his book may, therefore, strike those who do not already share his views as somewhat perverse,

T. M. KNOX.

The Validity of Religious Experience. By F. E. ENGLAND, Ph.D., M.A., B.D. (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Ltd., 1937. Pp. vii + 288. Price 8s. 6d.).

The belatedness of this review is in part owing to the disarrangements caused by war and previously by other matters, but it is also due to the fact that the book was not received till a considerable time after it was issued. Those who know Dr. England will expect to find solid scholarly work in all he writes and this book is no exception. Its main thesis is the unity of the intuitive and interpretative elements of religious experience. One of the most interesting chapters is that which supports this position by an acute analysis of the apprehension of objects, a line of approach which is unusual. Dr. England demurs to admitting that the objectivity of religious experience is a question of the objective reference of a given idea of God. Rather is it, he thinks, what concept of God we are compelled to form to do justice to the facts of experience. That may be so as regards the believer, but if we are to show that the existence of God is a defensible belief, it is easier to do so in the way Dr. England rejects than in the way he accepts, should the objector reply with Laplace, that he has no use for the hypothesis of God. Dr. England further contends that the criterion that the real and the rational are co-extensive is invalid. The hosts of Hegel are now too attenuated to dispute this. Instead, he suggests that the criterion should be "progressive discrimination." The search for the conception of God as it is demanded by the facts, leads Dr. England to reject Absolutism, as furnishing no real explanation of the phenomenal world of experience. He adopts Urban's criticism of Alexander, that either space-time admits of no conception of emergence, or if it does, it then is more than space-time. He proceeds to grapple with Whitehead's doctrine of God, with the valour of Laocoon, but succeeds in extricating himself from the coils of this perplexing conception more successfully than many critics have done. Finally he comes to his own conception. We are not entitled to call God a person, but we cannot doubt the divine nature is characterized by personal qualities. Actually, many do doubt that very point, and though I agree with Dr. England on the matter, it seems that here again we feel the defect of the position that has been mentioned, namely that we are compelled to form a certain conception of God. After all, is not that to return to a path that runs very close to the old theistic "proofs"? This is, however, to give a scanty account both of the critical and constructive sides of Dr. England's work, which is sound, measured, and coherent. The book deserves a welcome as a definite contribution to an important subject.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The Passions of Life. Being the Search for an Ideal. By WILLIAM ROMAINE PATERSON. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 220. Price 6s.)

The author tells us that the title is derived from Plato's simile of the two horses of the chariot of the soul, symbolizing reason and passion. If the passage in *Phaedrus* is meant, the nobler horse is not reason but "spirit" (Thumos), which as Plato says is driven by voice and reason. Reason corresponds rather to the driver than to the steed. By "passions" Mr. Paterson refers to the

"inner world" of feeling. The discussion is carried along pleasantly, though at times the author's dicta may be thought a little summary, for example, his remarks on totemism. He adopts Durkheim's view that the totem was a sign of religious and political unity. Here his authority may shield him, though Durkheim has by no means convinced all his fellow scholars on the point. But when he says that traces of totemism are universal, he is wrong, and when he adds "even among the ancient Hebrews" he is on uncertain ground, whilst to call the Ark of the Covenant a totem is absurd. Nor is it correct to say that "a religious relation of a magic kind linked the totem to the tribe." Totemism is an exceedingly obscure subject and no summary statements regarding it are justifiable. The last chapter declares that the ascent of man is to come though the aesthetic ideal. "Art brings peace," says Mr. Paterson. If so, we wish it good speed, but we seem to remember that Hitler has declared himself to be really an artist, not a politician. To argue, moreover, that men have been tortured and killed in the name of religion, but never in the name of art, is perfectly true, but the same is true of mathematics. Is that any reason for believing that there is saving power in mathematics? "The only remaining hope seems to lie . . . in a fresh ideal of conduct based on the aesthetic education of mankind." If that is the only hope the present reviewer fears he is among the hopeless.

E. S. Waterhouse.

Religion in Essence and Manifestation. By G. Van Der Leeuw, D.Theol. Translated by J. E. Turner, M.A., Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 709. Price 25s.)

The German original, *Phänomenologie der Religion*, 1933, from which Dr. Turner translates, appeared just before the Nazis had extended their domination over scholarship, and was widely welcomed. The aid of the Sir Halley Stewart Trust makes this ambitiously planned volume accessible to the English reader. Indeed, although one is thankful that such a work should be thus available, if there is to be criticism, it is that the plan is too sweeping to be covered adequately in any single volume, and the average length of the chapters, about six pages each, makes for some disconnectedness. Take, for example, the section on the soul. It consists of nine chapters, covering 60 pages in all, and dealing severally with The Soul as a Whole, Souls in the Plural, The Form of the Soul, The "External Soul," The Uniquely Powerful and Divine Soul, The Immortal Soul, The Creature, The Country of the Soul, The Destiny of the Soul. It is obvious that these discussions must overlap. No such clean-cut divisions can be naturally made, and that tends to a certain incoherence and jerkiness which irritates the reader. Moreover, though there is great erudition and the most widely gathered authorities are brought to give evidence, the subject is so vast and the material so bewilderingly varied, that the result is often unconvincing. One might, indeed, guarantee that, taking the *Golden Bough* alone as authority, a case could be made for almost any view of the character of primitive forms of belief, well supported by the customs and beliefs of some race or other. It needs an encyclopædia, not a single volume, to present the essence of manifestation of all forms of religion from that of savages to Christianity. Notwithstanding this, one is amazed at the width and comprehensiveness of Professor Van der Leeuw's survey. Only a man of exceptionally wide reading and deep insight could have produced such a book as this. Dr. Turner deserves the grateful thanks of all who are interested in the study of religion for having undertaken the stiff

task of translation. The author keeps strictly to the phenomenological standpoint. He does not discuss the pre-history or origins of religion. He has obviously been influenced by Otto, but has no particular theory to air. Patiently, inductively, and systematically, he sorts out his vast material, and seeks throughout it all to exhibit the essential characteristics of religion in the manifold of outward manifestation. No one will read this book without being made wiser, and after all, can any higher commendation be given? It is not the type of book that anyone will read and set aside. It will be kept and referred to again and yet again. It may well prove a literary watershed from which streams will flow in many directions, and serve as much in what it suggests as in what it expounds.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Preface to Faith. By LOUIS ARNAUD REID, D.Litt. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 214. Price 6s.)

Professor Reid seeks to be the candid inquirer. What, he asks, are the essential minima of religious and, particularly, Christian belief, and how can such statements be expressed in a way congruent with modern thought? He realizes how stupid is much of the criticism popularly passed upon religion. "In other matters we must consult the expert; but any stick is good enough with which to beat the theologian . . . . In no other field will wild generalization upon little foundation win such easy applause from the 'intellectuals'." As to the essence of religion, Professor Reid says that it is based on an intuitive apprehension of spiritual reality as something to which the individual spirit can and does respond. He admits it is false to say that the God of Christianity is an inferred God. Yet, Professor Reid is equally sure that we have no clear philosophical knowledge of God. If we stress the word philosophical in the sense of purely rational, this may be correct. Professor Reid adds that we have plenty of "unclear" knowledge. It does not appear whether or not he uses these terms in Leibniz's sense, but surely the intuitive apprehension of spiritual reality is knowledge in a true sense. Professor Reid does not discuss the character of religious knowledge, which is a pity. He simply remarks, "Of knowledge I need not say very much," which is surprising in a book so much given over to the intellectual comprehension of religion.

Professor Reid can be credited with the advantages of the lay position he represents, but its drawbacks are also noticeable. For example, he says that unassailable contemporary testimony about the life and person of Jesus is very scanty indeed. True, he does not adopt the scatter-brained "Christ-myth." But one wonders if Professor Reid has ever doubted the existence of Julius Caesar of whom we have much less contemporary and unassailable evidence than we have of Jesus. It is doubtful, indeed, if any historical figure is as well attested as is Jesus. Those who want to pursue the myth idea will find abundant easy examples for their skill—Zoroaster, The Buddha, Lao Tsze, all of whom are regarded as actually having existed on far less evidence than there is regarding Christ.

Laying the book down, one wonders how much faith is left when the preface is over. The answer is that Professor Reid's moral faith is as sturdy as his intellectual faith is hesitant. None need complain. What is essential in Christianity is the Galilean Gospel of Jesus Himself, ethical rather than theological, the expression of a life not a creed. Added to that is a mystical experience, an intuitive certainty, the inner light. Against these creeds are secondary. We must be prepared to vindicate rationally what we believe intuitively, but as Bergson realizes so emphatically the representation is a poor expression of

the actuality. Professor Reid has both the intellectual acumen and the spiritual sympathies for the task he has undertaken, and the result, the conclusions he reaches, are less important than the method. On such subjects no two men think exactly alike. Probably no reader will wholly agree or disagree with the author. But the method and spirit of the inquiry are a model for all who would seek for the intellectual expression of religious faith.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The Philanthropic Motive in Christianity. By F. M. HNÍK, Ph.D. Translated by R. and M. WEATHERALL. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1938. Pp. xii + 328. Price 16s.).

Dr. Hník is, or was, Reader in Christian Social Ethics in the John Huss Faculty at Prague, and the book under notice is designed as "an analysis of the relations between theology and social service." It presents a comprehensive and well-documented survey stretching from New Testament to modern times. There is a good bibliography, in which works in English are well represented, at the end of each of the five sections which compose the book, though Lord Stamp's valuable little book on *The Christian Ethic as an Economic Factor* has escaped notice. It is fair ground for complaint that no index is provided, which, in a book of this type where so many men and doctrines come under review, is a serious handicap to its use. Of the five sections, those upon early Christianity, Mediaeval Catholicism, and the Reformation deal with subjects that have been treated by others; although, of course, the treatment here is not general but from the special standpoint of the book as a whole, namely that of the Church and social service. But the two concluding sections on the Social Philosophy of Modern Humanitarianism and on that of the Czechoslovak Church cover ground upon which there is little written. The former, however, is practically limited to Unitarians, Channing and Theodore Parker in particular, and without disparaging what has been done by these men, it must still be said that modern Humanitarianism is by no means the product of Unitarianism alone. It is extraordinary that a book that aims at so wide a scope passes without, or almost without, notice the work of the Quakers, the Methodist Movement, the Prison Reformers, Wilberforce, and many others. Modern Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are also left aside. Whilst, therefore, Dr. Hník's book is by no means a complete account of its subject, it is within its limits a capable and competent one that will prove useful to all who desire to study the relation of Christian faith to Christian charity.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Reason: University of California Publications in Philosophy, Volume 21. (Berkeley: University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. 228. Price $2.25; 11s. 6d.)

This volume worthily maintains the high standard of its predecessors. This annual enterprise may well be regarded as one of the more interesting events of the philosophical calendar. Those responsible are to be congratulated on their courageous choice of topics, while the contributors to the present series deserve praise for the liveliness and general excellence of their papers. *Reason* is a theme which might well give pause to the hardiest. It is too large to be encompassed even by a symposium such as this: nevertheless, the contribution made by these papers to various features of the theme is noteworthy. A brief review of each paper is all that space will permit.

The Appeal to Reason, by William R. Dennes. Professor Dennes' concern is this: if a Herr Goebbels tells us that "his blood" tells him thus or so, and bids him behave in such and such a manner, of what avail is it to call him unreasonable? If, against him, we "appeal to reason," to what, with what justification, and to what effect do we appeal? Firstly, of course, we must know *what* we appeal to. Hence the question: what is reason? From Hume the author takes over four senses of reason, namely (i) experimental reasoning of causes and effects, (ii) the elaboration of tautologies, (iii) "the reasoning that analyses and distinguishes meanings . . ." (iv) informed appreciation and evaluation. The great rationalists have not, he argues, improved upon or added to this list. His answer to the first question is that, in any of these senses, the "appeal to reason" fails both in effect and in logic against the out-and-out blood-and-soiler. He stands his chance of winning in the struggle for existence over his scientific and reasonable opponent: he also "seems to win the theoretical argument." On the point of survival the author may be right; and he is certainly justified in holding that reasons i, ii, and iii do not move men to action, and that as to reason iv it is difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreement on the reasonable where men differ as to the *important*. On a more adequate rendering, however, of reason iv the blood-and-soiler might be *shown* to be unreasonable; as also on reason iii. A Socrates might not *change* or *convince* him, but might expose him (to an objective bystander) in contradictory assertions about, e.g., man, his station and duties. On the whole Professor Dennes takes a "low" view of reason which is not that of all the symposiasts.

Artifacts of Reason, by J. Loewenberg. Science and metaphysics are artifacts, and have more than a distant analogy to works of art in the aesthetic sense. The latter are artifacts of imagination primarily; but imagination is continuous with reason, and whereas science keeps its distance, metaphysics lies very close to music and poetry. The principles of acquiescence and of transformation apply to scientist, metaphysician, and artist, but in varying degrees. In science acceptance is at a maximum, in fine art transformation. The two criteria of truth, correspondence and coherence, apply both to science and metaphysics. In science correspondence leads, in metaphysics coherence. But correspondence with what? With the data or objects of common sense. But this last is also artifactual. In short, everything cognitive is an artifact of reason. "We cannot go behind or beyond reason without reducing cognition to sentience. And sentience . . . is silent." There is, parenthetically, an interesting discussion of the *ontophobia* and *methodolatry* of some contemporary schools.

Reason in Science, by V. F. Lenzen. Science arises from a double process of reason, namely, abstraction and construction. From experience is taken a generalization. Then, "the significant step in the development of principles is the transformation of generalizations . . . into postulates. These postulates may be interpreted as the definitions of characters of perceptible things, or as principles of construction of the concepts of objects which are assumed in order to explain experience." Contemporary physics shows (e.g. in the invention of a new entity, the neutrino, to permit the application of the principle of energy to nuclear disintegrations) how the hypothetical structure of science is erected. Once firmly established, such inventions come almost to be treated as observed. As one of Professor Lenzen's colleagues justly remarks, the keyword here is *almost*. The author turns, finally, to the crucial problems for the philosophy of science, namely perception and cause; and on both he is drawn to the sceptical answers of Hume.

Definition, Stephen C. Pepper. Against "those who believe in the reality

of essences" and against logical positivists, Mr. Pepper holds that definition is definable. His search follows the Socratic path through instances, provisional definition, exception, and refinement, to something approaching a final definition. The article is too detailed for effective summarization. Provisionally a definition is "a rule for determining the meaning of symbols." This suggests the distinction between a law (of nature) and a rule, leads to an inquiry concerning the arbitrary and the independent, and discovers the general field of research, which is "the field of the arbitrary in cognition." This area the author studies by sampling. In no case, it is found, is arbitrariness absent. Where the purest description is sought there is still arbitrariness in (i) the selection of symbols, (ii) the degree of precision of application of symbols, (iii) the choice of measurement, (iv) the choice of frames of reference for measurement, (v) the choice of controlling hypotheses. His improved but still tentative definition is: "A definition is an expression illustrating the conditions for the application of a rule in accordance with which the meanings of certain symbols expressed are determined."

Reason in History, by E. W. Strong. This is a study in the vein, and under the inspiration of, Santayana, whose scepticism he approves, while suggesting limitations. It is all rather *fin de siècle* and superior. The author (notwithstanding his underlying Sophistic humanism) takes a very much higher view of science than do his more scientific colleagues. From his own summary: "The test of" (historical) "likelihood is twofold: (1) conformity of an interpretation to the facts established by critical scholarship" (a coherence test, surely, since the relevant scholarship will be historical), "and (2) conformity of an interpretation to contemporary scientific knowledge. The foregoing argument, if sound, enables us to reject interpretations which deliberately cultivate and inculcate historical myths. First, such interpretations contain an internal contradiction in claiming to promote social welfare while subverting science. Secondly, they are false by the test of conformity to demonstrable propositions in science." On this one might dilate, but perhaps it had better be left for examination to the author's fellow symposiasts. The upshot of the discussion is that reason in history has the function of guiding men in the light of these established facts and demonstrated propositions. "While rationalization tends to confirm beliefs already entertained, an examination of science and society leads to revisions of theory and recastings of practice." We travel with Mr. Strong a longish and not unpleasant road, but we do not journey far.

Rationality and Irrationality, by Paul Marhenke. The author first distinguishes several senses of rationality and its opposite. There are several senses in which the terms could only be predicated of beings with minds. By a rational being he would understand one which can perform one or more of the following functions: "(1) It can entertain beliefs and express them by means of propositions. (2) It can draw inferences both deductive and inductive from these propositions. (3) It can apprehend or intuit necessary connections, that is, it is able to recognize the *a priori* truth of a proposition. (4) It is capable of forming *a priori* concepts." A sub-distinction arises from the consideration that a man's beliefs or inferences may be irrational. His rationality, however, would only be questioned were it "impossible to convince him that he has violated the rules." There are other senses of rational and irrational the subject of which is not a mind. Some speak habitually of an "irrational" element in knowledge. Professor Marhenke develops some of the difficulties, on several sides, arising from this sort of view. His opinion that, "No materials are ever supplied to the mind which do not bear the impress of mind," brings him close to that of Professor Loewenberg. He turns to consider those rational

explanations which follow the path of subsumption and in so doing provide points of rest for the mind, but no steady content, since there are no settled highest generalities. This discussion he closes with a not unkindly criticism of Meyerson's view of final explanation as identification. "If Mr. Meyerson were right, one could not but marvel at the stupendous efforts that are made to reach this proposition" (that $a=a$). "Reasoning in accordance with the scheme of identification about the world seems to be the hard way of finally saying nothing about it."

Reason as Custodian, by D. S. Mackay. Professor Mackay suggests that reason is the guidance of thought and action in accordance with standard meanings. He is at one, therefore, with Professor Pepper in seeing the problem chiefly as that of *the reason for definition,* and not a definition of reason. He looks to the *Meno* and other Platonic writings for guidance in the quest for "ideal standards." Thus he is led to redress the balance of the symposium in favour of the practical activity and exercise of reason.

Reason and Purpose, by George P. Adams. Reason suggests order, and howsoever they may otherwise differ rational situations will exhibit order and not disorder. But the proposition is not convertible; all order is not rational. Nature presents orders, from the thin but pervasive space-time order to more complex organizations: and these may be so impressive as to distract the philosopher's attention from the profound difference between order in the human scene and order outside it. Were the two to duplicate one another, lacking only reflective mind in the one, the difference would be "momentous." For "once any organizing pattern of life and experience is discerned and reflected upon . . . reflective thought . . . turns around, scrutinizes, appraises, and criticizes the very principle of which it was originally the expression. . . . It examines its credentials, its claims, its validity." Reason adds another unique "dimension" to events. Reason (Professor Adams continues) as measured and detached criticism is sharply to be distinguished from reason as narrowly purposive, as that practical intelligence which man shares, in some degree, with the animals. Modern civilization stresses reason in the latter sense, virtually ignoring it in the former. It is thus clever in contrivance, but is lacking in reason. Objection may be taken to this narrow use of *purpose,* since without "ends and purposes" the "disinterestedness, objectivity, and universality which it is the office of reason to provide" can only survive (if at all) as empty and unfruitful sentiments. But Professor Adams allows that his contrast may be too sharp.

From this brief summary it should be evident that this volume deserves study.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Human Nature Writ Large: A Social Psychologic Study and Western Anthropology. By F. CREEDY. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. ii + 484. Price 15s. net.)

In a free country every man has a right to play the philosopher; and so too the human sciences, anthropology, sociology, psychology, are no monopoly of the special student, but, in so far as they appeal to the public at large, may be held to a like extent to invite the co-operation of the layman. Whatever Mr. Creedy's technical qualifications may be for handling that well-worn theme, man's past history and future prospects, he certainly manages to be interesting. If his treatment is loose no less than it is large, there is plenty of good sense and good temper behind it; and the reader is not likely

to withhold his sympathy even if he be one of those who demand such strictness in the use of terms as a given type of argument allows. The title presumably looks back to Plato's metaphor of the "larger letters," and bids us seek a key to the moral life of the individual in a social psychology which is here said to amount to a "Western anthropology," whatever that may be. For anthropology recognizes no meridian line, whether drawn at the Rhine or at the Jordan, and is by no means ready to concede more than its fair share of importance, reckoned in terms of survival-value, to that so-called Western phase of culture which can nowadays be studied in Japan or Uganda almost as profitably as in Europe or America. One gathers, however, from the fact that the book has the blessing of so distinguished an anthropologist as Dr. Malinowski that, even if the 'average man' for whose benefit the book is especially written is primarily Western and white, the underlying principles are derived from a contemplation of mankind in its universal aspect. In particular, men in general are addicted to mythology by way of rationalizing their very various customary ways of life. Unfortunately, the term has a bad sense, and is thus question-begging, as if my own beliefs alone escaped the charge of being mythological, and were by contrast rational. But if faith were to wait on demonstration, our moral world, and we with it, would blow out like a candle. On the other hand, to re-examine our beliefs so as to purge them of the nonsense that undoubtedly clings to them, if only because intelligence is not equally distributed between leaders and followers, and the former, even if well-meaning, are bound to speak in parables, is undoubtedly helpful; and, with the progress of education under a democracy, may well lead to moral advance. Mr. Creedy is mainly concerned with the critical examination of current beliefs as they bear on religion and on economics. As regards the former, his attitude is tolerant rather than enthusiastic, and, while he regards a certain idealism as a permanent trait of human nature, he notes how religion in its institutional forms finds it hard to keep in touch with the intellectual life of the day. On the subject of economics he speaks with more assurance and, one might guess, with fuller knowledge of the facts, and one gathers that the New Deal, rightly understood, can provide a cure for the more disastrous effects of the dollar-hunting craze. Perhaps he underestimates the amenities that wealth brings in its train, or it may be that in the United States, where a bathing-pool is said to be the equivalent of an English park in the assessment of social status, the purchasing-power of money is less when material and spiritual advantages are reckoned up together. Be this as it may, Mr. Creedy's review of the modern problems confronting the Western world, and variously concerned with religion, wealth, war, marriage, and, in short, all the main elements of our so-called civilization, is both penetrating and conspicuously honest; and, whereas it is possibly a little untidy in thought and expression, this is at most but a superficial fault, and there is good, much good, in the heart of it.

R. R. Marett.

The Boundaries of Science: A Study in the Philosophy of Psychology. By John Macmurray. (London: Faber & Faber. 1939. Pp. 268. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The scope of this book requires both title and sub-title for its description. Its contention is that the attempt to make a science of psychology clearly reveals the need for a type and system of knowledge that is not science. Psychology is the only province that remained for science to conquer. Taking

stock of its victory we can see plainly, for the first time, that science cannot be everything in the knowledgeable way.

Mr. Macmurray is always a stimulating writer both for professional philosophers and for a laity that is philosophically inclined. He has not let himself down here. I don't think the book is easy for readers of either the above classes, but readers of the second class may find it smoother going than readers of the first class. It is a prolonged dialectical argument exploiting antinomies and "paradoxes." The trouble about such an argument is that wary and practised readers are apt to question or to deny either thesis or antithesis or both in each antinomy that is presented. They therefore hesitate so often that they find it difficult to enjoy a marching discussion that must go with a swing if it goes at all. In comparison with such readers those who are glad when they can see the point of an argument, and are not inclined to stop and scratch their heads, have a much better chance of pleasurable excitement.

However that may be, I should like to express my respectful admiration for the way in which Mr. Macmurray has written this book. He has used plain English or what looks like plain English. His illustrations illustrate without distracting one's attention. He does not clutter up his pages with learned debris, however interesting, and he has a strong sense of proportion. Thus although the book is shortish it is full of meat. In confessing, as I have to confess, that I find the book less digestible than palatable, I should like to add that I hope the defect is in me.

Mr. MacMurray holds that the behaviouristic (and psycho-analytic) psychology of recent times is the first serious effort to bring human nature within the ambit of science proper. For sociological reasons that (he says) is what one should expect. Science had to begin with the external world; so Galileo began with it. We can now take stock of the limits of science. Its inadequacy in dealing with man reveals limitations that previously were easy to overlook. Can we really expect to co-operate with our fellows on the basis of the external observation of their behaviour, and of their observation of ours? Let us examine the psychology of psychology. We shall see that intentions are excluded from science, yet govern all that can properly be called human *action*. The same lesson may be learned from psycho-therapy with its characteristic paradox or antinomy, viz. that the theory depends upon the externality of the unconscious to the conscious, while the cure depends upon interiorizing the unconscious and including it in a unified conscious personality. A general study of the relation between motives and intentions yields the same result. Unconscious intentions are contradictions in terms; yet "science" cannot begin to deal with intentions. The wider moral is said to be that there is philosophical understanding as well as scientific verification and that each has a legitimate sphere.

The above is a rapid and vaguish sketch of an argument which depends for its force upon the solution of the constituent antinomies. Naturally enough among such antinomies one encounters quite a lot of old friends, "subjective" and "objective" (sometimes mumming in odd disguises), the supposed impossibility of self-observation, "making a difference" to what is known and not making such a difference, determinism, the external observer's predicament in all "science"; and so on. I have no space to discuss these old friends with new faces, to say nothing of the new friends. So I shall only indicate a few of my difficulties, and, I am afraid, will be rather eclectic in doing so.

Why is the science of psychology said to be so very modern? Has it not marked affinities with Aristotle's *De Anima*? Why precisely were Hume and Hartley unscientific in their attempts to reach a science of human nature? Why is Comte ignored? The answer would seem to lie in some special conception of science which seems to me to be assumed rather than explained.

Why again is it so certain that man has to begin with the external world and proceed later to sociology? Are his parents and nurses and the head-hunter across the marsh so very negligible? And if it be so, what precisely is the sociological reason that delayed "science" until Galileo turned up (I suppose it is Galileo that Mr. Macmurray is thinking about although he names no names). What certainty have we that Galileo or his like would accept behaviourism and psycho-analysis?

There is something gay about a chapter on "the psychology of psychology," but if the chapter were about the behaviour of behaviourists, it would startle nobody by its title. (I think Macmurray would admit as much.)

That, however, is only a beginning of my long list of difficulties. I hope Mr. Macmurray will have a wide public. In any case I believe that he deserves a discerning one.

JOHN LAIRD.

Toward a Dimensional Realism. By CHARLES M. PERRY. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1939. Pp. ix + 180. Price $2.50.)

This metaphysical enterprise might—only half-facetiously—be described as an essay in the fruitfulness of the right-angle. It aims to show that what philosophers have tried to account for under the traditional doctrines of the universal and particular, of relations, of cause and effect, of substance and attribute, of subject and object, and more recently by the notion of "emergence" can be better accounted for by "the dimensional principle." This principle is not defined or definable, for it is universal or ubiquitous. "Dimension" is not spatial or temporal. "Space and time are not the most fundamental or the most general principles in the universe. . . . They are, rather, a specific instance of the dimensional principle, namely, that in which it is applied to the character of besideness" (p. 37).

The "event" with which some modern philosophies begin is analysed into two components or "dimensions"—that of the line of the event, and that of "the changeless" in respect of this line. "The 'changeless' for a given event may change but, if so, it does so in some line of action or direction that is indifferent to or at right-angles with the advance of the event . . ." (p. 10).

Of relations: these . . . "are movements negating certain things which remain fixed and therefore right-angular to the movements and arriving at other things which are fixed and therefore right angular to the given movement but which must contain at least a component which is right angular to the thing which was originally negated" (p. 61). Further, "Their essential nature is to be active" (p. 73). Space will not permit citation of the author's solutions of the several problems associated with causes and effects, or with consciousness (which last—we are told, but without surprise—is at right-angles to its object).

It should be clear from even these brief references that for all his ingenuity the author makes large demands upon the reader's indulgence. From the outset his "right-angles" are mildly Pickwickian ("so to speak," pp. 11, 87, and *passim*), while as he advances from the geometrical to the human and social we find more and more of Pickwick and less and less of simple sense. (For example: "the supreme value" in society is "the maximum dimensionality." A good society protects and fosters "multidimensionality.") Furthermore, were the dimensional account of reality in substance acceptable it would still remain, but for features simple smuggled—e.g. that relations are active, that contradiction "keeps the universe changing"—an anatomy merely; whereas most of the important problems concern what we may call the physiology or

'go' of things. When, however, the author descends momentarily from his angular hobby-horse, his underlying acumen often brings forth judgments suggestive and admirable. Perhaps I should close this notice with such a passage. "It is frequently asserted with an appearance of great authority that no one knows what life is. If by that statement is meant that no one can express the distinctive character of living substance in terms of simpler levels it is true. . . . If it means, however, that no one can delimit its characteristic directions and define them with ever greater accuracy, it is false. . . . It is possible to know life in the same sense that it is possible to know anything else" (p. 145). Against much mystification this seems to me a sound opinion.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Odysseus oder die Zukunft der Philosophie. By F. HEINEMANN. (Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer Verlag, 1939. Pp. 116. Price Kr. 3.15.)

The author of this essay, one of the many philosophers for whom Germany has no room, has been driven upon an Odyssey the spiritual aspects of which have bitten into his mind more deeply than the physical ones. The first part of the essay, beautifully and powerfully written, is an intensely personal document, which it would be inhuman to analyse or summarize: it reflects a triumph of philosophical passion over the beastliness which has rooted the author and his like from post and home and fatherland. The extinction of the freedom without which philosophy cannot exist, and the nervelessness and lifelessness of philosophy in the other countries of Europe, provide the starting-point for the reflections of the second part. Not the exiled philosopher only, but philosophy itself is thrust out on an Odyssey, and we are summoned to consider the sort of journey it should make if it is to reach its haven. For too long, says Dr. Heinemann, philosophers have been negative, denying this and denying that, and by this nihilism have contributed to the now obvious dehumanization of Europe. To become philosophers again we must become men again, renouncing the conceptual system-building that leaves most things out, and making our thinking emerge from and guide life. This means among other things that we must recover first-hand experience instead of seeing, as most of Europe is now seeing, the world and its problems through the distorting spectacles of national and class propaganda.

Dr. Heinemann makes certain suggestions on the technical plane, but neither the space he has been allowed (the pamphlet is one of a series) nor the essay-form which he has adopted (rightly, I think) enables him to develop them to the point where their value can be seen. His most general point is that we are at present far from a philosophy and must remain for a while at the exploratory level, seeking out the various philosophical *possibilities*. European philosophy, for instance, has hitherto bound itself too closely to the exact sciences on the one hand, and to theology on the other; the realms of biology and history have remained largely unexploited, and their methods ungeneralized and unexamined. The desideratum, therefore, is a study of reality as a connection of concrete qualities, as distinguished from both mathematical abstractionism and the crass materialism which sees only a *sinnliche Welt* but not a *Sinnbereich*, only a world of sense without any sense. The function of reason is to give access to the transcendent world of meaning which informs the sensible world. One procedure would be to examine the branches of knowledge as now constituted and see whether their accepted combinations and separations are right. This would doubtless

lead to a single comprehensive science of man, another of life, and so on, matching each relative totality with an adequate discipline and seeking threads by which to unite one with another. One such thread, it is suggested, is direction (*Richtung*), exemplified inorganically in magnetic phenomena and organically in the tropisms, and operating in man as self-direction upon objects. It is claimed that the acceptance of this notion would make the notion of final causes unnecessary.

These suggestions, to reveal their force, would require some acquaintance with the author's other writings, to which he refers in his notes. The essay is, however, of independent value as a moving statement of a philosopher's reaction to the immense material and spiritual crisis of to-day. It deserves to be widely read.

T. E. Jessop.

The Man versus the State as a Present Issue. The Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1939. By J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A. (London: G. Allen & Unwin. 1939. Pp. 31. Price 1s.)

The Spencerian title of this Spencer Lecture does not introduce an academic reversion to the nineteenth-century theme. Professor Muirhead grows with the youngest of us into the problems of the day, and practical problems have always engaged his special attention. He sees that we have passed beyond the old antithesis of individualism versus State interference, that we now accept the curtailment of individual action as involved in the function of the State, and that the living issue to-day is the question for what end, and therefore with what limitation, the State shall carry out that curtailment. The last few years have witnessed the open confession and practice by Italy and Germany of the policy that the State exists to augment its own power. In consequence, the congruity between political and humanist ethics which the centuries have been working towards has been broken: the free play of the humane spirit within the State, and active co-operation between States in both the pursuit of prosperity and the relief of distress, are by those two countries not being simply neglected, but deliberately, contemptuously, and ruthlessly repudiated.

After this indication of totalitarian doctrine and practice the pamphlet takes up three questions—how all this has come about, whether it expresses the truth about the relation of man to the State (and of States to one another), and what in the present situation is to be done. When a mind at once so mellow and so vigorous as Professor Muirhead's sets itself to work on such questions, the result, even when so short as a lecture, is worth reading—with the grumble that we want more. Anyone familiar with his ideas will know that to the second question he will give the classical answer that though the individual has no existence outside the State, the State is nevertheless man's product and instrument, the institutional environment which *he* moulds for his own moulding; and that on the third question he will contend that the humane spirit can only be repressed, not altogether destroyed, and that the continued propagation of it by philosophers, together with the removal by political action of the external grievances which have contributed to its repression, is the great task of our day. On the first question he observes that tyranny arises when a people loses its faith in ideal values and when, partly because of this and partly as inducing this, its internal order collapses. An analysis of these two factors with special reference to the present situation being impossible within a single lecture, Professor Muirhead has given what space he can to refuting the common supposition that the political crimes

of Germany have their ideal instigation and sanction in the philosophy of Hegel. He shows that the present monstrosities could not be consecrated by a system of thought which conceives the world-process as a movement away from the otherness of spirit to the progressive realization of its pure spirituality, or by a thinker who roundly charged von Haller with confusing the force of right with the right of force; in Hegel's own words, "The power he means is not the power of right, but the power of the vulture to tear in pieces the innocent lamb." "I think it true," remarks Professor Muirhead, "that Hegel more than any other modern philosopher was responsible for the rehabilitation of the idea of the State as an organ of Right in the early decades of last century."

T. E. Jessop.

Hume's Philosophy in his Principal Work, "A Treatise of Human Nature," and in his Essays. By Fr. Vinding Kruse, LL.D., Professor of Law in the University of Copenhagen. Translated by P. T. Federspiel. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 66. Price 6s. net.)

This short book—or rather long pamphlet—attempts to show that there was no important change or development in Hume's philosophical views after he had written the *Treatise* at the age of twenty-five. The author first points out that this thesis is antecedently probable in view of what we know of Hume's character, and then attempts to establish it by a fairly detailed comparison of the *Treatise* and the later works, particularly the *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and the *Inquiry Concerning Morals.* Hume himself confesses that the desire for literary fame was his ruling passion. The *Treatise* was a failure. In his later works, he therefore set himself to re-state his philosophy in a form more agreeable to the popular taste of the day. But according to Professor Vinding, he did not modify his views in the least; he merely omitted those parts of them which were too abstruse for the public to appreciate. So posterity has been right in assuming that the *Treatise* contains the fullest exposition of Hume's philosophy, even though Hume himself repudiated it later; and the most mature exposition at that, even though it was written at the very beginning of his literary career.

Professor Vinding's book is clear and scholarly, though somewhat slight; and in the present reviewer's opinion, his main contention is substantially correct. The translation is excellent.

H. H. Price.

Naturalism. By James Bissett Pratt. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1939. Pp. x +180. Price 2 dollars; 9s. net.)

In these four Mahlon Powell Lectures, Mr. Pratt, a well-known philosophical writer, discourses amiably and ripely upon a "liberal naturalism." The "liberalism" of the doctrine seems to consist largely of the author's readiness to surrender materialism and the narrower forms of scientific positivism and, instead, give generous house-room to mind, and moral character and religion, and other such glories of nature. Its "naturalism" is intended to be a catholic empiricism "the persistent attempt to find out by all the resources of empirical fact and unprejudiced logic the truth about the world we live in" (p. 17).

The discussion takes a wide sweep and (I think) is meant to be suggestive rather than to be *very* closely argued. A lecture on life and evolution succeed-

ing the introductory lecture, is introduced by an assertion of the omnipervasiveness of efficient causality in nature. Hence, the author seems to think, there is hope for an "almost organic" interpretation of nature. This is also declared (p. 58) to be "luminous"—an unguarded statement that reads oddly when one remembers this author's strictures on rationalism, viz. that it is a light-worshipper (What is wanted, apparently, is a gentle glow, not a dry, thin, blinding illumination.) But Mr. Pratt thinks that biology proves immanent purpose. (He does not effectually distinguish between purpose and teleology.)

Next he discusses the mind-body problem and tries to vindicate the efficient causality of mind, correlating this conclusion with the persistence of selves whose purposive action is teleological and indeed primarily volitional. In the last lecture he argues that morality, the art of wise living, is essentially an affair of getting what men care for most, including all their "highest" purposes. This also is natural. Finally, a concordat between religion and naturalism is said to be relatively easy; for immanent purpose paves the way.

I prefer Mr. Pratt when he is more positive and not quite so urbane. But, as always, he is both instructive and pleasant to read.

JOHN LAIRD.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

ON the outbreak of war it became necessary to suspend the Evening Lecture Courses and Meetings that had been arranged for the Session. There followed a short period of uncertainty as to the best arrangements to be made in the circumstances. But early in October it was decided to carry on the Institute's normal work to the extent that war conditions allowed.

It was thought that a valuable piece of national service could be rendered by arranging a special series of Addresses, to be given in the early afternoon, on *The Deeper Causes of the War and the Issues Involved*, to be free to the public. When this series of Addresses was announced it at once evoked great interest from the general public and the national Press. Moreover, the Ministry of Information considered that the series would be very important for enlightenment abroad and asked for permission to make full use of the text of the Addresses—which of course was readily given. The first four Addresses were delivered in the Assembly Hall of the Royal Empire Society, at 2 p.m. on the following dates: Thursdays—November 16th: Professor W. G. S. Adams, C.H., D.C.L. (*Warden of All Souls College, Oxford*). November 30th: Professor Gilbert Murray, D.C.L., F.B.A. (*Formerly Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford*). December 7th: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., Hon.D.C.L. December 14th: The Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt. (*Dean of St. Paul's*). The series of Addresses will be continued after Christmas, when the dates and speakers will be as follows:

Thursday, January 18th: "The Crisis of Civilization." Sir Richard Livingstone, D.Litt., LL.D. (*President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford*).

Thursday, January 25th: "Peace by Federation." Sir William Beveridge, K.C.B., B.C.L., F.B.A. (*Master of University College, Oxford*).

Thursday, February 1st: "Science and Humane Values." Sir Richard Gregory, Bart., F.R.S. (*Formerly Editor of "Nature"*).

Thursday, February 8th: "The Problem of an Order of Europe." Professor Ernest Barker (*Professor of Political Science in the University of Cambridge*).

Members and their friends are cordially invited to attend the meetings after Christmas. Those which have already taken place have had large audiences.

In addition to this series of Addresses, a course of Lectures entitled "Problems of Philosophy and Civilization" was given during the Michaelmas Term by Miss Hilda D. Oakeley, M.A., D.Lit.; and the Director of Studies held a class on "The Contribution made by Greek Philosophy to Human Thought." The Director of Studies hopes to continue this class in the Lent Term.

Information concerning any courses of Lectures that are arranged for the remainder of the Session will be communicated to members in due course.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
These lectures are free to members.
(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
(6) There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

[*Suggested*]

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

The Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

IN MEMORIAM: The Rt. Hon. Lord Tweedsmuir, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.H.

The British Institute of Philosophy has suffered a great loss in the sudden death of its Honorary Treasurer, Lord Tweedsmuir, Governor-General of Canada. We were looking forward to his being with us at home within a few months, but it was not to be. It appears that his health had not been good for some time, but with a fine courage he refused to spare himself and carried on his arduous duties to the limit of his strength until the end.

We have read with pride and admiration of his achievements in a many-sided life. His versatile gifts have found expression in a number of different fields, and they have all contributed to human happiness and well-being. As a great teller of tales, as a historian, and as a writer of biographies of outstanding historical personages, he used his literary gifts to bind more closely together the peoples who speak the English language. As a Member of Parliament for the Scottish Universities he proved himself a constructive and distinguished representative. As Governor-General of Canada, by his deep understanding of the traditions of the Canadian people and his genuine friendship with them, he forged still stronger the link uniting this great Dominion with the homeland.

John Buchan, after having graduated at Glasgow University, proceeded to Brasenose College, Oxford. Here he won the Stanhope Essay Prize in 1897, and the Newdigate in the following year. He took a First in *Literae Humaniores*, and was president of the Union in his last year. Thus (as *The Times* obituary notice said) "to his earlier love of Scotland was added the love of Oxford, and the two influences remained strong in his character for the rest of his life."

Lord Tweedsmuir accepted the office of Honorary Treasurer of the British Institute of Philosophy in 1932. From the first he showed himself genuinely concerned in the work of extending an interest in philosophy to a wider public. Shortly after assuming office he rendered a great service to the Institute, as one of the Trustees of the Pilgrim Trust, by securing a grant from that body to be used in an effort to expand the influence of the Institute's Journal *Philosophy* through an increase in the number of its subscribers. In spite of his exacting duties as Governor-General of Canada during the past five years, he has always been accessible, and in administrative matters generous in advice when it was sought. It may be said of him that he was a lover of men and their ways, and that he spent his powers in ministering to the needs both of their minds and bodies.

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